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1624 H Street, N. W.

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Organized November 9, 1885

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The Chief of Cavalry
extends to the Officers
and Enlisted Men of the
Cavalry, the Season's
Greetings and his best
wishes for the Ensuing
Year

MODERN CAVALRY: A Discussion of Employment, Troop Leading, Organization, and Training*

By G. BRANDT,

Generalleutnant, German Army, Retired; formerly Inspector-General of Cavalry.

Translated from the German by F. W. MERTEN.

(Continued from the September-October, 1934, number)

II. MISSIONS OF ARMY CAVALRY

BECAUSE of the necessity of treating the abundance of available material in so limited a space, it is obvious that the brief historical review just presented has been merely an outline, a sketch that was to bring out how manifold the employment of cavalry has been throughout the ages. Furthermore, this short review was to recall to our minds the feats cavalry has been and still is capable of, provided there are leaders who correctly value the characteristics of the arm, who study its nature and spirit, and who, based upon this realization, use cavalry in battle accordingly.

Though in the course of time there have been changes in the implements of war with which nations fight their bloody battles for existence, the centuries as they have gone by have not been able to alter the missions of cavalry. For every problem that may confront modern cavalry finds in history a counterpart which may serve as an example. It is on this account that the study of military history is of unlimited value to him who may be called upon to command and train mounted troops. From every epoch in history we are, therefore, able to derive some lesson, though it may teach us, if nothing else, what not to do. In our archives there is hidden a vast amount of source material, the evaluation of which no doubt would furnish us invaluable lessons regarding the employment, organization and training of cavalry. It is to be deeply regretted that, to the detriment of our arm, the means available for such purposes do not permit of putting to work in the Government Archives experts charged exclusively with the research of such documents as are of instructive value to the mounted arm. The benefit of such research work would serve not only the cavalry but all other arms as well.

In summarizing the missions with which cavalry may be entrusted, we find that this arm possesses the possibility of being employed in a great many ways. Such missions include—

- Frontier protection;
- Reconnaissance;
- Screening;
- Occupation of areas;
- Employment in battle;
- Flank protection;

- Pursuit;
- Withdrawal;
- General Headquarters reserve;
- Independent operations against the enemy's communications (raids).

FRONTIER PROTECTION

When war threatens a nation, the cavalry is promptly mobilized and will often be called upon to concentrate rapidly along the frontiers with a view to their protection. Maintaining close contact with the local frontier guards, the cavalry must then divide its zone of action into sub-zones and send forward covering detachments or pickets to points where the frontier may readily be crossed. On the other hand, the cavalry leader must, for the time being, withhold the main body of his forces and dispose it in such a manner as to enable him to frustrate by a swift attack any hostile invasion that may be attempted. For this purpose, the local system of signal communications



Generalleutnant Georg Brandt

**Moderne Kavallerie*, published by E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin. American translation rights owned by the United States Cavalry Association.

should be taken advantage of to the fullest extent, and, whenever necessary, it should be improved. Constant communication with all telephone centers near the frontier must be assured by day and by night. Besides, barriers to stop hostile armored cars must be erected. Finally, farther to the rear, positions must be reconnoitered and strengthened with a view to checking the enemy, should he attempt an invasion in force.

On the other hand, it devolves upon the High Command to see to it that, before the operations begin, the cavalry receives timely relief from its employment on the borders, so as to make it available for more important tasks. Frontier protection, as such, is and will always remain merely a secondary mission for the cavalry; this service can readily be performed by other arms, provided an appropriate amount of cavalry and cyclists is attached to them. To leave frontier protection in the hands of cavalry for a protracted period would be justified, only if one's main forces had to advance first in order to create the necessary maneuver space that is required to render a successful employment of army cavalry possible.

To use the mounted arm, however, for the purpose of effecting a break-through by crossing the frontier is inadvisable. Even during these early engagements, the resistance of the enemy often is so great that it may be overcome only by employing all arms, inclusive of strong artillery. There is always the danger that, in the course of this type of fighting, cavalry might suffer such heavy losses as to be rendered incapable of executing satisfactorily the further, more important, missions for which the High Command will need it. The less army cavalry a nation possesses, the greater must be its care not to overburden this arm with secondary tasks; they might lower the marching capacity and fighting power of cavalry before the real operations are under way.

Likewise, little may be gained in the way of reconnaissance by ordering an early advance of cavalry during the periods of mobilization and concentration. Besides, intelligence regarding the enemy's railroad system, his frontiers and adjacent terrain, and his concentration areas is generally quite well known from the start.

RECONNAISSANCE

In paragraph 132 of the German Field Service Regulations, strategic reconnaissance is regarded as "the principal task" of cavalry. It must be considered a moot question whether this holds true, or whether "the principal task" of modern cavalry should rather be sought in co-operation in battle. This statement, however, is not meant to underrate the great importance that attaches to reconnaissance.

Since the World War, the service of reconnaissance in particular has undergone many fundamental changes which must be taken into account when dealing with the various methods of obtaining information in this manner. Formerly, our reconnaissance detachments were instructed to force their way through the screen of hostile reconnaissance and security detachments in order to pene-

trate within close proximity of the enemy's main body, as prescribed in the Field Service Regulations of 1908. In those days, both friend and foe, formed in long columns, ordinarily marched only by day. If fortunate, patrols frequently found an opportunity of observing such a column through their field glasses.

Because of the danger of being attacked from the air, modern troops, if marching in the daytime, must needs proceed in small columns. Furthermore, in order to prevent their being photographed from the air, troops more frequently than ever before will have to march under cover of darkness. For this reason, a picture showing long marching columns will rarely be seen now. Nor do modern troops make use of the principal highways; on the contrary, the various columns are split up and take advantage of all by-roads. Hence, a patrol will not often be in a position to make lateral excursions for the purpose of observing the enemy from the flank. The hostile columns are preceded by security detachments which cannot be penetrated by the patrol. Though drawing fire at all points, the patrol is unable to determine what is going on beyond the hostile screen. The only information to be gained by requiring a reconnaissance detachment to fight consists in finding out whether the enemy will withdraw or consider himself strong enough to accept the challenge. Reconnaissance then will yield mainly information regarding the line which, owing to the hostile resistance, cannot be transgressed by the reconnoitering patrols. No intelligence will, however, be obtained as to the strength of the enemy himself, for the enemy need divulge no more of his forces than is necessary in the defense against the reconnoitering parties. If the reconnaissance detachments, finally, are fortunate enough to determine also the width and depth of the territory occupied by the hostile forces, terrestrial reconnaissance has fully accomplished what in all fairness may be expected of it.

Another factor considerably influencing the service of reconnaissance is the motor. The motor may be installed in a heavy or light armored car, or it may speedily convey infantry and artillery to a central point for the purpose of a reconnaissance in force. That cavalry which disposes of numerous armored cross-country cars will be capable of paralyzing almost completely the service of reconnaissance of an adversary who, like the German cavalry, possesses none of these motor vehicles.

By skillfully taking advantage of the terrain, individual mounted patrols may be able to escape this armored enemy. A large detachment, however, as for instance a reconnaissance detachment of present-day strength and organization, will not be able to do so. On the contrary, shortly after being discovered by the enemy, the detachment must expect to be hunted and attacked by a swarm of these speedy cars; and what is more, as far as the reconnoitering party is concerned, these cars are absolutely invulnerable. The few anti-tank weapons carried by a reconnaissance detachment will not suffice to put up a stand against this enemy. The cavalry will, therefore, be for-

fortunate indeed, if it succeeds in reaching a tactical locality that favors a strong defense. Simultaneously, however, the service of reconnaissance is interrupted for the time being. The enemy will block the detachment and render it incapable of moving. In response to a radio call, infantry in trucks and motorized artillery will rush to the scene, and a fight will ensue which most likely will terminate in favor of the enemy. If at all fortunate, the reconnaissance detachment might find some way of withdrawing from its dangerous position; but, in so doing, the detachment will probably lose all of its vehicles.

It may be contended that the picture has been overdrawn. And yet an alert enemy, disposing of a sufficient number of mobile armored weapons, cannot very well act otherwise, if he knows his business at all. It would, therefore, be fallacious to close one's eyes to this truth; for the bitter disillusioning experience with its heavy losses would not be spared us.

What then are we to do in the face of these bare facts? We possess neither mechanized nor anti-tank weapons. We cannot divide our artillery for defense against armored weapons; moreover our artillery is far too weak and insufficient numerically. Nor will the reconnaissance detachment be able to forestall an engagement as described before by locating a number of observation points that are secure from attack by armored cars, and by advancing by bounds from one of these vantage points to another, and thus seeking safety in passive resistance. There will hardly be any choice, then, but to resort again to the activities of reconnoitering patrols. Patrols carrying light radio equipment on pack animals do not have to maintain the former close contact with the reconnaissance detachment, since their messages may now be conveyed by technical means. Patrols, by skillfully adapting themselves to the features of the terrain, must endeavor to get close to the enemy. As long as we cannot equip our reconnaissance detachments with an adequate number of mobile armor-piercing or anti-tank weapons, our former methods of reconnaissance, in which we relied upon the reconnaissance detachment to sustain the patrols, can no longer be considered effective. On the contrary, following the old tactics is bound to entail the gravest danger. It is quite obvious, therefore, that tests and experiments must be conducted during peacetime maneuvers for the purpose of finding an expedient. At the same time, we must always clearly and fearlessly bear in mind that, in view of our present condition as to armament, our service of reconnaissance is put at a great disadvantage, as compared with that of any nation not so restricted.

Reconnaissance is divided into distant reconnaissance, close reconnaissance and battle reconnaissance. Distant reconnaissance implies the examination of distant objectives for the purpose of obtaining information which is to form the basis for the decisions of the High Command. Close reconnaissance, on the other hand, principally serves tactical purposes. It constitutes the foundation upon which the commander on the ground will employ his troops; therefore, close reconnaissance goes into greater detail.



A Squadron on the March with Aviation Distances

Finally, battle reconnaissance has for its object the observation of tactical measures that the enemy may take during combat.

Due to the increased range of firearms, as well as the greater mobility of motorized troops, the spheres of each of these three methods of reconnaissance have undergone considerable changes in the course of time. Inasmuch as the advance to the attack begins now at greater distances from the enemy than formerly, battle reconnaissance of necessity commences at an earlier stage of the operation, and its range of activity increases proportionately. For the same reason, close reconnaissance will have to extend farther than it did in former days. Though the average rate of march of foot troops and cavalry may be estimated fairly accurately, this calculation is upset by the contingency that other elements might move up in trucks. Hence, some of the missions formerly included in distant reconnaissance form now obviously a part of close reconnaissance.

Paragraph 117 of the German Field Service Regulations, in the case of distant reconnaissance, prescribes the following: "Among other duties, distance reconnaissance is to determine the hostile concentration, supply depots, railroad and highway traffic, location of airports, construction of field and permanent fortifications, direction of the enemy's advance, march objectives attained, and the location of the enemy's flanks and rear echelons. This reconnaissance is performed by the air service and by cavalry." But the Field Service Regulations carefully qualify this requirement by adding: "However, none of these tasks can be performed by any one of these arms alone, as they are limited by their respective capabilities."

Air service and cavalry must supplement each other in the performance of distant reconnaissance. It is impossible for cavalry to penetrate deeply into the enemy situation. On the other hand, the mounted arm is well able to feel out and determine the conditions obtaining along the enemy's front.

Hence, in the future, cavalry units of a strength comprising as much as an entire division or more will not be employed on strictly reconnaissance missions. In view of the fighting power of modern army cavalry, such use

would constitute a mere waste of forces. Instead, army cavalry must be given a definite combat mission. Such a mission may require the cavalry to attack or contain the enemy; or to seize, and firmly defend, a certain area; or to perform some other combat mission. Within the sphere of these operations, cavalry would then, of course, have to conduct its own reconnaissance. From the point of view of the High Command, such reconnaissance may be classed as distant reconnaissance; whereas it represents close reconnaissance as far as the main body of the cavalry is concerned. In reality, we may speak of distant reconnaissance on the part of cavalry, only when certain elements of the army cavalry, without being followed by a large body of troops, are operating far ahead for the purpose of observing an area not included in the zone of advance of their own main body. Reconnaissance, as observed during field exercises or maneuvers on a large scale in peacetime, practically always resolves itself into close reconnaissance and must be considered as such.

At this point the question arises whether to restrict the term of "distant reconnaissance" exclusively to the activities of the air service and to such distant reconnaissance as is carried out by armored cars, while classifying reconnaissance by cavalry as close and battle reconnaissance. In consideration of the increased marching capacity and mobility of motorized troops, it becomes then necessary to increase the scope of close reconnaissance in depth.

Any form of reconnaissance not based upon a definite system will either fail entirely or at best produce results, only if favored by downright luck. As regards the method of distant reconnaissance formerly in vogue, a definite system was obtained by dividing the zone to be reconnoitered into sub-zones. Thus, a commander was held responsible for the reconnaissance of a well-defined area. It was due to this system of procedure that, in general, distant reconnaissance in the past proved quite effective.

The more, however, distant reconnaissance merged into close, and later into battle reconnaissance, the more frequently complaints were raised that the service of reconnaissance was breaking down. This deficiency was the outgrowth of a definite cause: it was attributable to a lack of organization of the reconnaissance service, rather than to a faulty performance on the part of the reconnaissance detachments themselves. In most instances, the old method of dividing the distant reconnaissance zone into sub-zones no longer met the exigencies of close reconnaissance. Moreover, once the system was disrupted, connection between the various reconnoitering elements rarely could be reestablished by resorting to individual patrols from the rear for the purpose of lending assistance. It is quite natural that centralized control over the several reconnaissance detachments should thus have been lost. As a result the transmission of messages from front to rear proved unsatisfactory.

As soon as the activities pertaining to distant reconnaissance fail to do justice to the changes in the situation, it will be necessary to make other arrangements for the purpose of obtaining the desired reconnaissance results.

It is of vital importance that the reconnaissance missions in the various areas be entrusted to responsible leaders who are answerable directly to their common superior for the reconnaissance of their respective zones. It will be the task of peace training to school these commanders in such a way that it may be safely left to their discretion how to execute each reconnaissance mission that may devolve upon them.

The distinction drawn between the different types of reconnaissance gains still more in importance when close reconnaissance passes into battle reconnaissance. In order to obtain results from battle reconnaissance, it will be necessary for the cavalry to engage in combat. A prerequisite, however, for maintaining centralized control over such an engagement is a tried organization. Therefore, battle reconnaissance is best conducted with the aid of full-sized squadrons.* Under certain conditions, these squadrons should be reinforced by heavy weapons; they must, moreover, be given definite objectives and zones wherein to fight the reconnaissance battle.

In view of the manifold demands made upon the service of reconnaissance, it is obvious that considerable forces are necessary to satisfy them. Economy of force, therefore, is imperative in all reconnaissance work. While the situation is gradually progressing and the troops finally engage in combat, the reconnaissance detachments are continually facing new problems, which can be met, only if the several reconnaissance units are employed sparingly. If too large a force is squandered on reconnaissance work, the main body will be too weak to achieve the victory in the ensuing engagement. For, after all, the decision of this encounter constitutes the most important factor and the *raison d'être* of reconnaissance itself.

In summing up this discussion on reconnaissance, we arrive then at the following:

Distant reconnaissance is chiefly a mission of the air service. Yet, in special situations, distant reconnaissance may be supplemented by sending forward armored cars and detachments of the army cavalry.

For the purpose of carrying out distant reconnaissance missions alone, large bodies of cavalry must, however, not be employed. Keeping within the proper limits of the operation as a whole, cavalry should be given tasks involving such close reconnaissance as is required for its own needs. At the same time, the zone of action obviously must be extended in depth proportionate to the mobility of cavalry. From the point of view of the High Command, the results thus obtained by close reconnaissance may be considered to have been secured by distant reconnaissance.

The methods formerly followed by reconnaissance detachments no longer meet the exigencies of modern warfare against an enemy disposing of a large number of armored cars.

All reconnaissance must be based upon an unyielding

*The squadron (Eskadron) is the lowest tactical and administrative unit in the German cavalry regiment. Each regiment consists of four squadrons (six officers and approximately 200 men per squadron). Each squadron is composed of one squadron headquarters and four platoons. Tr.

system; this applies particularly to battle reconnaissance, where central control in combat is essential. Besides, economy of force as applied to reconnaissance is of vital importance.

Finally, mention should be made of a certain form of reconnaissance which, however, is feasible only in friendly territory: namely, telephonic reconnaissance. At the beginning of the World War, this type of reconnaissance worked splendidly during the operations in East Prussia. The enemy's advance may quickly and accurately be determined by calling up the various telephone stations and inquiring whether any indications of the enemy have been observed in those parts.

Permanent connection will have to be maintained with these telephone stations. The latter must, moreover, be instructed to render reports at stated intervals to a designated telephone center.

On the other hand, this method proves that it will be absolutely necessary to interfere with this means of communication whenever the troops are operating in hostile territory; to this end, patrols must, therefore, systematically cut and render unserviceable all telephone lines within their path.

SCREENING

Screening is accomplished most effectively by sending army cavalry far in advance of the object to be concealed with the mission of attacking and repulsing the enemy's cavalry. Frequently, however, this method cannot be applied, partly because of inadequate strength, partly in view of the fact that other tasks may be awaiting the cavalry. In this case it would be inadvisable, of course, to send the cavalry too far ahead of the main body. On the other hand, even if it should become necessary to revert to defensive screening, local attacks ought to be staged in connection therewith. This will tend to deceive the enemy, retard his progress and keep him at a distance.

Whether, in screening, the forces should be extended laterally immediately after the advance is taken up, or remain concentrated for the time being, is a question which has to be decided according to the circumstances in each individual situation. A lateral extension of the screening elements from the very beginning of the advance precludes all offensive action, for it will prove difficult to concentrate the dispersed forces for combat. Therefore, if one feels that one matches the enemy in strength, offensive screening is to be preferred; the latter will not only lead to a decision, but will, moreover, enable one's forces to retain the initiative. This presupposes, however, that one keep the troops well in hand.

A defensive screen is best established by taking up positions in areas that can readily be defended and can be crossed only at isolated points. The richer an area is in defensive localities, the less forces are needed for its defense. Energetic reconnaissance in front of the screen is of vital importance. Then, too, the heavy weapons and the artillery will have to be assigned to positions in such a manner that they may take the enemy under fire at a

considerable distance.

If the nature of the terrain is such as to permit of a prolonged defense, it is advisable from the very beginning to move up strong forces to the forward positions in order to forestall any hostile attempt at a penetration. Yet this does not entirely eliminate the necessity of holding reserves in readiness to support the front lines. On the other hand, if the terrain does not lend itself readily to defensive action, the screening forces must be disposed in greater depth. In this case, strong reserves must be held out; the action must be fought on the principle of the elastic defense; and, should the enemy succeed nevertheless in penetrating one's screen, he must be driven out by means of a counter-attack. A reliable and effective system of communication is of utmost importance in making use of these tactics.

On the whole, the success of all screening operations depends largely on one point: namely, to conceal from the enemy the fact that he is confronted by a mere screen. Therefore, any form of deception is in order: such as lively reconnaissance activities, short local thrusts and the defense of important tactical localities. All this may tend to simulate aggressive intentions, while a broad line of defense and an extensive use of artillery and heavy weapons will lead the enemy to assume that a strong defense is being contemplated.

For the purpose of screening, army cavalry will be employed to good advantage in closing gaps that may exist between the various armies; or again, army cavalry may be sent into zones where no offensive action is planned and, at the same time, the enemy is not likely to attack. In the Battle of the Argasul River, which took place during the latter part of November, 1916, Schmettow's cavalry corps was successfully employed as a screening force when it was required to fill the gap that existed between the two armies of Kosch and Falkenhayn. The operations of this cavalry contributed materially towards bringing about a victory.

OCCUPATION OF AREAS

Thanks to its great mobility, army cavalry is able unexpectedly to make its appearance in such areas as at the time are merely weakly held by hostile forces or not at all. Owing to its increased fighting power, this cavalry, moreover, will be strong enough to hold its own against the attack of a hostile superior force, even though it might have to rely upon its own resources.

This sudden appearance of cavalry in regions as yet unaffected by the operations may serve a number of purposes. Finding himself cut off from the sources of supply that are located in the occupied districts, the enemy will be forced to resort to counter-measures. To this end, he will need troops which he must withdraw from other theatres of operations. Thus, the enemy will be compelled to weaken his front at points which for the time being are of greater importance to one's own forces.

Then again, the occupation may be effected in order to anticipate a similar action on the part of the enemy, as

well as for the purpose of creating a base that will favor the development of future operations. It then becomes the duty of the cavalry stubbornly to defend the area it has so easily gained until the High Command has successfully accomplished the object for which the invasion on the part of the cavalry constituted the prerequisite. It may be a case of seizing a favorable area wherein to concentrate the forces for a new operation, and of covering and screening such a concentration against hostile interference. The operation of Schmettow's cavalry corps in Rumania during the World War represents an example of such an employment of cavalry. After the Battle of Targu-Jiu, this corps pushed on by way of Carracal across the Aluta, where it secured and defended the river crossing until, several days later, three infantry divisions were brought up and moved across the bridge.

For an employment of this kind, cavalry as a rule will be required closely to concentrate its forces; for, as soon as the enemy has recovered from his surprise, he will in all probability launch a vigorous counter-attack with a view to expelling the cavalry from this area, so important to him for future operations. In order to receive timely warning of this counter-attack, far-reaching reconnaissance operations will be in order. Inasmuch as an encounter must eventually be expected in such circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will be successful only if carried out by strong, powerful cavalry elements. Although a minor force might succeed in temporarily interfering with the advance of the enemy, yet it will not be able to maintain itself in the occupied area for any length of time.

EMPLOYMENT IN BATTLE

Coöperation in battle—that is to say, active intervention wherever the issue of a campaign is to be decided—must always be considered as the principal mission of cavalry. Army cavalry, organized, equipped and trained according to modern standards, today is far better qualified to perform this task than it was during the World War.

In battle, army cavalry is most suitably and most effectively employed against an exposed hostile flank. On the other hand, there is hardly ever sufficient army cavalry available to enable it simultaneously to attack both hostile flanks. In view of the fact that an exposed flank will always be supported by several echelons of reserves, strong and determined opposition must be expected. For this reason, it is usually a mistake to divide up the army cavalry in order to take care of both flanks of the enemy for nothing will ever be gained by such a division of forces. On the contrary, in preparation for the battle, all available army cavalry, supported if possible by such divisional cavalry as may temporarily be dispensed with along the front, must be concentrated under one command.

An enveloping attack against the hostile flank will be most effective, if the cavalry is in a position to develop for action at some far-distant point and advance against the selected flank from a favorable direction.

An operation staged against the hostile flank and rear

even prior to the battle may serve various purposes. For instance, besides interfering with the disposition of the enemy forces for the battle, it will screen the assembly of one's own main forces or any major enveloping movement that might be under way and, moreover, attract hostile elements which thus will be eliminated from the battle proper. During the battle, the cavalry will in this manner constitute a constant menace to the enemy's flank. Then, too, the cavalry will be in a position in good season to recognize and forestall, or at least interfere with, any enveloping maneuver the enemy might undertake. Thus employed, the cavalry's success depends solely on its faculty of surprising the enemy. Suddenly appearing at some unexpected place, the cavalry must compel the enemy to alter his dispositions at a time which obviously is most inopportune for him. This, however, will be accomplished only by committing to action cavalry forces of such strength as will be able actually to compel the enemy to adopt measures contrary to his original plans. A smaller cavalry force with no striking power will not succeed either in deceiving, or interfering with, the enemy.

If, however, it becomes necessary to move the cavalry first of all past one's own flank, the surprise effect is usually nil. The enemy, on the other hand, will gain sufficient time for adopting counter-measures; and so, instead of the contemplated envelopment, a mere lengthening of one's own flank will be the outcome.

Owing to the large size of armies in present-day warfare and the increased range of firearms, the distances involved in enveloping movements are far greater now than in former days. Moreover, troop movements behind the front must be concealed from observation by enemy airplanes. It is for this reason that columns must be divided up or march under cover of darkness. All these factors will tend to interfere greatly with an attack against a flank. The enemy, on the other hand, may be able quickly to shift fresh troops to the endangered flank by means of motor trucks. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, the most favorable position of cavalry in battle will always be on the flank, where it can take full advantage of its mobility. Besides, from that location cavalry will best be able to take up the pursuit after the battle, or cover the withdrawal, in case one's own forces should meet with a reverse.

The attack against a flank of the enemy during a major battle requires a substantial cavalry force. For there are a number of other missions connected with the attack, all of which tend to reduce the strength of the mounted troops. First of all, reconnaissance parties will have to be sent out, not only in the direction of the objective, but also to any other point whence hostile reinforcements are likely to approach. Furthermore, provision must be made for security detachments to cover one's own exposed flank. To the greater part of the cavalry, however, will generally fall the task of preventing reinforcements from strengthening the enemy's flank. Consequently, the necessary troops for the actual envelopment and the deep

thrust into the enemy's exposed flank incident thereto will be available, only if there is an adequate force on hand from the start, before operations are under way. Hence, one solitary cavalry division cannot very well be expected to be especially successful as an enveloping force during a major offensive. On the contrary, a decisive victory will require the employment of at least one cavalry corps. If, in addition, the cavalry is closely followed by infantry, the latter will be able to take the place of those mounted elements whose progress has come to a standstill, with a view to continuing the enveloping maneuver.

Should the hostile front have no exposed flank or there be danger that the envelopment might come too late, one must not hesitate to use the cavalry also frontally. In a frontal attack, however, cavalry cannot do full justice to its principal characteristic, i.e. mobility, which is quite obvious. Yet the mounted arm will be of greater service in this way than it would be, were it to stand idly by merely watching the great event unfold itself before its eyes. Still, the decision to employ cavalry in frontal attack should be made only as a last resort in an extreme emergency.

By assigning to army cavalry a place in the front line, other elements will be made available for employment on that part of the front where the main effort is to be made. At the same time, the High Command must always keep in mind that in such circumstances the cavalry ceases to be cavalry, and that it acts exactly like infantry. Moreover, considerable time is lost before the cavalry, which for dismounted action will have to send its horses far to the rear, will have regained its mobility after a decision has been reached. It stands to reason, then, that timely measures will have to be initiated in order to make sure that the cavalry will be able to participate in the pursuit.

If, for the time being, the situation permits of no suitable employment of the cavalry, it should be held in reserve. This would imply that the cavalry must be placed far enough to the rear to be immune from the effect of the enemy's fire, so that the animals may be fed and watered and, if possible, also unsaddled; thus the mounted troops will conserve their strength for future missions. To place cavalry in the battle line, simply because the situation at the moment offers no suitable opportunity for mounted action, is and will always remain a mistake that is bound to prove costly, regardless of whether the battle is won or lost. For, if this is done, the cavalry will be found wanting after the battle, just at the time when it is most urgently needed.


During the World War, there was only one instance—in September, 1918, in Palestine—where cavalry participated in battle with a view to destroying the enemy. This was due, however, to the fact that in the course of this protracted war only a few battles were fought that involved a systematic employment of sufficiently large cavalry forces. In the Battle of Tannenberg, as well as in the Winter Battle in Masuria, only one cavalry division was present. As compared with the large masses that

will concentrate on the battlefield of the future and whose destruction must be one's aim, the strength of one small cavalry division is far too inadequate to be able to achieve outstanding results.

FLANK PROTECTION

In flank protection, we differentiate between protection against a local envelopment on the part of reserves and other rear elements which the enemy may bring up on his immediate flank on the one hand, and protection against a far-reaching strategic envelopment on the other.

In the former case, the cavalry will best solve its task by forming in echelon; then, as the enemy is about to embark on his enveloping operation, the cavalry, on its part, must attack him in flank and defeat him, or at least cut off his retreat. It is for this reason that, whenever an exposed flank is to be protected, it is best to form the cavalry in echelon and in advance of the general line from the very beginning. Inasmuch as the enemy will conceal his movements or march only at night, it will be difficult to recognize the hostile enveloping maneuver in good season. If, therefore, the cavalry is not already in position on the flank of the enemy, its attack might easily come so late that it is apt to strike the prolonged front of the enemy rather than his flank. Consequently,



ABOVE: A Heavy Machine Gun
BELOW: Heavy Machine Gun Going into Position

thorough and detailed reconnaissance is required in order to insure that the proper moment for the cavalry's intervention is clearly recognized.

In a like manner, any strategic enveloping operation that the enemy may undertake must be identified at an early stage. Frequently, such a menace to one's strategic flank will develop from the general situation. If this contingency has to be reckoned with, constant aerial surveillance of the enemy's movements is necessary. Indeed, at times it is this aerial reconnaissance which will furnish the High Command the basis for the employment of the army cavalry.

The farther the cavalry advances in its endeavor to intercept the hostile reinforcements, the farther from one's own flank, which the cavalry is supposed to cover, the first encounter with the enemy will take place. Hence, the greater the distance between the battlefield proper and the place where the hostile enveloping force is checked or at least detained, the longer one will be able to avert the danger of being actually enveloped.

From this it follows that, in a situation of this kind, the cavalry must move out to meet the enemy and endeavor early to interfere with his advance. To this end, extensive and timely reconnaissance is required for the purpose of determining the direction and zone of the hostile advance.

Whether the cavalry must solve this problem by means of offensive or defensive tactics depends entirely upon the comparative strength of the two adversaries. Yet, even though the cavalry might be considerably weaker than the hostile reinforcements, it had better attack at least the advance guards regardless of the circumstances, if for no other purpose than to check their progress. Then, if later the hostile preponderance in numbers proves to be too great to favor a continuation of the attack, one may, according to the situation, either fight a delaying action or pass to a protracted defensive. It is, therefore, highly important to attach to the cavalry a substantial artillery force that should also include long-range guns. Artillery, thus equipped, will be in a position, at an early stage, to compel the hostile columns to leave the roads and develop for action, which, in turn, will interfere with the hostile advance at a considerable distance from the battlefield.

Inasmuch as both opponents are advancing straight toward each other, the ensuing combat will as a rule resolve itself into frontal action. It goes without saying that only a very strong cavalry force will be capable of pinning down the enemy in front while charging him from a flank with the main body. In connection with an operation of this kind, it may be pointed out that road obstructions and demolitions will cause the enemy considerable difficulties. The cavalry, therefore, should make ample use of such expedients. A liberal assignment of demolition squads will prove of valuable assistance.

PURSUIT

With respect to this activity of the cavalry, we must differentiate between several forms of pursuit: namely,

frontal pursuit, parallel pursuit, strategic pursuit, and lastly, that type which develops from a contingency where cavalry is employed after a break-through has been effected in the hostile front. The difference between a parallel and strategic pursuit is explained by the fact that, in the latter case, the cavalry, by advancing somewhat obliquely to the enemy's line of retreat, seeks to strike him in flank and rear.

As the battle nears its culmination, the High Command must take care that the cavalry is promptly led to a point of vantage from which it will be prepared to take up the pursuit in due time. Ordinarily, this will be practicable only if the cavalry has been held in reserve. Actual conditions, however, will compel the cavalry, as a rule, to launch the pursuit from wherever it may happen to be engaged. Yet these points will not always coincide with those that are most desirable for the purpose.

No matter what the pursuit may be, the cavalry will always require the support of a strong artillery detachment. Thus the pursuing forces will be able to effect a deep penetration into the hostile retrograde movement and besides take under fire in good season any defiles through which the enemy may have to pass. Then, too, once the enemy has decided to withdraw, he will of necessity assign to his rear guards ample artillery; speedy action against these batteries is, therefore, highly essential. Not artillery alone, however, but engineer troops as well will have to reinforce the cavalry. In order to effect a successful retreat, the enemy will demolish roads and erect barricade. These obstructions must be eliminated in order to keep the pursuit at its full vigor. On the other hand, in a parallel pursuit or, still more frequently, in strategic pursuit, the engineers will be called upon to effect demolitions and put up road obstructions. Inasmuch as all armies with their numerous vehicles and motor transportation are nowadays vitally dependent on good roads, demolition has gained in importance excelling all former experience. But only such engineer units as possess a degree of mobility conformable to the rate of speed of mounted troops will be suitable to assist the army cavalry in a pursuit.

A frontal pursuit generally promises very little, unless the morale of the defeated enemy has suffered so much that his troops are no longer willing to defend themselves. If, on the other hand, the enemy is still in a fighting mood, a frontal pursuit will soon come to grief before the resistance of the rear guards. Since it will prove difficult, however, in a broad zone for the enemy to maintain a general alignment of the several rear guards, there will often present itself an opportunity to attack the flank of one or another rear guard that may have postponed its withdrawal too long, and thus separate it from its main body. In this manner, an opening will be created which, in certain circumstances, may be exploited with prospects for a decisive success.

Of course, if the retrograde movement has turned into a headlong flight, frontal pursuit, too, has a chance of

being highly successful. In such instances, even the mounted charge regains the important rôle it played in former days. Owing to its overwhelming moral effect, the cavalry charge is capable of breaking down the last remnants of hostile resistance and of throwing the enemy into utter confusion. Indeed, at times a mere handful of horsemen will suffice to cause large enemy detachments to surrender. The history of the World War is replete with numerous examples to support this statement.

Then again, openings may be effected in the hostile retrograde movement, should the enemy columns choose to retreat in different directions. Several cases of this kind occurred during August and September in 1914, when, for instance, the armies of de Langle and d'Esperey became separated, and again in the Battle of the Marne, where a gap developed between the French Fourth and Ninth Armies. Yet it is difficult to discover such openings in time. As cavalry alone cannot recognize them, it requires the assistance of aerial reconnaissance. Once the gap has been discovered, the cavalry should venture into it with bold determination; this, however, will often presuppose a complete abandonment of all communication with one's own forces.

In a parallel pursuit, the cavalry must endeavor to get in front of the retreating enemy by moving over side roads, to attack him in flank, to oppose him in the most favorable tactical localities, and to force him off the road on which he is withdrawing. In view of the fact that the enemy will protect himself against parallel pursuit by means of flanking detachments, the cavalry commander will have to decide in each case whether to extend his envelopment maneuver still farther, or whether his mission may be accomplished sooner by attacking these flanking elements. Extensive marches with a view to encircling the hostile forces require time, which is precisely what the enemy is trying to gain during a retreat.

If, at the beginning of the pursuit, the cavalry is in echelon formation in advance of its own army, its chance of striking the enemy's flank are better than they would be, in case it had to be moved up first from the rear. Therefore, foresight in this respect on the part of the High Command will contribute materially to the success of a parallel pursuit.

In conducting a parallel pursuit, it will be advisable to advance in several columns, with the bulk of the forces marching on the outer wing. Thus the foundation for an ever encircling movement will be laid which will eventually culminate in an engagement with the enemy. The columns marching as the inner wing must be supported by artillery, so they can compel the enemy to give battle and, in turn, enable the columns on the outer flank to take part in the encounter. But the latter troops, too, will require some artillery; for it must be remembered in this connection that artillery fire, coming from either flank or rear, will have a vast moral effect on a fleeing enemy.

A pursuit of necessity includes far-reaching reconnaissance, to be conducted against the enemy's flank as well

as in those directions whence hostile security detachments are apt to make their appearance. In the performance of this task, the air service will be of vital assistance to the cavalry.

Most promising, however, is that method of pursuit which permits strong elements of army cavalry to advance from one extremity of the battle line and strike the withdrawing enemy in flank and rear. Such favorable situations, naturally, are rare and present themselves only to cavalry which has taken no active part in the battle itself.

In this form of pursuit, the cavalry advances in the same manner as it does in any other forward movement against the enemy. Reconnoitering parties will have to operate not only in the direction of the enemy, but also on one's own flanks. Security detachments for the protection of the outer wing must, likewise, be sent out. If the cavalry is separated by a considerable distance from the flank of one's own main forces, such flank protection, though proportionately weaker, becomes necessary also for the inner wing.

To determine the place, however, where the pursuing forces are to strike the enemy, is a matter requiring particular consideration on the part of the cavalry commander. Reconnaissance and the situation of both friend and foe must furnish the basis for his decision. Terrain conditions are, likewise, of the utmost importance; for the decision—whether to attack at this or that point, or whether more might be gained by outmarching the enemy—often depends on the conformation of the terrain.

If the cavalry succeeds in reaching and occupying a strong tactical locality in advance of the retreating hostile columns, such a feat might lead to the destruction of the enemy. Yet enterprises of this kind can be undertaken only by a strong cavalry force, inasmuch as the protection of its own rear requires the presence of substantial numbers.

And so we are brought to realize once more that a major success can be expected only if the cavalry is employed in large masses. As has been stated before, any mission devolving upon cavalry implies certain secondary tasks, such as reconnaissance, security and flank protection. The greater independence cavalry possesses in a given area, the larger will be the zone it has to reconnoiter and cover. A small cavalry force, on the other hand, will dissipate all its strength in the execution of these essential but subsidiary duties. Regardless of how sparingly a commander may assign troops to these secondary missions, the striking power of his force is bound to disintegrate. Naturally, it will then be too weak for the combat which, in the end, must follow if the principal mission is to be carried out. And so, despite the greatest effort and determination on the part of the pursuing forces, they will not be successful. Yet the fact that the available forces were out of proportion to the magnitude of the task in hand will usually not be given any weight.

Finally, we arrive at the case in which a break-through

may be followed up by a pursuit. Once the High Command has decided to bring the operation to a head by effecting a break-through, the cavalry must take up in good season a position in readiness in rear of the zone where the break-through is to occur. To this end, the cavalry commander should be given timely instructions regarding his mission; for he will have to make considerable preparations.

The assembly positions of the cavalry should be concealed, since the success of an operation of this kind depends materially on the first surprise effect. Moreover, the troops must be formed in such a manner that they may be in a position to launch the attack upon short notice. With regard to crossing one's own lines, arrangements will have to be made insuring a temporary clearance of the roads involved by all other troops; if necessary, orders to this effect must issue from Army Headquarters. The cavalry commander, himself, will have to submit his recommendations in time to receive due consideration. Lastly, the terrain and roads over which the advance is to pass must be reconnoitered constantly; in addition, it might prove necessary to repair the roads. In short, it is the duty of the cavalry leader carefully to arrange all details, so that the forward movement may be effected promptly, without friction or loss of time.

Closest liaison should be maintained with the combat divisions as well as with the headquarters of the High Command. The cavalry leader must, furthermore, possess a clear picture of the situation, for the time of departure for his forward movement ought to be left to his discretion. It is quite evident that a superior commander, from his headquarters still farther to the rear, cannot possibly give this order. On the contrary, this zero hour can be determined only by someone who in person is able to follow the course of the battle at the point where the break-through is being effected, rather than by him who must rely on messages from other command posts. Under no condition should the cavalry commander wait for the order to move forward, for, by so doing, he is apt to miss the opportune moment. The success of the cavalry stands or falls with the determination and sound judgment of its leader, as well as with his perspicacity for selecting the right moment.

The cavalry will never find the break-through zone entirely cleared of the enemy and, therefore, should attend to this matter first. Immediately after passing through the positions of its own infantry, the cavalry must throw out a dense combat reconnaissance screen of sufficient strength for aggressive action, to be closely followed by small detachments including heavy weapons. As soon as it becomes practicable to go beyond the combat reconnaissance zone, advantage should be taken of this opportunity to send out patrols on special missions. Yet to have reconnaissance detachments push forward under such circumstances would be useless, for battle reconnaissance progresses with equal speed. Besides, such action might only too easily cause the other elements to

retard their advance in order to enable the reconnaissance detachment to remain in front. It must always be borne in mind that in this case the object in question is primarily one of fighting rather than of reconnaissance. It is, therefore, of vital importance from the very start to make the troops assigned to battle reconnaissance strong enough, so that they can advance with due energy.

To set down definite figures governing the width and depth of a force in any tactical operation has always been a matter including both advantages and disadvantages. Small minds will cling to such firm rules and are happy and contented once more to have discovered a panacea that will eliminate any mental effort on their part. These men forget, however, that the situation and terrain features must be taken into consideration in order to pass upon the merits of each individual case. The words which Frederick the Great in this connection impressed upon his officers hold true to this very day: "There will be as many different battles as there are different terrains. It is impossible to state in advance what course any battle will take. For this reason, I attach myself merely to the general rules which I wish to impress upon you. In many instances, it is the *habileté* and *présence d'esprit* that count." In determining the width of a zone which, for purposes of battle reconnaissance, should be assigned to a squadron, one may start from the assumption that, owing to the large number of machine guns carried by a squadron, a front of some 2,000 yards in width will not be too large. Yet it must be remembered that this sort of action is not to constitute an engagement wherein the troops are formed in a long, dense line without depth; on the contrary, the troops are to fight in groups widely separated from each other. The enemy's resistance will have to be overcome by penetrating into the gaps that exist within the hostile line of defense. As soon as the troops engaged in battle reconnaissance encounter a solid, broad line of resistance, it devolves upon the stronger detachments that are following in rear to go into action.

Following the detachments charged with the immediate support of the battle reconnaissance force, marches the main body of the army cavalry. The latter is divided into several columns and marches in depth formation; moreover, it is held back sufficiently far from the reconnaissance force to retain perfect liberty of movement. The cavalry commander must always be in a position to concentrate his main forces for a vigorous attack at a given point, as soon as the hostile resistance stiffens. In order to recognize this, however, the cavalry leader in person must always ride far in advance of his main body. He should be accompanied by the artillery commander, who will have to keep most of his batteries within easy reach, so as to enable him promptly to put down a concentration on any point where serious hostile resistance may be encountered.

In theory, the cavalry must relentlessly exploit the break-through and follow the enemy in that direction which, in the opinion of the commander, promises the greatest success. In practice, however, the situation usu-

ally takes a different course. The exposed flanks require protection; moreover, every step forward increases the semicircle wherein reconnaissance and security missions will have to be carried out. Both activities consume forces; these then will have to come from the main body which is moving forward to the attack. Whereas the strength of the pursued will increase once the reserves have moved up, the strength of the pursuer is bound to diminish, unless he is reinforced by fresh elements and the security of his flanks is entrusted to other troops. One solitary cavalry division, however, will not be able to accomplish anything worth while beyond the subsidiary tasks, and its advance will soon be checked. It will, therefore, be necessary to employ at least one cavalry corps whenever, in a major offensive, a break-through is to be followed up by a pursuit. Moreover, the gap, created by the break-through battle, must be wide enough not to compel the cavalry from the very beginning of its forward movement to turn against the flanks of the hesitating enemy.

When, in 1920, the Russian cavalry under Budienny succeeded in breaking through the Polish lines south of Kiev, it was without a final objective which it should have endeavored to reach. This goal, though far in rear of the enemy's front lines, should have been set by the High Command. Irrespective of the hostile elements still holding on to their positions, the cavalry, in this case, should have pushed on into the territory of the enemy, in order to upset the latter's plan of operation. Then, too, the cavalry might have been given the mission of turning against the enemy's rear. However, it must not be left to the discretion of the cavalry commander which of the two tasks to choose, after the break-through has been effected.

A pursuit carried straight through, and far into, the enemy's territory is to prevent the adversary from organizing a new system of defense. By advancing at a rapid pace one will force the enemy to move his detrain- ing points farther and farther to the rear; the effect will be that the hostile reinforcements can go into action only piecemeal and that they will be unable to put up a uniform resistance. To this end, the cavalry must attack with inflexible determination, even at the risk of encountering reverses. Hostile reinforcements brought up by truck usually include only a small amount of artillery; nor is the latter very mobile, since the horses must be left behind. Any delay in the attack on the part of the cavalry will, therefore, benefit the enemy, because he will thus find time to organize his defense and bring up additional reserves. It will consequently be necessary to take under artillery fire all roads and localities that may be of importance for the forward movement of reinforcements, even at long range if need be.

Finally, special emphasis should be laid on the highly important rôle played by armored cars and the air service, in conjunction with cavalry, in all missions of pursuit. The air service ought to furnish observation planes as well

as attack planes. In pursuit, cavalry cannot afford to be without these weapons.

How greatly the French, in 1918, feared the appearance of German cavalry at those parts of the front where the Germans had broken through, and how highly the effect of such cavalry actions was estimated, is brought out in a report submitted by Representative Belcastel of the French Chamber of Deputies in 1923, on the occasion of the enactment of a law having for its object the reorganization of the cavalry. This report, among other things, contains the following: "Finally, on March 21, the British front is shattered. The German infantry advances without encountering any resistance whatever. Not before March 26 are the Allied armies able to re-establish the front by means of a thin line of squadrons and battalions that are hastily rushed up. Do the German forces include cavalry? This fateful question occupies



Light Machine Gun Being Unpacked and Set Up for Antiaircraft Defense

the minds of both officers and men. Indeed, the country lies wide open to any enterprise this cavalry might choose to undertake; an advance of only 25 kilometers would carry the enemy as far as the region south of Amiens, and through Montdidier to the vicinity of St. Just, where our troops are detaining. Again, on May 27, a wide breach is made in our lines on the Chemin des Dames; and only with difficulty is it concealed from the enemy by our cavalry divisions on May 29 and 30. The German cavalry can reach the Marne before the arrival of our infantry reserves; but again the enemy fails to take advantage of the opportunity which, moreover, is to be his last. For this we may be truly thankful. Above all, however, we must today draw from these experiences the valuable lesson which they hold. This lesson presents itself to us in the form of a negative demonstration, in that it teaches the 'inability to win' if any army fails to make use of cavalry for the exploitation of its gains."

This conception of Representative Belcastel being shared in many foreign quarters, two other French opinions will be cited here: "Fortunately, just at the moment when our fear regarding the appearance of hostile cavalry was at its height (March 18), it proved unwarranted. Whereas the French High Command had reorganized and modernized its cavalry, the Germans seemed to have completely forgotten to attend to theirs"; and: "If Ludendorff, in March, 1918, had disposed of a cavalry equal in valor to that of the French, and employed this cavalry in the zone where the break-through in the direction of Amiens was effected, Germany most likely would have been victorious. At any rate, it may be said that the Allies would have been unable to bring the war to a successful conclusion during 1918." General Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief, has expressed himself in a similar vein. Yet during all this time, the German cavalry divisions were fighting in the trenches, while their horses were used in drawing guns and caissons.

In case the pursuit is checked in front of a river line, the subsequent course of the operation will be greatly facilitated, if the cavalry succeeds in establishing a bridgehead and in defending it until the infantry can come up.

In pursuit, the utmost that man and mount can give must be exacted, while an inflexible determination must dominate the commander. No major pursuit has yet succeeded without the iron will of the leader directing it; his eyes should, therefore, be fixed solely on his principal mission: namely, to destroy the enemy and spare his own main forces the trials of another battle. He must close his ears to complaints coming from the troops and, in such circumstances, must demand of his men to give every ounce of strength that they possess. "What does it matter," so exclaimed Blücher during the pursuit after the Battle of Katzbach, "if the country does lose several hundred horses, so long as it is spared another battle?" On his pursuit of the defeated Darius, Alexander the Great, after eleven days of constant marching, reached his goal with only 60 horsemen left out of his original 6,000.

WITHDRAWAL

The covering of a withdrawal has always been one of the problems of cavalry. Being able to march more rapidly than other arms, it can again and again free itself from contact with the enemy.

The place where cavalry is to be employed as the covering force of a retrograde movement ordinarily is dictated by the general situation. Primarily, the cavalry will cover the withdrawal in that zone where it was committed to action. The High Command will scarcely resort to a withdrawal before having made every effort to achieve victory; to this end, all reserves, inclusive of the army cavalry, must be assumed to have taken part in the battle.

The tactics to be employed during a retirement depend upon the morale and strength of one's own forces and of the adjoining troops, the terrain, and the fighting methods of the enemy. Delaying action will, therefore, alternate with stubborn defense whenever suitable tactical localities are at hand. At the same time it will be necessary to take advantage of, and exploit fully, every opportunity for the purpose of launching local counter-attacks. Experience has taught us how great a moral effect a sudden assault will have upon the pursuer, and also how quickly any success, however small, will revive the courage and self-confidence of the pursued. Hence, during a withdrawal, every commander, from the highest to the lowest, must continually strive to create opportunities for local attacks. In the execution of such counter-attacks, armored cars will furnish valuable support to the cavalry.

Demolitions and road barricades play an important rôle in a withdrawal. With regard to our* neighbors, we must also reckon with the contamination of wide areas by gas. For the purpose of covering a retreat, whoever has chemical troops will attach such units to the cavalry, in addition to engineer elements and a substantial artillery force.

As long as the retrograde movement of the main body proceeds in a fairly orderly fashion, the rear guards in the center will generally be able to repulse the frontal attacks of the pursuer. Far greater is the danger, however, on the flanks of the retreating force. The enemy will endeavor to attack the columns constituting the wings in flank or to cut off their retreat by means of artillery concentrations, in order to force these troops towards the adjoining columns and thus cause delay. A pursued force, therefore, must always make provision for flank protection.

Unless special circumstances require the cavalry's presence at some other point, the mounted elements in a retreat must invariably be placed on a wing as flank protection; from this position, they should then try, if practicable, to solve their problem by offensive means. The best defensive is, and will remain, the offensive. We know from the late war in how masterly a fashion many an offensive was arrested by resorting to the counter-offensive directed against the flanks of the aggressor. These coun-

*Germany's. Tr.

ter-offensives always were more effective than mere defensive action, which allows the opponent to dispose his forces as he sees fit.

Although the offensive constitutes the most effective means towards regaining the initiative, it will not always be possible to adopt it. A general rule, however, for the conduct of cavalry—applicable to all cases where mounted troops furnish flank protection for a withdrawing wing—exists just as little as any rule that might be applied to frontal action during a retrograde movement. On the contrary, counter-attack, stubborn defense and delaying action are bound to interchange continually.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS RESERVE

During the World War, cavalry on various occasions was effectively employed by the High Command as a General Headquarters reserve. Mounted troops, far better than any other arm, are adapted for rapid movements to points where the situation is in danger. Cavalry conveyed by mechanical transport is able to carry along only a limited number of horses and, therefore, possesses little mobility after detrucking; besides, the artillery accompanying these troops usually is too weak initially to be able to support the action effectively. Army cavalry, on the other hand, can engage the enemy with its entire mobile strength, the moment it appears on the scene. Hence, it will be in a position to launch its attack without delay; whereas motorized infantry, because of the lack of draft animals for its heavy weapons, can in general be used on the defensive only.

For reasons that need not be entered into here, the Germans during the last years of the war transformed their cavalry divisions into rifle divisions. As a matter of fact, there was no German army cavalry at all on the Western Front in 1918. That the decision to strip completely the West of all army cavalry was not a happy solution of the problem is proved by the events of that year. The German forces were then unable to exploit their achievements to the full, because there was no cavalry.

The Allies, on the other hand, made extensive use of their cavalry as a General Headquarters reserve in stopping up and defending the gaps where our forces had effected a break-through. No less than three times did the French cavalry in 1918 save the armies of the Allies from suffering a complete defeat.

During the big March offensive in France, again in April at Mount Kemmel and, finally, in May of the same year at the Chemin des Dames, it was the French army cavalry that closed the gap each time and so afforded its infantry and artillery an opportunity to reorganize their defense. The forced marches accomplished by the cavalry during these operations covered up to 125 miles. Thus the French cavalry did render its country an invaluable service, which fact has received due credit in the foreign military press.

But in order that the cavalry may be capable of such performances, it must be afforded the necessary rest during periods which offer no missions that are suited for

purely mounted action. During this phase the cavalry will have to strengthen and further develop its marching capacity and fighting power, for great demands will be made upon both these qualities when it is a question of carrying out subsequent missions.

The experiences gained during the World War, enhanced by the fact that the fire power of mounted troops is steadily increasing, should materially further the trend to employ cavalry as a General Headquarters reserve. Not only is this arm capable of aggressive action, but, thanks to its large number of machine guns, it is also well equipped to cover zones of considerable width. The latter faculty will often constitute a very important factor in the employment of cavalry as a General Headquarters reserve. Thus used, it represents to the High Command an exceedingly flexible weapon. Finally, its high degree of speed and mobility renders the mounted arm especially valuable as a reserve.

Whether the reserve forces should pursue offensive or defensive tactics depends, of course, upon the situation. If they are to force the issue of a battle, they will have to execute their mission by offensive means. If, on the other hand, the cavalry is to frustrate unexpected hostile action, the High Command as a rule will have to endeavor first of all to gain time for counter-measures. In the latter case, it will be the duty of the cavalry to engage the enemy for the purpose of gaining time. This may include aggressive or delaying action, or perhaps a stubborn defense.

In the Eastern Theatre of War, the German cavalry frequently served as a reserve of the High Command. Thus, for instance, during the period of trench warfare along the Dubissa in May and June, 1915, the 3d Cavalry Division several times was swiftly moved while mounted from Rossinie to Schaulen and back again; in this manner, it successfully checked several Russian attempts at a break-through. Further examples are furnished us by the operations of the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions staged late in 1914 and in the early part of 1915 along the Mroga and Ravka; by those of the 2d Cavalry Division at Mlava; and by the performances of the 3d Cavalry Brigade and the 2d and 6th Cavalry Divisions on the Windau and Dubissa in 1915.

As long as the operations are progressing on mobile lines, army cavalry ordinarily will be assigned to more important tasks, and so its employment as a reserve may not be regarded as advisable. At this stage of the operations, the front will frequently reveal exposed flanks and gaps between the various elements; or again there may be unoccupied zones in front of one's own forces; all of which offer opportunities for a successful employment of cavalry. After the open zones have narrowed down, the gaps have disappeared, and the flanks are no longer exposed, the operations of the army cavalry in advance of the infantry of necessity terminate. The cavalry must, therefore, either be withdrawn to constitute a reserve, or be assigned to a suitable zone including lines of communication, such as would be allotted to any infantry division.

If this is not done in good season, both cavalry and infantry divisions are apt to interfere with each other in their assignments to billets and roads. Yet with a little foresight on the part of the High Command, these difficulties may all be avoided. Since the duties of cavalry can be performed equally well by infantry in situations where the former is deprived of its freedom of action, it will generally be best to withdraw the mounted elements in such circumstances and retain them as a reserve. Moreover, if their previous operations involved considerable marching, such an opportunity for taking them to the rear is highly desirable. For the conservation of the marching capacity and fighting power of his troops constitutes one of the foremost duties of a commander. Troops thus carefully husbanded will later repay him with redoubled effort.

INDEPENDENT ENTERPRISES AGAINST THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATIONS (RAIDS)

The interpretation of this term has been the subject of much controversy. For the sake of defining "independent enterprises," mention is made here that they are to be understood to constitute undertakings on the part of independent cavalry. In the execution of such missions, the cavalry, separated from its own forces by great distances and having cut loose from its communications, operates in the enemy's rear. Not included in this term, however, are those efforts directed against the enemy's rear that result from a sustained cavalry attack on the hostile flank in the course of a battle.

Raids attracted world-wide attention when, during the American Civil War, 1861-1865, Generals Stuart and Morgan launched such enterprises in a remarkably successful fashion. Yet these two generals cannot, after all, be considered to have originated the raid, for such enterprises were resorted to in earlier wars. Mention should be made in this connection of the performances on the part of General Chernyshev's Russian cavalry during the Wars of Liberation, 1812-1815, best known of which is the ride wherein a cavalry detachment of 3,000 sabres accompanied by two guns, marching from Dessau to Cassel, covered a distance of approximately 150 miles. The instance, wherein Frederick the Great, in the Seven Years' War, sent a detachment of hussars as far forward as Nuremberg, may with equal justice be termed a "raid," just as the famous Austrian ride to Berlin executed by General Hadik deserves that appellation.

Now, what is the purpose of a raid? The object is to gather information regarding the situation in the enemy's rear; to disrupt the enemy's communications; to destroy vital structures and installations; to interrupt the enemy's service of supply, in short, to injure the enemy to such an extent as to influence favorably the operations of one's own forces. Inasmuch as these raids will seldom have a decisive effect upon the course of the operations, they will, as a rule, constitute secondary missions and assume major importance only in exceptional cases. For instance, if a raiding party should succeed in destroying the only available railroad bridge spanning a broad river far in rear of

the hostile front, such an act might in certain circumstances compel the enemy to break off the battle because of a lack of ammunition.

Although, on the one hand, modern armies are highly dependent on an efficient service of supply and, therefore, may easily be affected by an interference with the latter, yet, on the other hand, great improvements as compared to former days have been made towards insuring its proper functioning. With the aid of the air service, radio telegraphy and an extensive telephone net, any danger that may loom in one's rear will quickly be reported. And so the route of march of motorized troops can easily be diverted over the many roads that are usually available. Trucks not only will speedily carry covering troops to points that are of vital importance, but with their assistance one may soon take up the hunt for the invading cavalry. It, therefore, stands to reason that, hand in hand with the improvement of the defensive means, the chances for successful raids are today considerably slighter than in the past.

The less developed a country is in which a campaign is waged, the more difficult will it be for the enemy to intercept a raid. Thus in areas containing but few and poor roads the raid may still be considered to form a proper mission for the cavalry.

Wherever an adequate number of good roads is available, mechanized units in future must be expected to engage in raids freely and frequently. Their inherent speed will generally tend to produce a surprise effect, especially when the various motor columns, after moving up over different roads, suddenly unite in front of the designated objective.

Should the theatre of war lie in one's own territory, raids will more readily find remunerative objectives, since it will be possible to stage them with a better chance for success than in enemy country. If, in addition, the cavalry can count on assistance from the population, it will be in a position to perform feats of incalculable value. For instance, it might inaugurate some sort of guerilla warfare in the enemy's rear and, in conjunction therewith, inflict considerable damage upon the opposing forces and thus force them to assume the defensive, with prospects of wearing them down. Mere mention may be made of the multitude of vitally important objects in rear of the combat zone, as for instance airports, fuel depots, etc., that require protection.

The prerequisite for a cavalry raid, however, must always be this: either there is an excess in mounted troops—a case that probably will never occur—or cavalry, for the time being, cannot be employed to any better advantage. The raid is, and will remain, an instrumentality in warfare presupposing situations, on the side of friend and foe alike, such as will seldom be encountered. In conclusion, it deserves to be stressed once more that a raid in friendly territory is much easier of execution and, therefore, will yield far greater results than would be the case were it staged in the enemy's country.

(To be continued)

Field Exercises and Practice March

1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry

Following are certain paragraphs which have been extracted from official reports of a march made by the First Squadron, 3d Cavalry, Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.

GENERAL

THE First Squadron, 3d Cavalry, was engaged in Field Exercises and a practice march between September 1, 1934, and September 14, 1934. During that time it marched a total distance of two hundred and eighty miles, the last seventy-five of which were negotiated in twenty-four hours.

The route traversed during the march leads from the Champlain Valley near Burlington, Vermont, through the Green Mountains, across and up the valley of the Connecticut River from Bloomfield, Vermont, to Colebrook, New Hampshire, thence to Dixville Notch, New Hampshire, in the White Mountains. Following, for the most part, the valleys of such rivers as the Lamoille, the Gihon, the Nulhegan, and the Connecticut, the grades are generally easy. It involves, however, the passage of several major divides, the most notable of which are the Lowell Mountains, Westmore Mountain, and the ascent to Dixville Notch from the valley of the Connecticut. The roads are of compacted gravel of the general consistency of soft sandstone. About thirty miles are paved with concrete or asphalt.

During the march the wear and tear on shoes was great and brought forth many comments from those officers whose marching experience has been had principally in the middle west and in the southwest.

FIELD EXERCISES

A tactical situation was prepared and mimeographed before the march began. At a conference, held on August 25, 1934, the general situation was made known to all, maps were issued, and a plan for detailing commanders from day to day was announced. At this time, it was pointed out that, to the officers, the principal value of participation in the exercises would flow from the opportunities that would be afforded them to issue combat orders; that although actual maneuvering would be precluded by the fact that all roads are fenced and private property must not be trespassed upon, nevertheless, active imaginations would call to mind the uses that should and would be made of terrain features in the changing situations; that such imaginations would enable all to give valuable instruction to their units; and that, while the best march technique was expected, it is always only a means to the end of successful tactical operations.

The Field Exercises were carried out between September 1st and September 7th. Mimeographed situations were distributed to all officers each day. The interested commanders then issued tactical and administrative

orders at the times and places thought proper by them and in accordance with their ideas as to what was sufficient. Record was made of the time and place of issue and of the substance of each order. At the end of each day a conference of all officers was held, and the operations of that day were discussed fully. In the beginning, there was a tendency on the part of all to let their minds dwell more upon school forms covering the issuance of formal orders for *brigades* and *divisions* than upon the simple and evident facts of the situation. During the conferences, the greatest interest in the operations was displayed by all, and this led to conferences of much greater length than had been contemplated.

MARCH TECHNIQUE

All marches were conducted in accordance with the general principles set forth in "Tactical Principles and Logistics for Cavalry, 1933." In general, the following practices obtained during the march:

The horse was relieved of the weight of the rider for about fifteen minutes during each hour. This was accomplished by leading for five minutes just before the halt; halting for at least five minutes; and leading for five minutes after the halt. In addition, the horse was relieved of the weight of the rider on all steep up and down slopes.

The walk and the lead were at the rate of four miles per hour.

At night and on concrete or asphalt, the trot was at the rate of eight miles per hour. At other times, the trot was at the rate of approximately nine miles per hour.

At night and on concrete or asphalt, no trot period was longer than five minutes; at other times, trot periods did not exceed seven minutes in length.

Platoons were required to march at such distances from each other as would permit a following one to make the same use of terrain favorable for increased gaits as was made of it by the preceding unit. To this end, each platoon had its time-keeper and pace setter; was required to comply with the limitations as to length of trot periods; and constantly maintained liaison with the platoon in front by the use of connecting files, when the advance was being made at night or over winding roads with abrupt rises and falls.

During the first day of the march, the pace setter and time-keeper became quite skilled in his functions. It soon was apparent, however, that there was a tendency for the detailed squadron commanders to stick too rigidly to the head of the column. In the beginning, no inspections were made by the leaders while the column was in motion, and inspections at the halt were all too infre-

quent. Within the troops, platoons, and squads, however, inspections were excellently well timed and were thorough. In such circumstances it became necessary to devise ways and means to impress upon the detailed squadron leaders the fact that, with a trained pace setter and time-keeper, the commander can and should be away from the head of the column more frequently than he is with it. On the outward march, the tactical situation furnished ample means to this end. On the return trip, inspections were made frequently and satisfactorily.

There was a tendency on the part of the detailed leaders to follow the watch too rigidly. For example, at the end of an hour of marching, the regular halt would be made, although it might be known that the place where it was intended to water was but ten or fifteen minutes away. The urge to be meticulous about march minutes outweighed the obvious disadvantage of unnecessary mounting and dismounting. Flexibility is as desirable in march as in other plans. For this reason, it seems preferable to refer to "march periods" rather than to "march hours."

It was soon apparent that while the factors .06 and .15 suggested in "Tactical Principles and Logistics for Cavalry" gave computed distances that compared favorably with speedometer readings of the actual distances travelled when the movement was at night or when long walks or leads were necessary in mountainous terrain, there were great discrepancies whenever the walk and lead were at the rate of four miles per hour and the trot at the rate of nine miles per hour. In this latter case, the factors .07 and .16 were used, and gave fairly accurate results.

As the march progressed, the skill of all concerned increased rapidly. The march technique during the return trip was superior.

SURPRISE MARCHES

The schedule prepared in advance of the march, and which provided for but one night march of twenty-three miles, was adhered to except in two cases. The first deviation from the planned occurred on September 6th. Upon completion under pursuit tactical conditions of the twenty-seven scheduled miles for that day, an inspection of the animals indicated that they were in excellent condition. Since the tactical situation indicated that further advance should be made under cover of darkness, warning was given two hours after arrival in camp that the march would be resumed at 7:00 p.m. This change in plan was carried out. The advance to final destination was made on an extremely dark night, over a distance of sixteen miles of asphalt road in three hours and fifteen minutes, or at the rate of five miles per hour.

The approved itinerary for the Squadron provided that it march from Barton, Vt., to Eden Mills, Vt., on September 13, 1934, a distance of twenty-nine miles. Accordingly, the command left Barton at 7:00 a.m., on that date, and, after a difficult march over the many long steep grades involved in the passage of the Lowell Moun-

tains, arrived within a mile of its scheduled destination at about 1:15 p.m. At that hour, orders, dispatched by motor, were received from the Commanding Officer, Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, directing that the Squadron return to Fort Ethan Allen with the least practicable delay. Immediately thereafter, the Squadron occupied a bivouac near Eden Mills, and the Post Commander was informed by telephone that the command would reach Fort Ethan Allen not later than noon of September 14th. An inspection of animals indicated that the amount of time spent at Eden Mills would depend upon the time required to replace the numerous shoes that had worn to the danger point during the day's march. The operations of replacing these shoes occupied all of the available horseshoers in the troops until 7:00 p.m., at which hour the march was resumed. In the meantime, animals had been groomed, fed, and watered twice, hay had been kept before them continuously during the whole rest period, and the men had been served two hot meals.

The plan for the continuation of the march involved an uninterrupted advance to Cambridge, over a distance of twenty-three miles; a halt at that place of sufficient duration to again check the shoeing, groom, feed and water the animals, and feed the men; and a subsequent advance to destination. To the ends that this plan might be carried out and that burdens upon the animals and upon the animal-drawn trains might be reduced to a minimum, the supply officer, by means of the troop-owned trucks had early begun the removal to Fort Ethan Allen of all equipment considered unnecessary to the successful completion of the march, and the movement to Cambridge of all surplus supplies and forage. Later, and by telephone, he requested that the Commanding Officer, Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, assist him in these operations with any motors that might be available at that station. Six trucks were furnished by the Post Commander, and these reached Eden Mills at about 7:45 p.m.

The advance to Cambridge was uninterrupted and was completed at 11:15 p.m. Before the column arrived, the supply officer had stretched the picket lines and had placed thereon an abundance of hay. A hot meal had been prepared for the men. After grooming, watering and feeding the animals, replacing such worn shoes as was necessary, and feeding the men, the column again took the road at 1:45 a.m. It reached Fort Ethan Allen at 7:00 a.m., September 14th, having covered seventy-five miles in twenty-four hours.

During the last two phases of this march, which were made on a dark night and which involved a movement of forty-six miles, fifteen of which were paved with concrete or with asphalt, not a shoe was lost en route, not a man fell out, and but one animal showed such signs of exhaustion as to cause it to be left by the wayside. It was retrieved by the train later on the 14th and travelled to Fort Ethan Allen under its own power. The lightened train completed its march in good condition at 6:00 p.m., September 14th.

EXPERIMENTING WITH MOTORS

During the night march from Columbia Bridge to Dixville Notch and the forced march from Eden Mills to Fort Ethan Allen, experiments were conducted in the matter of transporting, by motor transport, part of the weight carried by the animals. For the night march from Columbia Bridge to Dixville Notch, cante packs and feed bags were removed and were hauled to the new camping place in the trucks. Upon arrival, the kitchen details, which had accompanied the trucks, placed these rolls, at estimated necessary intervals, along the proposed tent line, as designated by the supply officer. Although the night was extremely dark, camp was made most expeditiously and, in the opinion of all concerned, with less confusion than would have obtained, had it been necessary for each trooper to remove his cante roll from his saddle after arrival.

When, upon reaching Eden Mills, the squadron received orders to continue its march to Fort Ethan Allen without delay, the removal of weight from the animals took on added importance. Men and animals had to be in as good conditions as possible upon arrival. The mission, therefore, consisted in bringing the squadron to Fort Ethan Allen in as short a time as possible and in proper condition to be entrained for further active duty. The question of arms and equipment on the horses had no bearing on the situation, except that the less weight the horse had to carry, the better would be his condition at the end of the march. Accordingly, the rifles, cante rolls, and feed bags were removed from the saddles, leaving only the saddle bags. In this connection, history offers many examples of cavalry marches made in time of war but outside of or behind the theatre of active operations, where speed and condition upon arrival were the primary considerations; contact or combat with the enemy improbable or impossible; and where the transportation by motor of arms, equipment and of part of the personnel, would have aided greatly the cavalry commander in bringing his command to its destination in condition for further strenuous effort. In effect, such consideration of animals increases the marching radius of a command when not actually in the presence of the enemy. The inclusion of motorized trains with our horse cavalry make such dispositions easy of accomplishment. If necessary, the trains are able to make several round trips to the destination or next campsite, while the combat elements are covering the single distance.

The removal and disposition of the various articles of equipment referred to above was a simple operation. The cante rolls of each squad were tied together with coat straps, much as one would tie together so many stocks. Feed bags, after removal from the horses at the end of feeding, were taken to the end of the picket line, filled with a feed of grain, folded flat, and were then placed in piles of about ten to the stack. Bundles of cante rolls were tagged with ordinary shipping tags, marked with the number of the squad and the squad leader's name.

Feed bags already carried the stenciled troop number of the man to whom issued. No effort was made to see that each man recovered his own feed bag. The stable sergeant checked the total number of feed bags to be sure none were missing. Bundles of cante rolls, feed bags, and rifles in boots, were placed in the truck in the order in which they would be needed. If the feed bags were to be used before reaching the next campsite, they were placed in the rear of the truck where they could be issued anywhere along the road in but a few minutes.

Since the controlling considerations with respect to the night march from Eden Mills to Fort Ethan Allen were that both animals and men arrive at Fort Ethan Allen in the shortest time and in the best possible condition, a further experiment was made in relieving the horse of weight for at least half of the journey. To this end, all men saddled their horses for the departure from Eden Mills; one man in each set of twos was then required to turn his horse over to the man beside him; the mounted man was required to adjust the stirrups of his led horse to suit his own needs; and the dismounted man reported to the supply officer for transportation to Cambridge by motor. Thus, each trooper left Eden Mills riding one horse and leading a spare, which was saddled. At each hourly halt, the spare horse of the hour before was mounted and ridden during the succeeding hour. Upon arrival at Cambridge, the dismounted men, who had been transported by motor, rejoined their organizations immediately and took care of their mounts. On departing from Cambridge, those men who rode from Eden Mills to Cambridge were dismounted, their places in the ranks being taken by their comrades. The dismounted men were transported by motor to Essex Junction, two miles from Fort Ethan Allen. From Cambridge to Essex Junction, the practice as to use of animals which had obtained during the earlier phase was continued. Upon arrival at Essex Junction, all men rejoined their units, and the squadron completed the last two miles of the march as a whole. In carrying out this experiment, only the officers and about one-half of the noncommissioned officers rode the entire seventy-five miles from Barton.

When this plan was first announced, there were many protests from the men, all demanding that they be allowed to ride the entire distance—but when the necessity for preserving the strength of the animals was explained to them, they accepted the situation in a whole-hearted manner. It was impossible to arrange for two mounts for every man. This was notably true in the cases of officers and their orderlies. Therefore, some horses carried weight the entire distance. These all came through in as good condition as the others.

It is believed that the presence of motors with cavalry columns will frequently make it possible and desirable to make movements with many combinations of the methods described herein, and it is recommended that further tests be had along the indicated lines.

The Indian Cavalry

BY CAPTAIN GEORGE H. SHEA, U.S.A., RETIRED

THE Cavalry of India is probably the most interesting of any of the foreign Cavalry organizations to an American Cavalry officer. The primary reason is that the training of Indian troops is conducted along lines similar to that existing in our own organization. The terrain resembles materially that of our own country in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. To a great extent also, the climatic conditions are similar, with the exception, of course, that the heat is more extreme in certain sections of India.

At the present time there are a total of twenty-six Cavalry regiments serving in India. Five of these regiments are British troops, and the remaining twenty-one regiments are composed of the Indian natives. In addition, there are five squadrons of about one hundred men each. One of these is detailed as a bodyguard to the Viceroy of India, and the other four to Governor Generals of districts for bodyguard service.

A Cavalry regiment is composed of four rifle squadrons of about one hundred and fifty men each, and a headquarters organization of about one hundred men. A squadron in the Indian army represents our troop organization and in each instance is commanded by a Major. The regiment is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. The squadron, in turn, is divided into troops and platoons. Inasmuch as each squadron is kept at a strength of approximately one hundred and fifty men at all times, it forms a very complete and thoroughly trained fighting unit.

The British Indian Army officers remain on duty with their regiment until such time as they are retired. These officers attend various service schools, are detailed to staff departments and in some instances to civil duties, but always at the expiration of a particular detail, return to their own regiment. The number of British and Indian officers assigned to a regiment varies slightly, but on an average there are about fifteen British officers and about twenty-five native officers. The British officers, normally speaking, spend about nine years in the grade of Lieutenant, nine years in the grade of Captain, four or five years

in the grade of Major, and then assume command of a regiment with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The native officers serve very much longer in the equivalent grades, seldom obtaining rank higher than that of Major, and that only after they have spent about thirty years in the grade of Lieutenant and Captain.


Due to climatic conditions the Indian develops very young and is mature at about sixteen years of age. The result is that Indians can be accepted for enlistment at an earlier age than would normally be desired in white troops. The Indian soldier is accepted as a recruit usually from seventeen to nineteen years of age, and he retires at the expiration of fifteen years' service, except in instances where a commanding officer desires to retain certain selected men. In these instances they may remain for a much longer period. However, the number of such selections is small, and the result is that the enlisted personnel is composed of comparatively young soldiers.

The native complement within a regiment is always composed of at least two castes. This organization seems to be most satisfactory from the standpoint of training. Soldiers of any one caste are particularly anxious to outdo members of any other caste in any type of work in which they are engaged. This fact, as far as military work is concerned, causes keen competition between organizations within a regiment. Each soldier seems to take a great pride in his personal appearance, and I never at any time saw any Indian soldier whose uniform equipment was in any manner shabby in appearance.

Due to the fact that a civilian personnel is used for the purpose of policing grounds, barrack room orderlies, and kitchen police, the Indian soldier is enabled to spend a great deal of time in the upkeep of his equipment and in his training. The enlisted personnel apparently are well satisfied with the service and state without any hesitancy that they are very much better off in the service than they would be in civilian life within their own communities. They have the utmost respect for the British officers assigned to their commands, and it is apparent that the British officer has the same feeling toward



A British Hussar Regiment on the March



A Platoon of the Viceroy's Bodyguard



Various Types of Uniform Worn by British Cavalry Officers Assigned to Indian Organizations

his Indian troops.

The accepted uniform equipment of the Indian Cavalry is the khaki, and in the colder areas the olive drab is worn. Certain regiments are provided with a full dress uniform which is characteristically Indian in design and detail. The leather equipment of the Indian troops is kept in the finest condition possible. This is true of both cavalry and horse-drawn artillery organizations.

Barracks are built in one-story or in one-story-and-a-half with high ceilings. The building material used seems to be adobe, although I did see some that were built of red brick. They are exceedingly well ventilated, and in general the cantonments resemble our own posts in appearance and size. Each cantonment maintains plenty of athletic activities and competitions for the commissioned personnel. Tennis and polo are the favorite games.

Excellent provision is made for the stabling and care of animals used, and regardless of the unfavorable climatic conditions that exist in many places, the horses are in excellent condition. Sufficient range is available at all cavalry cantonments for drill purposes and for the purpose of turning animals loose for exercise.

Cavalry regiments are divided into two classes—horse regiments and lancers. They are named, in many instances, after famous early British officers who served in India. As for instance, Jacob's Horse and Hodson's Horse. Other regiments bear the name of the district from which they are recruited, as Deccan Horse and Poona Horse. Certain ruling princes of Indian states maintain as private troops regiments named for their principalities, as the Hyderabad Lancers.

The Cavalry service for India is primarily frontier service. The British officers on duty with the Indian army are a fine type of men who have great pride in their regiments. They are most courteous and anxious to do anything within their power to assist American officers who may visit India, and entertain them generously. One British officer offered to send a soldier from his own regiment to meet us and act as our personal servant during our 4,000-mile tour of India. The majority work hard, play hard, and bear the inconveniences of life in India in a spirit of true British sportsmanship, looking forward to the time when they may retire and go "home to England."

The Cavalry Participation in the Third Corps Area Maneuvers

BY CAPTAIN FRANK A. ALLEN, JR., 3RD CAV.

THE Third Cavalry (less 1st Squadron) marched out of Fort Myer, Virginia, early on the morning of September 27th to participate in the Third Corps maneuvers, and every available officer and soldier were in ranks. The new light trucks assigned the Regiment had arrived a few days previously, and they were included in the march order but directed to proceed independently of the column to the Camp Area under the command of the Regimental Supply Officer.

The Third Corps Area maneuvers for 1934 were divided into three separate phases: 1st, the march to Fort Hoyle, Maryland, to join the 16th Infantry Brigade, (September 27, 28, and 29); 2nd, the march of the 16th Brigade, reinforced, from Fort Hoyle to Fort Meade, Maryland (October 1-5), and lastly the Tactical Exercises and Maneuver at Fort Meade (October 6-13).

The march from Fort Myer to Fort Hoyle was made through Washington to Baltimore via U. S. Route No. 1, a heavily-traveled six-way concrete pike, U. S. Route No. 40, to Joppa, Maryland, thence south to Magnolia, Maryland, and Fort Hoyle. The rate of march was prescribed at 4½ miles per hour the first hour, thereafter 5 miles per hour. The equipment taken was full field, less cante rolls and grain which were carried in trucks, until after arrival at Fort Hoyle. This relieved horses of from 15 to 20 pounds back load. No readjustment was made of the pack, as the load removed was equally distributed laterally.

From the beginning of the march great stress was placed on march discipline, and the results obtained more than justified the attention and effort every rank paid to the details of the march and position of the men in the saddles. The troops were habitually marched in column of twos, save when footing on the shoulders was such that the column could be split advantageously to permit one column on each side of the road, the middle of the road being left free for traffic. It should be added that this was seldom done because of the relatively large number of pack animals in the Squadron, it was found that the going was better and traffic was interfered with less when the unit marched in column of twos on one side of the road. This phase of the march demonstrated very clearly that a good flat concrete pike proves a good road for a Cavalry command to march on at a walk or trot, which experience was borne out by later marches. High crowned roads, or roads of a so-called Tarvia composition or similar substance, proved very slippery, and particularly on a slope caused many falls in the command. At one time fourteen animals slipped and fell on a piece of road which was high crowned and of an asphalt or tar

composition. Narrow roads with gravel shoulders caused excessive interference among the animals and, in addition, were the source of considerable lameness as a result of rocks and stones caught in the frog of the foot. As a great deal of the early marching was done in the rain, an opportunity was afforded to note that horses slipped less on the wet roads than they did on the dry roads. And it was noted that the slipperiest piece of road encountered was that which bore the paint signs of warning to motorists such as "Stop" or "School." Invariably the horses of the Squadron would slide and slip over these painted notices. The troop was designated as the march unit, and distances between troops varied from nine to thirty yards depending upon the type of country traversed. The halt for camp the first night was made at Savage, near Laurel, Maryland, after a march of 25 miles, where the inevitable heavy rainstorm struck shortly after camp had been established and thoroughly soaked every bit of equipment. Rain was to continue to fall intermittently until after our arrival at Fort Hoyle.

The Regiment marched through Baltimore on the second day, camping that night just beyond the city limits, having gone a distance of 25 miles. The march through the heart of Baltimore at about 9:00 a.m., was made with motorcycle police escort. The streets traversed are narrow, cobbled and carry street car tracks. Upon entering the congested area, the trot was taken, and although held for an excessive length of time, traffic was interrupted scarcely at all, and there were no resulting ill effects upon the command. Next day the command marched into Fort Hoyle, arriving at noon on Saturday, September 29th, completing a march of 21 miles.

The Troops of the Regular Army concentrated at Fort Hoyle consisted of:

Brigade Headquarters, 16th Infantry Brigade
34th Infantry
12th Infantry
1st Bn., 16th Field Artillery
6th Field Artillery
Co "A" 1st Regiment, C.W.S.
3rd Cavalry (less 1st Squadron)
15th Ordnance Company
30th Ordnance Company
1st Bn., 13th Engineers
1 Co., 66th Infantry (light tanks)

The above named units were organized into the 16th Brigade, reinforced, to march essentially under peace-time conditions with the maximum number of men and the minimum of transportation, to terminate the march with all elements of the command in ranks as on the day of

departure and, so far as practicable and desirable, to standardize procedure on marches with a view to securing best results for all concerned.

The march from Fort Hoyle to Fort Meade, Maryland, was organized in three columns as follows: 1st, the Dismounted Column consisting of the Infantry and Engineers, less trains; 2nd, the Mounted Column consisting of Cavalry, horse-drawn artillery and animal-drawn trains; 3rd, the Motor Column consisting of all motor elements. Each column marched by a separate route, and each serial of each column by a separate time schedule.

The Third Cavalry was, of course, a unit of the Mounted Column, which column was placed under the command of Colonel Joyce, Major John F. Davis, assuming command of the regiment. The march was made on routes north of Baltimore in five stages, in easy marches of between 17 and 18 miles for the animal elements. Routes were clearly marked, and inspections by the high command along the route were frequent.

Camps were made at Laurel Brook, Timonium Fair Grounds, North Brook, and Columbia, Maryland. Fort Meade, Maryland, was reached on Friday, October 5th, shortly after noon, and the Regiment moved into a prepared camp for a week's stay. The marches were short and conducted with a maximum of attention to march discipline, rate of march, and arrival and departure from critical points at exact times.

With the 16th Infantry Brigade, reinforced, marching in three columns and camping in one area, it was essential that unit march tables be figured with great accuracy, carefully coordinated and all watches synchronized so that critical points such as road junctions and the entrance to camp sites would be cleared to permit the free passage of the following organizations. The elasticity of gaits in the Cavalry permitted the Regiment to arrive at and pass any and all designated critical points on the minute specified, and at no time was any unit delayed by the Cavalry failing to fulfill its march mission.

Quartermaster details consisting of an officer from the Regiment and one enlisted man from each Troop preceded the column into camp to lay out and mark the camp sites in detail. This group set out stakes to denote location of picket-lines, shelter tents, kitchen tents, and officers' line, and the individual members of the group reported to their respective Troop Commanders as guides when the troop arrived at the entrance to the camp area. This detail proved of great assistance to organization commanders, facilitated the establishment of camps, and permitted all elements of the command to flow into their camps with no buckling or stopping on the highways or approaches to camp sites. This continuity of motion was stressed by all commanders and proved highly successful.

When the Regiment arrived in camp and after the picket-line was established, horses were tied on the line, and unsaddled with blanket and surcingles left on, and the troops then pitched shelter tents before returning to the picket-line for stables. This routine was established

on the march and worked smoothly and easily. Grain was carried on the saddles so that horses were fed after watering and the men could return to their camp for meals. Meals served at noon consisted of sandwich lunches, carried in the saddlebags, as the trucks containing the kitchen equipment were delayed in arriving at camp sites, sometimes until 5 p.m. This was due to the conditions imposed. While normally the new light motor trucks, new standard equipment of the Cavalry, can remain at the old camp until the troops have started the march, take up the picket-line, police the camp site and, traveling by a circuitous route, arrive at the new camp area, have the picket-line up and a hot meal ready to serve when the troops arrive, on this particular march the time schedule of the fast moving trucks was intentionally arranged so as to necessitate troops making camp before the arrival of their motors.

The conduct of the march of the 16th Brigade, reinforced, from Fort Hoyle, Maryland, to Fort Meade necessitated that all units march practically at "attention," with no one permitted to smoke while mounted and only after having attended to his animal and equipment at the halt. The position of the trooper, mounted, was watched carefully, and the success of the effort was proved by the lack of sore backs suffered during the march. The Cavalry habitually marched in column of twos, and signals were transmitted from head to rear of the column by hand and whistle, insuring that all units of the column take up the new gait at one and the same time. The appearance of the Cavalry, marched at the position of attention, along the highways in and near Baltimore and Washington drew very favorable comment from every one who saw them, and they created a very favorable impression during the entire march.

The maneuvers at Fort Meade were under the personal direction of Major General Paul B. Malone, Commanding General, Third Corps Area, and for the first time in the history of our Army were conducted entirely at night. General Malone, in his opening address to the assembled officers, outlined the plans for the maneuvers which were to be conducted as though a state of war existed and the units were in the presence of the enemy with all the attendant hardships, such as no lights or loud talking in any part of the command and a system of rigid discipline enforced on all concerned. The maneuvers were held entirely at night to impress all with the difficulties encountered in operations and the movement of any force after dark, particularly in strange country. General Malone stressed the lessons of the last war and the resultant knowledge that in the next war, all displacements of troops must be made under cover of darkness, handicapped not only by the absence of light but by the constant interruption by hostile air observation and attack.

The Cavalry participation in the Third Corps maneuvers was coordinated with that of the other units present and started with a night march in the presence of the enemy, but behind the line held by our own forces. This

march of 20½ miles had to be coordinated with the march of other units, mounted, dismounted and motor, and necessitated a close adherence to a carefully prepared march table. Hostile aeroplanes were in the air during the march, dropping flares to locate and identify units and to determine their direction of march. Because of the conditions imposed on all units, as marching in the presence of the enemy, smoking was prohibited and the use of flashlights was reduced to an absolute minimum consistent with safety from motor traffic. In addition to prohibiting smoking and the use of flashlights which would disclose the position of the command to the air observer, the column was halted whenever a flare was dropped and the troops remained motionless off the road or under trees. It was a matter of pride to the Cavalry that, on account of these precautions, they were not discovered by the air observers. The march was made as a Squadron with a platoon of Troop "F" 3rd Cavalry under the command of Lieutenant E. L. Harrison, as advance guard. Again, the Cavalry march was so coordinated and led that all critical points were reached and left "on the minute" and no unit delayed. The success of the Cavalry during this particular feature of the maneuvers was outstanding, as there was no opportunity to judge location or landmarks because of the intense darkness, and only a thorough knowledge of gaits and distance travelled enabled the Squadron Commander to arrive at and pass the critical points on the minute.

The second night of maneuvers saw the Cavalry as a War Strength Troop under the command of Captain Frank A. Allen, Jr., with a platoon of the Machine Gun Troop, Communication Section, and Supply Section, Headquarters Troop, attached, assigned the mission of filling a gap in the line caused by the failure of an Infantry Division to arrive at its designated position. The use of Cavalry in this phase constituted the establishment of an outpost with a line of outguards to protect the approaches by road into the sector assigned, with the reserve maintained in a central position of readiness, from which it could move to the support of any outguard. The Machine Gun Platoon Commander selected alternate sites for the placement of his heavy guns to support the outguards, and the communications section established and maintained radio communications with the Infantry Battalion Commander on the right. The Supply section attached was charged with and successfully accomplished the delivery of hot food to the outguard before 5:00 a.m.,

and return of the trucks to the parking area by 6 a.m.

The third phase of the Cavalry participation in the maneuvers was again coordinated with the other units participating, and consisted of the relief of all units in the line, to be accomplished during the night. Troop "F" under Captain Allen was established in the same outpost position as on the night previous, and Troop "E" under command of Captain James Duke, effected their relief at night in an efficient manner with no loss of time or resultant confusion. Troop "E" then remained in the line in position until "Recall" was sounded in the morning, after having served hot food to the outguards.

The last phase of the Cavalry maneuvers consisted of a War Strength Troop with one Platoon of the Machine Gun Troop, Communications Section, and Supply Section, Headquarters Troop, attached, under command of Captain James Duke, acting as a Flank Guard for a Division which was to attack at dawn. The troop took its position in the line at 10:00 p.m. The situation was further developed, when after dispositions had been made to assure that no enemy could reach the attacking division, the Troop Commander was advised that one of the river crossings which he had sent a patrol to secure was in the hands of the enemy. This new situation necessitated the prompt use of the Reserve in a combined mounted and dismounted attack, which drove off the enemy and secured the bridge for the use of our troops. After a bridgehead had been established and new dispositions made, that phase of the maneuvers ended, with the sounding of "Recall."

The 1934 maneuvers at Fort Meade closed with a Review of all the Troops which had participated, before the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Harry Woodring, and the Corps Area Commander, Major General Paul B. Malone. The 3rd Cavalry (less 1st Squadron) passed in review at the walk and after the last change of direction took up the trot and headed for Fort Myer, Troop "E" later dropped out of the column to remain at Fort Meade to engage in combat firing practice, but the remainder of the Regiment that had started for maneuvers on September 27th marched into the Post at 5 p.m., October 13, 1934, conscious of having played its part well in the tactical exercises and on the march and appreciative of the many lessons learned that should contribute to the further successful participation of the Cavalry in other combined maneuvers.

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the United States Cavalry Association will be held at the Army and Navy Club, Washington, D. C., at 8:00 p.m., Monday, January 21, 1935.

The proxies of members who do not expect to be present may be sent to the Secretary, U. S. Cavalry Association, 1624 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Stratosphere Cavalry

By 1ST LIEUTENANTS R. L. LAND AND J. H. STODTER, 4TH CAVALRY

THE Black Hills Stratosphere flight, with its extensive preparations involving establishment of a camp of one hundred men, the assembly of equipment, the guarding of the same, and control of visitors and traffic, was marked by the successful cooperation and work of the Fourth United States Cavalry stationed at Fort Meade, South Dakota. First Lieutenant John Hughes Stodter and forty-three enlisted men were on continuous duty for two months from June 8th to one week after the date of the flight. Five officers and one hundred thirty-four enlisted men were detailed for the trial flights on July 6th and 7th, and for the twenty hours preceding the final flight on the morning of the 28th. Second Lieutenant Carroll H. Prunty and fifty enlisted men performed the guard duty at the top of the rim on the night and morning of the final flight, credit for highly commendatory press notice being largely due to their efforts. Colonel W. R. Pope and his staff devoted a large part of their time and effort toward making the occasion a demonstration of the efficiency and cooperation of the modern United States Army.

The Black Hills of South Dakota were early selected as a prospective location for the start of the stratosphere flight. Records indicated that the type of clear, calm weather necessary might be found here, while the prevailing winds in the upper atmosphere would carry the balloon to a landing somewhere on the broad open plains of Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, or Illinois. Furthermore, it was hoped that some natural depression might be found suitable for the sheltering of the great bag during its inflation.

As a result of some correspondence with Major Kepner, Colonel W. R. Pope, commanding officer of Ft. Meade, South Dakota, initiated a survey of likely locations early in March. Eleven miles southwest of Rapid City and about forty-five miles from Fort Meade, a site was found which, for natural advantages, could probably not be duplicated anywhere else in the United States. It was a bowl-shaped depression with a nearly level floor about two hundred and fifty yards in diameter, its sides formed by perpendicular cliffs four hundred and fifty feet high, except for one corner where the canyon of Spring Creek skirted the bowl, and another break where a trail barely passable for vehicles ran down a mile of the rim. At his first survey of the bowl Major Kepner is said to have remarked: "God must have made this for a stratosphere flight."

The property was owned by the Bonanza Bar Mining Company from whom it was leased for the period of the flight.

The equipment and personnel, which soon began to assemble for the expedition, included spectroscopes assembled by Dr. Brian O'Brian of Rochester, N. Y.,

cosmic ray equipment assembled and brought to the scene by Dr. W. G. F. Swann of Swarthmore, Pa., instruments loaned by Dr. Millikin of California, a giant parachute constructed by the Army expert Major Hoffman, and extensive photographic equipment designed and built by Captain Albert W. Stevens, scientist and co-pilot, who is one of the world's experts in his field. A complete field broadcasting unit of the National Broadcasting Company, a complete and elaborate meteorological station, a Paramount newsreel team, two outstanding news writers—Lyman of the *New York Times* and Casey of the *Chicago Tribune*—and a working crew of more than thirty scientists and balloon experts gathered at the Strato Camp. A one-way road to and from the rim, and parking facilities were constructed under the auspices of the Rapid City Chamber of Commerce. A special road was constructed down to the floor of the bowl. The Black Hills residents stood by for the greatest period of activity and excitement since the vacation of President Coolidge in this region in 1927. The National Geographic Society, joint sponsor of the flight, was represented on the ground by Mr. Thomas W. McKnew, Assistant Secretary. Captain Orvil A. Anderson, alternate pilot, and Master Sergeant Joseph Bishop, well-known Army balloon racer, were in charge of technical details of the preparation and installation, while Major Wm. E. Kepner, noted army balloonist, was commanding officer of the expedition and Chief Pilot of the balloon.

Captain Charles Gordon Hutchinson, 4th Cav., as special liaison officer, was in charge of arrangements for cooperation of the Fourth Cavalry with the stratosphere flight and also in active charge of the special detachment which assisted in the inflation of the balloon.

On June 6, by special order of the commanding officer of Fort Meade, a special detachment of one officer, thirty-three 4th Cavalrymen and three men of the medical corps, was designated to form the Strato Camp Guard.

The guard detachment pitched its tents near the point where the new road entered the bowl. Nearer the stream, the camp for the scientists and technicians was laid out and the Strato Camp mess established in three large storage tents placed end to end. Much credit is due to the Camp Surgeon, Lieutenant J. J. Marren, Med. Res., and the medical detachment that, in a camp composed largely of scientists and technicians mostly unused to outdoor life, practically no sickness occurred.

On Sunday, June 10, arrived the first and most dangerous part of the property to be guarded, namely, the highly explosive hydrogen gas for the inflation of the big balloon.

The arrival of the gondola on its special 10-wheel truck was an important event, and from then on an ever-increasing stream of visitors came to the bowl and inspected

the 8-foot ball of light "Dow metal" in which the balloonists would seal themselves for their dash beyond the upper reaches of our atmosphere.

Major Kepner and Captain Stevens came by plane, bringing some of the instruments to be installed in the gondola. A special A.C. truck carrying a complete built-in generator for the manufacture of liquid air and liquid oxygen arrived safely, although it weighed about 22 tons. At last, on June 20, the balloon itself arrived, carried on another huge truck in a big box into which the enormous bag had been carefully folded.

A weather bureau was established in the bowl by Mr. Jekl of the U. S. Weather Bureau and Sergeant Berheisel and Corporal Sutter from the office of the Chief Signal Officer. The equipment included two teletype machines, a radio set and small balloons released daily to observe their drift and rise. Two weather maps of North America were completed daily; it was on these that the final decision for the date of the flight principally depended.

By July 1 the installation of instruments in the gondola was nearly completed, and it was announced that the flight would probably take place in the first suitable weather after the fourth.

The problem of the Guard in handling traffic, directing visitors and enforcing safety precautions was tremendous. In addition the men on post had to act as veritable information bureaus on all aspects of the flight. It is a credit to the keen interest of the men and the courtesy they displayed that they were able to answer questions, while carrying out their duties, in such a manner that no complaints were received throughout the two months of this arduous duty, and that no accidents were reported, in spite of the vast number of visitors handled. On the contrary, numerous letters of appreciation were received by Colonel Pope from civilian visitors, commending the courtesy, neatness and general efficiency of the Strato Camp Guard.

On July 6th a trial flight of a small model of the big balloon was successfully carried out by Major Kepner and Captain Orvil A. Anderson, and on the same day the "sealed-in" test of the gondola was made by these same two officers and Captain Stevens.

There was a considerable delay before weather conditions were pronounced just right, and the decision to inflate the big balloon was not made until July 27th. Within a half hour spectators began pouring into the all too limited parking area on the rim. Lieutenant Prunty and his detail of fifty men arrived and took over the control of traffic and spectators on the cliffs surrounding the bowl. The regularly detailed Strato Camp Guard were all placed on duty and assigned, by pairs, to their emergency posts. It was well that they were posted early, for, even before darkness fell, they found themselves engaged in turning back scores of spectators who endeavored to clamber down several steep foot trails which led to the floor of the bowl.

By midnight 3,300 cars had been checked in, and the gate at the rim was closed, as every available parking space was filled. As cars continued to arrive, they were parked by their owners in nearby fields and on the highway itself until about 2,000 more were left in the vicinity. It was estimated that nearly 50,000 persons witnessed the balloon ascension.

Meanwhile throughout the night the bowl was a scene of indescribable activity. Viewed from the rim, the bowl, with its ring of floodlights 500 feet below, appeared like a volcano crater with an incandescent floor, on which thousands ofimps moved about a giant bubble, which grew hour by hour until it reached a majestic height. The roar of the gas rushing through the big tubes and the throb of the two engines which drove the big electric generator for the floodlights made the illusion more realistic. At last, as dawn was breaking, a tiny ball, the gondola, was pushed out of its shed and under the great balloon, to which it was quickly harnessed.

On the floor of the bowl little groups of tired cavalrymen clung grimly to the ropes they had grasped some 12 hours before. The ropes were taut as fiddle strings. Four had snapped when the inflation was nearly completed but the men were rushed in to hold on to the skirt of the bag itself. A gust of wind and the balloon might have broken away, but the weather man had been right; conditions were perfect, the air calm and the skies clear.

At 5:45 a.m., just as the morning sunlight touched the top of the bag, Major Kepner from his post on top of the gondola said, "Let 'er go," and the world's largest free balloon was launched on its trip to the stratosphere.

Fifty thousand spectators cheered as slowly, but with increasing speed, the great bag, with its precious cargo, rose majestically out of the bowl and, steadily rising, soared slowly eastward.

While descending, about 3:45 p.m., M.S.T., at an altitude of 5,000 feet, the top blew out of the already crippled balloon and the gondola, like a comet, with a tail of balloon fabric, fell to earth. Captain Anderson, Captain Stevens, and Major Kepner, in the order named, escaped with parachutes from their doomed craft.

The crash occurred in a cornfield four miles northeast of Holdridge, Nebraska. The gondola was crushed but not broken apart. It was opened with axes and the instruments salvaged. All were damaged, but much of the film upon which results were recorded was preserved and developed so that, in spite of the crash, the flight proved to be one of the most successful ever made.

Finally, on August 4, the 4th Cavalry Detachment boarded trucks and at 10:00 a.m. left the stratosphere bowl for Fort Meade. The detail had lasted nearly two months, and probably not since the Horse Marines of Spanish-American War fame have cavalrymen been more successfully engaged in as interesting and unusual a service.

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Excerpts from An

Address of Secretary Dern

Delivered at Fort Monmouth
During the C P X

IT is a great pleasure to meet you gentlemen in this way. While I was Governor, when I was confronted with a large audience, I used to start with a story, which may or may not have been an actual occurrence. Shortly after my inauguration, the warden of the state prison invited me to visit the institution in order that I might become familiar with my new duties. Upon arrival I found that he had assembled all the prisoners and invited me to make a speech. I was not accustomed to addressing audiences of that kind, and in my confusion I said, "Fellow convicts." Of course, they all gave me the laugh and I saw I had made a mistake. I started again, in my continued confusion I said, "Fellow democrats." Instead of laughing they all got sore. When you get men in prison you may do a lot of things to them but they will not stand for being called "Democrats." It was some satisfaction to me to find that there were no democrats in the institution, and so I said, "Anyhow, I am glad to see so many of you here."

So I say today,—I am glad to see so many of you here. I did not come to these exercises for the purpose of making a speech, but it is a pleasure to appear before you and say a few words. I came to the War Department knowing little about the Army and less than nothing about the officers of the Army. I say "less" because I had the ordinary civilian's viewpoint to the effect that Army officers are a different sort of animal from the rest of the human beings, and that they are bound by tradition which requires that everything be done in the same old way. After I became Secretary of War I had to unlearn and learn a lot and I am ready to bear testimony to the effect that the experience has been most gratifying. I am ready to indorse what Secretary Hurley said to me the day before inauguration: "I congratulate you upon coming into the finest department in the Government. I would rather be Secretary of War than any other member of the Cabinet. You are dealing with a group of honest men. Army men are not infallible but they always give you what they think is right and are not always trying to put something over on you." I have had enough experience in other activities to know that that is not the prevailing rule. I appreciate the pleasure of working with a group of men whose integrity is above question and who have the highest standard of honesty. I am proud to be associated with the officers of the Army and the Army as a whole.

I am also gratified to find that the Army is a progressive institution, that it is not bound by traditions and does not fail to try new things. In my opinion that is the only



way progress can be made. Anyone who adheres to his old and fixed beliefs never gets anywhere and soon lags behind the procession. You know the old story about a debate on the question of capital punishment; finally one of the speakers said, "Hanging was good enough for my father and it is good enough for me." That is the great block to progress. Unless we are willing to make adjustments in order to keep up with new developments we are not going to make any progress. Most of us get our opinions, our beliefs and our views from our surroundings, and the average citizen gets his opinions fairly well fixed and does not re-examine them. I have often heard men say: "I have never voted anything but a straight Republican ticket and will not vote anything but a Republican ticket." To my mind there is only one thing less disgraceful and that is "I never voted anything but a Democratic ticket." I think anyone who is so hide-bound in his opinions that he never re-examines them, never takes any steps to improve the conditions by which he is surrounded, never discards the false things he discovers, is a

**Army men are not infallible,
but they always give you
what they think is right.**

block in the path of progress. I find that the Army is progressive and studying new methods all the time. It is a great gratification to me to work with a group that is interested in research and improving all things that make for more efficiency and higher standards. That is the sort of organization we want. We want the Army of the United States, although it is small, to be second to none in efficiency. The very fact that we do have only a small army (the country does not want a large army) is the best reason why that army should be the most highly efficient that can be obtained. The C.P.X. that you have been holding here is a step in the direction of making a better and more efficient army. Some of the things are a little beyond my comprehension as a civilian, but judging from the enthusiasm manifested by all the officers and the interest that you have taken in it, I have no doubt of the real value of this maneuver.

I feel that we should endeavor to get the money from Congress to continue to have maneuvers of this kind and keep up this very excellent and useful work.

We have had in the past year a great many problems in the War Department. I have found that I not only had to keep busy learning my job but I had to work on other problems as I commenced to comprehend them. When I came in the Army, the War Department was in some distress. There was the pay cut; the Army took that graciously and I believe that it will soon be over. There were other things that gave us a good deal of concern—a reduced budget for the Army and other ill-advised measures. It took a lot of time and effort to convince those who were trying to reform us that they were on the wrong track. I feel that we have made substantial progress during the past year in a great many directions. I am sure that there is a great improvement in the morale of the Army, also in the attitude of the country as a whole toward the Army. The work that the Army has done with the Civilian Conservation Corps has sold the Army to the people of the United States. Everywhere I go I find words of highest praise for the Army, which has done so much, not only in the way of training the Army itself, but in the way of relieving unemployment and building up and saving young men who might otherwise have drifted into lives of idleness, if not something worse.

The Army has been suffering from the lack of adequate housing. When I was in Camp Dix yesterday I felt that

some of the buildings occupied by Army people today are a disgrace to the United States. If some corporation required its employees to live in some of those buildings, I am sure the Department of Labor would be hollering its head off at the terrible disgrace. Yet we have Army officers and soldiers living in quarters that are dangerous and should not be tolerated. During the past year we have succeeded in getting money enough to make some improvements. Much more is needed but we should be happy over what has been accomplished.

I have taken particular pride in the work that has been done by the Army Engineers in connection with some of the great projects which are being built with the Public Works Administration money. I had the pleasure of accompanying the President from Portland across the country. We inspected the great Bonneville Dam and the Fort Peck Dam, as well as work on the upper Mississippi. I am sure the President, as well as I, got a real thrill over the progress that has been made on the projects which are in charge of the Army Engineers. I never had a greater thrill than I did at Fort Peck, where a tremendous amount of work has been done in a short time. The Army has proved itself outstanding in promptly putting large numbers of men to work. We had our projects ready, labor was widely distributed and men were put to work on useful projects. We all take pride in that achievement.

The Army has gained considerable lustre for the work it has done for other departments, especially new agencies of the Government. I refer to the fact that the Civilian Conservation Corps work has been largely an Army project. The administration of the Public Works program has been helped materially by Army officers, also they have helped the Department of Agriculture in a great many of its emergency activities. It is greatly to the credit of the Army and the Army officers that they have responded so willingly to the Administration's program whenever they have been requested to help put new measures into effect. In all cases, the Army officers have shown that they are intelligent and efficient, and above all that they are honest and reliable. In that way the Army has sold itself to the public and is much more popular, I am sure, than it has been in a long time. That is one of the things we are all interested in and we want facts about the Army known.

AFTER THE CONCLUSION of the war of 1870, Germany, guided by the iron will of Bismarck, divulged to Switzerland that the mailed fist had an itching palm for Swiss territory. Immediately an army of a hundred thousand Swiss mobilized on the frontier. They were the best armed, best trained, and altogether the most efficient soldiers in Europe. Bismarck concluded that the game was not worth the candle. If Switzerland had not been armed to the teeth and ready, that country today would be a part of Germany.—HUDSON MAXIM.

Hitching the Infantry-Artillery Team for Attack

By CAPTAIN ROBERT A. CASE
Infantry

WE find the following statement in paragraph 44, Field Service Regulations: "The coordinating principle which underlies the employment of the combined arms is that the mission of the infantry is the mission of the entire force. The special missions of the other arms are derived from their powers to contribute to the execution of the infantry mission." The arm of the service which most closely and most constantly contributes to the execution of the infantry mission is the field artillery. If the infantry is to obtain the utmost advantage of the cooperation and support of the artillery, infantry officers must understand the characteristics and limitations of this arm and must know something about the methods used by it in furnishing this support.

First let us look at the broad factors affecting the cooperation of the infantry-artillery team in the attack. What is the basic mission of the infantry and what can we expect from the artillery? Infantry is essentially the arm of close combat. Its ultimate mission is to overcome the hostile resistance with the bayonet and hand grenade. But the attacking Infantry has a long hard road to travel before it can employ its close-combat weapons. The mission of all infantry commanders during this advance is to get the maximum number of bayonets into the hostile defensive area in the least possible time. The defender, in turn, endeavors to inflict so many casualties on the attacking infantry that the number reaching his organized localities can be disposed of easily by the defending bayonets. The defender attempts to cause these losses by efficient coordination and use of the fire of his weapons. The two chief sources of the defender's fire are the supporting artillery and the defending infantry. Only upon rare occasions will the advancing infantry be able to even guess the general vicinity from which the hostile artillery fire comes; therefore they can do no more than report this fire and let some other agency seek its source. The neutralization of the hostile artillery is a very important mission of our own artillery but, as the infantryman has no means of determining the origin of this fire, we will not consider it further in this discussion.

The defender's infantry fire is another matter. Because of the fact that practically all of this fire will be delivered by direct laying methods, the areas from which it comes will be within the range of vision of the infantry suffering losses from it. Of course the attacking infantry will have difficulty in locating the exact source of this fire because of the efforts made by the defender to maintain the element of surprise. Inasmuch as the defending infantryman is stationary, in a covered position, with the best possible

"While the regimental commander is primarily concerned with planning ahead, the battalion commander is the man who takes care of the present."

field of fire, and the attacker must move from one firing position to another without the use of artificial cover, the advantage is with the defending force. The attacker must make the utmost use of the fire of the weapons at his disposal and of natural cover to overcome the advantage of his adversary. The attacking infantry will seldom be able to establish and maintain fire superiority by the use of its own weapons alone. It must depend upon the help of the other arms. Its chief source of help in overcoming the hostile infantry weapons is the light, direct-support artillery. Now let us see some of the methods used by this arm in giving this support.

Artillery acts by fire power alone. Owing to the size, weight and range of its weapons it maneuvers its fire instead of its guns. Its reserve is its ammunition. The light direct-support artillery supports the infantry by barrages or by concentrations. It fires two types of barrages, one the standing barrage which is fired in protection of the position occupied by infantry, and the other the rolling barrage which is a curtain of fire that advances in front of the infantry in offensive action. This latter type can only be used when we have an enormous amount of reinforcing artillery. It requires more artillery than we can hope to assemble except in situations approaching the conditions that existed on the Western Front in the World War. Inasmuch as a standing barrage is a defensive fire and a rolling barrage can only be used in special cases, we will disregard them. According to the present teaching of the Field Artillery School a light artillery concentration fired in support of infantry is a volume of one hundred and twelve rounds fired by one battery in five minutes in an area approximately two hundred yards square. Such a concentration is large enough to encompass the average combat group. It will generally cause a great many casualties and in addition, will certainly disturb the peace of mind of the remainder of the garrison. Neutralization is maintained by placing additional fire on this area at intervals of about ten or fifteen minutes. In case the area to be fired on is too large for one battery, two or more are concentrated on the same target.

These concentrations are divided into schedule fires and emergency fires. Schedule fires are those for which the




FIGURE 1

A METHOD OF ENGAGING TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY

A summary of the above problem

Infantry CO requests fire on machine guns.

Observer sends: "Base point, 300 right, 600 over, machine guns, can observe."

Battalion CO sends: "Adjust battery."

Battalion sends: "Battery has fired."

Observer sends: "100 right 200 over."

Battalion sends: "Battery has fired."

Observer sends: "10 left, over, fire for effect."

When the fire has the desired effect the observer sends: "Results accomplished."

data are calculated ahead of time and are fired in accordance with a prearranged time schedule or on call from the infantry. Emergency fires are concentrations for which no data have been prepared prior to the call for the fire. Schedule fires are further classified as preparation fires and supporting fires. The difference between these is more in name than in fact as the only real difference is of time. The former are fired before H-hour and the latter after.

No matter how much we study the enemy position and the terrain we can never foresee all the possible need for artillery support, and the more obscure the situation the fewer schedule fires we will be able to request. Therefore we must have some way of bringing artillery to bear upon targets of opportunity. Practically all requests for these fires will originate within the front line battalions. In most cases the first intimation of their need will be the losses the infantry is suffering. These targets will generally be so well concealed that company and platoon commanders will have difficulty in locating more than the general area from which the hostile fire is being delivered. Many times it will be difficult to designate the target by any means other than pointing. The artillery liaison officer with an infantry battalion who must describe the target to his commander some two or three thousand yards in rear has a real problem. In addition there is no assurance that the man in rear will be able to see even the area in which the target is located.

Realizing that the best way to support the attacking infantry is to bring early effective fire to bear upon the hostile troops that are holding up the assault echelons, the Artillery School has developed a method whereby the

liaison officer or one of his detail observes for the gunner in rear. The method is simple and effective. By it any battery can be expected to fire effectively on a target within five minutes after the target is identified by the liaison officer or his assistant. The entire battalion can be brought in within two minutes after the first battery is adjusted. Because the method requires little training in the technique of field artillery gunnery, the writer believes that every infantry staff officer should be taught to take the part of the *liaison officer*.

The system used is as follows: The infantry commander asks the liaison officer for artillery fire on a certain area or target. This officer looks for some reference point or terrain feature, preferably a numbered concentration, in the vicinity of the target which is known to his battalion commander. He then estimates the distance in yards this object is from the target both in range and deflection. He next sends a simple message to his commander containing the following elements, first the distance the reference point is from the target in deflection and range, second the nature of the target, and third the fact that he (the liaison officer) can observe. When a battery is ready to fire the liaison officer is notified and the battery fires on his command. He then reports the error of this round or salvo and repeats the process until the target can be encompassed in a concentration one hundred yards wide by two hundred yards deep when he orders, "fire for effect." The battery commander then fires forty rounds in this area and repeats until the liaison officer reports that the mission is accomplished. If the liaison officer thinks that a concentration one hundred yards wide will not cover the target he calls for the battery commander to open the sheaf or for additional batteries. Figure one shows a practical application of this method.

In case it is desired to concentrate the entire battalion on the target, the data for the other two batteries are quickly obtained by the battalion from the adjusted data of the first battery. They then fire for effect at once. This method requires some rapid portable means of communication. Therefore the liaison officer is given telephones, radio, and lamps and flags for visual signaling. His section consists of a sergeant as his assistant and sufficient personnel to man all means of communication. He may use one or more of these means of communication because he must go to some point where he can see the target and must have instant communication with his battalion. When the radio or visual signaling is used a simple fire control code is employed which expedites the sending of messages. Speed rather than accuracy is essential in estimating the errors, especially in obtaining the first data. All the observer wants is to get a round in the vicinity of the target. From then on the adjustment is easy since the fire of a battery is going to cover an area one hundred by two hundred yards. If the target is definitely located and occupies a smaller area the observer can reduce the size of the concentration.

Certain members of the liaison section are trained in



FIGURE II

Check points selected by an artillery battalion staff to enable the liaison observers to maneuver the fire of the battalion in support of the attack of an infantry regiment. These points may or may not be possible targets but they must be features that can be easily identified on the ground by the liaison observers. Each one is given a target number for the purpose of description.

the use of the above method so they can conduct fire when the officer is otherwise engaged.

Now let us summarize our problem. The infantry cannot advance unless it has fire superiority. It must depend entirely on the general support artillery to neutralize the hostile artillery. The infantry battalion commander's problem then becomes one of overcoming the hostile infantry fire in order to advance. The light direct-support artillery is a potent source of fire power which is ready and anxious to assist the infantry commander in solving his problem. The artillery commander can furnish two types or classes of fires on request of the infantryman—prearranged schedule fires and fires on targets of opportunity. The problem now becomes one of how the infantry commander can plan to take advantage of the fire support of the artillery.

First let us see what can be done prior to arriving at a decision. There are many factors which must be considered before deciding on the scheme of maneuver. One of these is the artillery support. The artillery commander should be consulted on this point because the ability of the artillery to support a main effort in one direction more efficiently than another may be the deciding factor.

Having made a decision the next step is to prepare a plan to carry out the attack. Inasmuch as the field artillery battalion is the fire direction unit and the normal quota

of direct support artillery for a regiment of infantry, let us first consider the infantry regimental plan. The regimental commander does not ordinarily have time to concern himself with more than a general request for fire in certain areas, but his staff should work out a plan in detail with the artillery staff. They should first plan a request for schedule fires to support the initial attack. In planning these fires the infantry staff should consider three factors: first, the infantry scheme of maneuver, second, the known dispositions of the enemy, and third, the terrain within and in rear of the hostile position. A study of the terrain which takes into consideration what is known of the enemy's defensive tactics will allow them to determine what areas are likely to be occupied by the defensive groups even though these dispositions cannot be seen.

The number of schedule fires to be requested depends upon the time available for planning and the enemy information at hand. If the time is short and the information is meager, about all that can be done is to request fires in certain areas known or suspected to be occupied by the enemy. In such cases the artillery will prepare data for certain check concentrations in the areas specified. The points selected for check concentrations will be ones that can be identified on the ground and on the map if one is available. When the data for these fires are prepared

ahead of time it will be a simple problem for the liaison officer to shift fire to any target appearing in the vicinity of a check point.

In a situation where the regiment is part of a larger force which makes contact with the enemy one day and plans to attack the next morning, a fairly complete schedule of fires may be prepared. Let us see what steps the infantry regimental commander and his staff may take in this case to secure the fullest coöperation of the supporting artillery. In the first place, the various intelligence agencies within and above the regiment will be able to make available a great deal of information regarding the hostile position. Time will be available for a study of the terrain and for detailed planning. Definite concentrations should be requested on known hostile organized areas which are likely to interfere with the scheme of maneuver. Fires should also be requested to cover those areas where the enemy is suspected to be and those which we expect him to occupy with his reserves or covering forces. In preparing the request all terrain should be considered from which the regiment may receive fire whether in its zone of action or not. The number of fires requested should be based upon the need of the infantry rather than on the fire capacity of the supporting artillery battalion, as the commander of that unit will pass on to the higher artillery unit all fires that he cannot handle. Next the staff should estimate the probable rate of advance of the attacking infantry and then inform the artillery commander of certain phase lines which it hopes the forward elements will reach at stated intervals during the early stages of the attack. Generally this can be nothing more than a guess, based upon a study of the known hostile works, the terrain over which the attack is made, and the supporting fires to be expected. In most cases this will be more or less in error, but it does allow the artilleryman to make a schedule of fire and it is more efficient to change all or part of a firing schedule as the action develops than it is to wait until the infantry runs into trouble and then call for a prearranged fire. Moreover, a battalion of light artillery cannot fire more than three concentrations at one time and, if the battalion commander has some idea of how the infantry attack is expected to progress, he can plan a schedule of fires which will coöperate closely with the infantry plan. If all concentrations are to be fired upon call from the infantry there will be certain times when the artillery will have nothing to do and others when it will be asked to deliver twice its capacity of fire.

The utmost use should be made of overlays, marked maps and aerial photographs in forwarding requests for fire to the artillery. The nature of the various targets should be indicated on the request. If time is pressing the request should be sent in fragmentary form, the first fires to be delivered being sent first. The artillery representative at the infantry headquarters should be consulted as to the amount of time needed for the preparation of data for these fires, as the time varies under different circumstances. Requests for schedule fires should be made in every situation where anything is known of the hostile

position, because it is easier for the artillery to abandon a firing schedule than it is for it to prepare fires on the spur of the moment.

In theory the infantry regimental and artillery battalion command posts are together, but in practice they are more often some distance apart. The infantry commander locates his headquarters where he can best control his regiment while the artillery battalion commander must place his where he can control and direct the fire of his guns. Because of this, the writer believes that an infantry staff officer should be sent to the artillery command post with the first request for fire and should stay there. This officer should be entirely familiar with the infantry plan. His duty would be to work directly with the artillery staff in preparation of the fire plan. He should be able to answer any questions regarding the infantry scheme and to give advice as to how the firing schedule should be arranged to give the infantry the best support. If conflicting calls for fire come in from the front line battalions during the attack, he should be able to advise which one would contribute the most to the regimental plan.

Let us go back to the infantry command post. The regimental commander is not through with schedule fires when those fires foreseen prior to the attack are asked for. The attack itself will bring out new information and the infantry commander should be planning ahead. He should continue to request schedule fires as he discovers new problems. These requests should be sent to the artilleryman as far ahead of the need of the fire as the situation allows. Few requests for fire on targets of opportunity will originate at the infantry regimental headquarters. The hostile dispositions will be so well hidden that little will be seen from the regimental observation post. Thus we see that the regimental headquarters is primarily concerned with schedule fires. The commander must be looking ahead and foreseeing the future rather than the present need of fire.

Now let us consider the problem of the infantry assault battalion commander. He has two means of contact with the artillery—one through his own regimental commander and one through the artillery liaison officer. His requests for schedule fires should be made through his regimental headquarters if time permits. This allows the requests of the entire regiment to be coöordinated to fit the regimental plan. If time requires the request can be sent direct to the artillery through the liaison officer. In this case we again see a need for that infantry regimental staff officer at the artillery headquarters. In case the calls for prepared fires come in from two or more front line battalions as well as the regiment, this officer can advise the artilleryman as to the best method of supporting the regiment as a whole.

Practically all requests for fire on targets of opportunity will originate within the assault battalions. When these requests reach the battalion headquarters the commander or his staff must decide whether the target is to be engaged with the infantry supporting weapons or is to be passed on to the artillery. If artillery fire is asked for, the

liaison officer will see that it is delivered in the manner described for emergency targets.

It is important that the person who brings in the request for fire be able to identify the target to the person who is to conduct fire. In case a call for fire on a target of opportunity comes into the artillery battalion headquarters while all batteries are being employed upon schedule fires, the battery that is engaging the least important target is placed at the disposal of the liaison officer. If the schedule fires are considered more important from an infantry regimental standpoint, the batteries are kept on their allotted tasks and the request is answered when a battery is free. Here again we see an opportunity to use an infantry staff officer at the artillery headquarters. Inasmuch as the assault battalion commanders have closer control over the forward elements than the regimental commander, they notify the artillery direct of any changes needed in the firing schedule. Thus we see that while the

regimental commander is primarily concerned with planning ahead, the battalion commander is the man who takes care of the present. He calls for fires on targets of opportunity and for changes in the firing schedule to meet the situation as it exists.

Our peace time infantry garrisons have little opportunity to work with artillery, and in most map problems the plan for artillery support is limited to the statement, "The artillery will support the attack. It will be prepared to place the bulk of its fire in the area ———" or "The artillery will pay particular attention to the main effort." That is sufficient for the attack order but we must go further and plan how to obtain the best result from this fire. It is essential that a workable method be devised for hitching the infantry-artillery team more closely together if we are to utilize to the utmost the special characteristics of the two arms in pulling the common load on the battlefield.

An Early Treatise on Cavalry

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS M. SPAULDING, A.G.D.

THE other day I hunted up Mark Twain's *Italian Without a Master* and read it again for the first time in several years. It describes Mark's tolerably successful struggle to keep up with the news in Italian papers without knowing anything of the language and without the help of a dictionary. It is an entertaining account, but I did not look it up with a sole view to amusement but rather to see if it offered any practical suggestions for my own use. For I found myself in Mark's situation, being entirely ignorant of Italian and having just received from a friend in London a book in that language which looks most fascinating. I have never seen the donor, our acquaintance being limited to an exchange of letters, but he is a friend indeed, since—knowing my predilection for old military books—he has sent me the first edition of a monumental treatise on cavalry, printed more than three hundred years ago.

This is entitled *Regole militari sopra il governo e servizio particolare della cavaleria*. The author, Lodovico Melzo, was a knight of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and lieutenant general of cavalry in the Spanish service. Though written in Italian, the book was published in Antwerp in 1611. It was evidently a standard authority, for it was reprinted in Italian twice, in Venice in 1624 and 1641, while a French translation appeared at Antwerp in 1615, a Spanish at Milan in 1619, a German and French at Frankfort in 1625, and a German at Frankfort in 1643. An English translation was to be published in 1632, but no copy is now known to exist, and very likely it never appeared. The English were not particularly interested in cavalry until after that time. Gervase Markham wrote about it, as he wrote about almost everything on earth, but there is not much else in the English language on the

subject before the period of the Civil Wars, and by that time Gustavus Adolphus and his Swedes had revolutionized cavalry tactics, and a good deal that Melzo had to say may have become obsolete.

Coming back to Mark Twain I found him amusing as usual but not helpful at this crisis. I have only a "general culture" knowledge of cavalry of the early seventeenth century, and here in one volume there appears to be everything that anybody could want to know on the subject. The opportunity should not be missed. But to make use of it I must rely on the remnants of Latin that remain from a sound university education, now many years in the past, and also on application of logical principles. To illustrate, early in the book there is a chapter headed "del alfiero." Now Latin—at least my Latin—does not help to determine what an Italian "alfiero" may be, but when one notices that the two preceding chapters are "del soldato à cavallo" and "de' caporali," and the two following are "del tenente" and "del capitano," there is only one conclusion to be drawn. I shall go ahead confident that I know what an *alfiero* is, until something inconsistent appears. Even better than Latin and logic are the pictures, for the book has numerous elaborate and carefully drawn plates, illustrating every feature of cavalry service.

First of all, even an illiterate can learn that there were three kinds of cavalry in Melzo's experience, for there are three plates, each showing a mounted soldier fully equipped, standing in front of a wall on which a full set of equipment is hung. One of them is the heaviest of heavy cavalrymen, the man-at-arms. His weapons are a lance—not the light affair of the modern lancer but the great cumbrous weapon that we associate with the mediæval

knight—and one pistol. He wears a closed helmet, and his body and arms are fully clothed in armor. He has no leg armor, however, from which, as well as from the lack of a sword, we may infer that he was not expected to engage in hand-to-hand combat. His job was to break a gap in the solid mass of infantry pikemen, into which the lighter cavalry might penetrate. One of these is shown in another plate, "light" only by comparison with the man-at-arms, for he also has a closed helmet and full body armor, and in addition he has armor on his thighs. Instead of the lance he has a heavy straight sword. He has two pistols instead of one, for until the enemy's ranks are broken the pistol is his principal weapon. The regular attack of these horsemen was made by riding up close to the enemy, firing the pistol and wheeling off to one side to return for a new discharge. The pikeman alone was quite helpless against this attack, of course; his square required a "garrison" of arquebusiers to keep off the cavalry with fire action. The third plate shows a mounted arquebusier, the primitive dragoon. He wears no armor except an open helmet. His weapons are the arquebus and a straight sword for personal defence.

The other plates show cavalry in every sort of operation over almost every type of country except mountains and dense forests. The exceptions are to be expected in a Flemish scene, and everything indicates that the scene is Flemish. It is not only that the book first appeared in Antwerp and that we know Melzo to have had extensive service in the Low Countries. The houses depicted have the typical "crow-stepped" gables, and the landscape is profusely dotted with windmills. On a hill somewhere in almost every picture there is also a gallows, and sometimes a wheel, but this is typical of all Europe at the period, and not of Flanders only. The gallows and wheel are put in merely to give a touch of verisimilitude and homely comfort to the scene.

In one plate, which lacks a gallows, there is nevertheless a lively group of soldiers in one corner, engaged in hanging a man on a substantial tree. There is an explanatory note, as to which a passage from Mark Twain's story is appropriate. "Sometimes a single word of doubtful purport will cast a veil of dreamy and golden uncertainties over a whole paragraph of cold and practical certainties, and leave steeped in a haunting and adorable mystery an incident which had been vulgar and commonplace but for that benefaction. Would you be wise to draw a dictionary on that precious word?" Now the explanatory note makes it perfectly clear that the provost is executing justice on one who has transgressed the orders about something, but there is just one word that conveys no idea to the non-Italian mind, and I cannot tell you what the man on the tree has done or is charged with doing. "A haunting and adorable mystery."

All these illustrations are interesting, and they tell a part of the story by themselves. But unlike the plates showing the cavalry equipment they cannot tell all of it. The text is necessary for anything like adequate understanding, and there is a vast amount of information to assimilate. There are chapters on marching, both by day and by night, on camping, on billeting, on foraging, on combat with infantry and with cavalry, on guards and outposts, on scouting, on ambushes, on the transmission of orders, and even a table of pay and allowances for all grades from private to general. The book is a rich mine of information on everything pertaining to the cavalry service of its time. Even if written in an intelligible language it would take a long time to work it out. This present miner has just begun.

About that haunting mystery; there is a good deal in what Mark Twain says. Just the same, I mean to find out, somehow, what they are hanging that man for.

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Will It Happen Again?

BY MAJOR LEONARD R. BOYD
Infantry

Part I

THE operations of one rifle company in a divisional engagement, lasting five full days, might appear to have but little influence on the final outcome of the battle. When it is considered that in most cases but eight rifle companies were in direct contact with the enemy on the entire division front, at the same time, it is apparent that one company does play an important part. Such a company may assist or hinder the advance of the battalion, and in turn, affect the success of the regiment, brigade and the entire division.

Company D, 16th Infantry, was distinctive in many respects, but particularly so in regard to its composition. The fourth rifle company of the First Battalion was formed by transferring groups from the three existing companies, and augmented by about 100 men from a replacement battalion formed at Syracuse, New York. This group of "spare parts" was banded together and christened Company D. The thirty-odd noncommissioned officers and men transferred from each of the three rifle companies were a varied group in respect to age, race, stature, temperament, physical fitness, and conduct. Many of this set of men were of the highest type of professional soldier—mature men who had elected the profession of arms prior to the entry of the United States into the World War. The leaven of these professional soldiers tended to change the heterogeneous assemblage of individuals into a closely-knit unit which gloried in professional disdain of danger

and sentiment. Over one-fourth of the company were of foreign birth and many had difficulty in speaking and understanding English. Others were of small stature, several had fallen arches and many were afflicted with periods of excess—usually soon after pay day. It should not be imagined that all of the men of Company D were below average in size or mentality, for replacements had reached the unit before July, 1918. One such group was composed of tall, strong youths from Montana and another similar group from Wisconsin had joined.

Early in its regimental life Company D was given the disparaging title of "The Foreign Legion." Strangely enough, this title was accepted by the men of the company, and the realization that they were considered as "black sheep" in the regiment seemed to give birth to an *esprit de corps* which remained throughout the combat service of "The Foreign Legion."

The majority of the men of Company D had been trained in France since July, 1917, and had served in the Bathlemont and Toul sectors and later in the Montdidier area. Here, they had been subjected to daily shell fire, had become familiar with combat discipline, and had experienced the depressing effects of seeing friends killed

An abstract idea such as insuring the safety of democracy, is no particular comfort to an individual undergoing the discomforts of an active campaign.



Not to eat them before dark.

and wounded. The training of the company officers had been largely that of participating in battalion, regimental and brigade maneuvers. Hence, after a year's training, they were thoroughly familiar with trench warfare routine and the formations of the company and its parts for defense and movement forward under the cover of a barrage. Little or no training had been allowed to fit squad, section and platoon leaders to utilize their men in attacks against individual machine guns. So we find Company D, after a year of training, only partially ready to

start on its first offensive mission.

The six months of intermittent trench warfare had thoroughly disillusioned the officers and men as to the glory of war. An abstract idea, such as insuring the safety of democracy, was no particular comfort to an individual who was undergoing the discomforts of active campaign. If the spirit of patriotism was present it was a weak, voiceless shadow, completely cowed by the idea that any show of sentiment was out of place in "The Foreign Legion."

Most of the men of Company D were young—excepting a few volunteers and some of the Regular Army personnel—and had become accustomed to hard work, broken periods of rest and irregular meals. They were probably in as fine physical condition for the work before them as could have been hoped for. Mentally, too, they were ready for combat. Their trench warfare experiences made each man feel that he was somewhat of a veteran, and as such, was anxious to appear disdainful of danger in the eyes of his comrades. For many tedious weeks these men had ducked on the approach of a German shell and had cursed the senders of these missiles. Few Germans had been seen and but very few shots had been fired by the company. So we find the company with an accumulation of hatred for the German soldier which was to be given an outlet in this, their first "jump-off."

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS

The 16th Infantry, after serving with the 1st Division in the Montdidier sector for ten weeks, was in "rest" area in the vicinity of Dammartin-en-Goele, northeast of Paris. During the night of July 14-15, heavy firing was heard in the direction of the front and rumors soon spread throughout the company that a break-through had taken place and that the Germans were again advancing on Paris. The normal routine was followed, in spite of these rumors, and at noon all who desired passes left the billets with orders to report in by "Taps" that night.

About 3:00 p. m. of the 15th orders were received from battalion headquarters to be prepared to entruck at five o'clock. The next two hours were spent in assembling equipment and clothing—much of which was being dried—and in making the packs of those who were absent on pass. The bedding rolls of the officers and the spare kits of the men were still en route by the animal-drawn sections of the trains, hence there had been no opportunity to re-equip any elements of the company.

By 5:00 o'clock all but a few of those on pass had returned and the company had been formed after a hot meal was served. In addition, each man was given two sandwiches and cautioned not to eat them before dark that night. The company entrucked and the column started off—towards the front again.

JULY 16-17

The truck column stopped about 2:00 a.m. and shortly thereafter a French officer, after talking in his native language for a considerable period of time, made known that we were to detruck. This was done and Company D was formed up on the side of the road and allowed to fall out, while the officers stumbled through the darkness in search of someone who knew where we were to go. A runner finally arrived with orders for the company to move "into those woods," pointing to a black mass extending across the horizon. A gap was dimly visible in the skyline and this proved to be a road, along which was found a mixed collection of companies of the 16th Infantry. Company D was pushed into this scene of confusion and halted while the officers tried to find battalion headquarters. After about an hour of shouting and stumbling the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, was formed and our march towards the front started. From that time until daylight the procedure consisted of a march of a few hundred yards—a halt, sometimes for only a minute but frequently long enough to allow most of the company to fall asleep—then moving forward and halting again. We reached a wooded hilltop shortly after daylight and went into bivouac.

During the early afternoon "officers' call" was sounded and the plans for the coming attack were discussed. The Regimental Machine-Gun Company, 16th Infantry, was attached to the battalion and the officers of that company, with the 1st Battalion personnel, made detailed plans for the advance over several miles of the enemy lines.

We found out, for the first time, that we were a part of a concentration of the entire 1st Division, and that we were situated near Pierrefonds, in the Villers-Cotterets forest. The 1st Division, in conjunction with the French Foreign Legion and the 2d American Division, was to participate



Had cursed the senders of these missiles.

in a surprise attack south of Soissons. The French troops were to be on our right and the 2d Division on the right of the Legion. We were informed that the four regiments of the 1st Division were to attack abreast, in order, from right to left: 18th Infantry; 16th Infantry; 26th Infantry; and 28th Infantry. The general direction of attack was to be slightly south of east and the zones of action were neatly drawn across the Paris-Soissons road, over the Paris-Soissons railroad, and past the Chateau Thierry-Soissons road. It looked to be a very simple maneuver—on the map.

All company commanders left by truck to go on reconnaissance at 5:30 p. m. The companies, led by the second in command, were ordered to march under cover of darkness to a new assembly position near Mortfontain.

The truck stopped about two miles west of Coevres-et-Valsery and the officers walked to French Division Headquarters which was located in the quarry west of Coevres. Here we waited until 11:00 p. m., when French guides appeared and were assigned to each officer. The guides could not speak English, and as I could speak but a few words of French, considerable difficulty was found in exchanging ideas.

The guides had made one trip to Division Headquarters before being detailed as such, and that trip had been made during the hours of daylight. They knew of no route to the front except by the main road through the town—and this road had been denied us for our march to the front. Off we went, down the steep hill into the darkened town—losing our way, retracing our steps, trying again and finally arriving in the battalion sector where we were to start our attack. So far the reconnaissance had confused rather than helped me in visualizing the terrain over which the company must be led during the following night. When daylight came all of the officers had arrived and we proceeded to the front line and tried to pick out some point on the terrain which might help us during the early stages of the attack. The front was a broad, gently rolling wheat field and beyond our immediate front we could see nothing on account of a morning mist. We were required to remain in the trenches as the French officers were apprehensive lest the presence of a large group of inquisitive officers might alarm the German outposts and result in artillery fire on their positions. When I left the front line I was quite dissatisfied with the opportunity afforded to actually see the positions we were to occupy—in fact I had only a general idea of where we were supposed to go. The other

officers, I found out, were no better off.

I went back to the company bivouac in the ravine west of Mortfontain, walking the entire distance in a drizzling rain, and found the company asleep and nothing done to prepare for the movement that afternoon. Fortunately the weather cleared shortly after my arrival and tents were struck and equipment laid out to dry. All men were urged to leave their valuables in tagged packages in care of the company clerk and most of them did this. The


blanket-roll portion of the packs, which were to be left behind, were marked with the individual's name and number. In the midst of this preparation, orders were received from regimental headquarters to

make a complete check of combat equipment. A similar check had been made while we were resting in the chateau and I had been unable to obtain any replacement for the missing articles. As far as I could see, this order was of no help to us as we certainly could get no replacements in the few hours left before we started our march. I tried to obtain a Very pistol (mine was still with the rest of the company equipment on the wagons) but found no one with any, much less with any extra pistols. Canteens were filled and extra am-

munition issued. A hot meal was served and one meat and one jam sandwich issued to each man. Again they were cautioned to try and restrain their appetites until after we were out of sight of the kitchen.

The company was formed and the first sergeant called the roll and checked each man as he answered. There was a marked tenseness in the attitude of the men as they stood "at ease" after answering. Early in the roll call there was an answer of "here" which quavered a bit and most of the company smiled. Thereafter the answers were somewhat louder than necessary and called out with studied indifference. The last of the 218 rifles came to "order arms" and Company D, 16th Infantry, "The Foreign Legion," was ready to start on its first offensive fight.

The roads leading towards the front were jammed, so that Company D, in the battalion column, marched in column of twos and most of the time we were lucky to be on the road at all. Darkness came soon after the start and thunder clouds forming overhead soon blotted out even the helpful light of the stars. Then the thunder crashed and rain fell in torrents. The road was soon a sticky, yet slippery, quagmire; packs became wet and heavy; men stumbled and fell and arose covered with mud. Flashes of lightning showed a road filled from



The minute hand was nearly at 4:45

gutter to gutter with animal-drawn vehicles, motors, tanks and numerous columns of foot troops. There was loud shouting—drivers urging their teams onward—lost columns trying to find their organizations—men cursing when wagons or trucks lost their direction and edged into them—it was a scene of the wildest confusion. The rate of march was slow—perhaps a half-mile an hour—for each man had to hold to the equipment of the man ahead to keep from becoming separated in the inky night.

I was surprised when we halted at the quarry (French Division Headquarters) for the march had seemed endless. The men threw themselves on the rain-soaked ground, utterly exhausted. The combined French and American headquarters was also a scene of confusion—excited French officers trying to find American commanders and assign guides to them. The guides for Company D were finally found, and, as I had feared, two new guides had been sent. These guides, too, had never been through Coeuvres at night, except by way of the main road, and had but one helpful idea—they knew when their own front-line trenches were reached.


The route assigned to Company D led through the fields and down the steep slope into the town of Coeuvres and thence along an unimproved road to the front line. About one hundred yards from the French P.C. the path became so steep and slippery that each of the 218 men had to be helped down this decline. Darkness and rain added to the difficulty of this procedure, and over one hour was spent in moving a hundred yards to the front. The company thus formed in single file, and, holding to the man in front, each individual tried to keep his place in the formation as it wound down into the ruined town. Most of the men were muddy and all were wet and tired and disgusted with war and everyone connected with it.

The troubles of the company were not over by any means. Our guides led us through yards, in ruined houses and over fences. One of the company buglers, Abie Goldberg, remarked: "What d'hell do they think I am, a ——— alley cat?" Everyone near by laughed, partly because the company comedian had spoken and partly because of the aptness of the remark. Goldberg's remark spread along the column and soon there was a

reference to "alley cat," accompanied by much laughter, whenever a man climbed over any obstruction. Jestings replaced grumbling and a few of the irresponsibles at the head of the column started a discordant song about the adventures of a young lady named "Lulu." The spirit of the company rose perceptibly when a man fell into the deep canal in the center of the town and was pulled out amid the derisive shouts of the company. Everyone within yelling distance felt called upon to think up a "wise-crack" at the expense of the shivering man, and there was laughter all along the column as the march was resumed.

The two guides having arrived at a decision as to the correct route, the company resumed the march up the road leading to the front. As we arrived at a crossroad the guides indicated that we were to go to the right. I felt sure that I had taken the left road on the night before and could not be convinced that the front line lay to our right. The guides had been lost many times before on our march and I had no confidence in their sense of direction. So I halted the company and took an officer and my orderly with me to reconnoiter the left road. Lightning flashes illuminated the road at intervals and I was certain that the guides were again wrong. Then a mounted military policeman accosted me and asked what I was doing, skulking. The ensuing conversation was lively, with the mounted man getting more and more suspicious of my actions and attitude. Our conversation must have been quite audible for a military police officer rode up and the entire explanation was repeated. By this time I was convinced that a mental kink had caused my loss of direction and I ended the argument by leading the officer to the halted company.

We took the right-hand road, much to the satisfaction of the two guides, and soon joined in a stream of men pushing up a narrow trail leading over the crest of the rise. There were four columns on this trail, three going towards the front, and one French column moving back. The stars were now aiding us in finding our way, and the eastern sky showed faint streaks of light. I could not understand the slow forward movement of the column until I reached the top and found a three-foot step-off, over which everyone was required to pass. The ground was slippery and the step too high for a man to get up



(in the dark) without some help. I ordered the first two men of Company D to remove their packs and to help up the remaining men of the company—but not to help up any but Company D men. In a few minutes the entire company was assembled on the trail. It must be admitted that the maneuver resulted in a rapid exchange of comments between myself and the officers of the blocked columns, but the principle of the objective overshadowed that of cooperation.

Once on the level plain, we moved to the left front and halted in a position which I estimated to be the one pointed out to me the previous morning. It was now light enough to see other columns moving into position and I realized that little time remained before the "jump-off." The company was formed in the "normal approach" formation, with two platoons in the forward wave and two in support. Each platoon, in turn, formed in two lines, so that the formation from front to rear was as follows: one section of each of the leading platoons—in line of squad columns—a distance of 75 yards—two sections of the leading units in line of squad columns—150 yards distance—and the two support platoons formed similarly to the assault platoons.

The company had not fully completed getting into formation when it became so light that I feared further movement might attract enemy fire and ordered everyone to remain in his present position and to correct the formations when we started the advance. Platoon leaders were assembled with me in a large shell-hole and final instructions were given for the attack.

One lieutenant was very obviously drunk. I had noted his good work during the advance and I was puzzled as to the source of his liquor. I found that his canteen had been filled with cognac and that most of it had been consumed within the last few minutes. The remainder of the liquor was wasted in the bottom of the shell-hole, but the problem of what to do with a gloriously drunk platoon leader was not solved. This officer was a good leader, and even on previous periods of intoxication had proved more efficient than some of the sober officers, yet I hesitated to entrust a platoon to him. On the other hand, I did not feel that I should send him to the rear and thus spare him from the hard work and danger ahead for the rest of us, so

I sent him back to his platoon and called his platoon sergeant to the shell-hole and gave him the complete instructions relative to the part his platoon was to play in the attack. One extenuating circumstance in the case of this officer was that he was convinced he would not survive the fight, and had given away all of his clothes and equipment, excepting that which he carried on him. My anxiety about him came to an end shortly after the "jump-off" when he was instantly killed. Up to that time his actions had been beyond criticism, and it was apparent to me that the nerve-racking incidents of the period just prior to our "jump-off" had served to sober him quickly.


A long column of tanks approaching from the west of Coevres set up a loud clatter and the lights through the open doors could be seen from our position. I was constantly waiting for a German shell to pass overhead onto their position, but "zero" hour came nearer and nearer and all was quiet on the German side.

There was nothing left to do but wait for the hour of 4:45 to approach, and as I slid down into the headquarters shell-hole I became conscious, for the first time, that I was more tired than I had ever been before. My body and brain became numb and a wave of depression settled over me.

A red and green flare rose from the German line and in an instant answering flares arose all along the line. We knew what to expect and within a few seconds the German barrage fell around us. Almost five minutes to wait! The air seemed to be filled with German shells—the ground rocked and the din of the continuous explosion surged over us as a heavy wave. All the occupants of the headquarters shell-hole gravitated towards the deepest part and I believe it would have been physically impossible for any of us to have climbed out during those first few seconds.

One sergeant, with company headquarters, was so much more frightened than the rest of the group that someone laughed and the tenseness was broken.

A shell burst—clouds of dust rolled into the hole—the acrid powder fumes caused all of us to cough—someone nearby called for help—and "zero" hour was still some minutes away. With nothing to do but wait and brace ourselves against the sides of the shell-hole, the outlook



for the day was far from reassuring. The minute hand was nearly at 4:45, when a solitary American gun spoke, and was instantly followed by a thunder of noise which made the German barrage barely audible.

THE JUMP-OFF

This American barrage was the most inspiring incident in the five days' fighting. We, who had been depressed and were dreading the formation of the company under the German barrage, now jumped up and hurried into our places in the "approach march" formation. It was a great relief to have something to do; the officers to supervise the formation, and the men to get into their proper places. There was some delay in getting formed as many had been killed and wounded by the German barrage and several squads had to be reorganized while the German shells were still falling around us. The first-aid men and stretcher bearers were busy and many cries for help came from the wheat where the men had lain throughout the bombardment.

During the first part of the advance from the "jump-off" line, I was surprised to see every man smoking a cigarette. Then I heard someone call out, "Over the top with a Chesterfield," and remembered that the company had been issued a tobacco ration of five cigarettes the evening of the 17th and I had cautioned everyone to save one so that each man could start "over the top with a Chesterfield." This gave the men something to think about during the first few minutes, and the badinage which arose about the relative worth of several popular brands of cigarettes, all while we were under this barrage, proved that this idea was not without merit.

I could see that few German shells were falling beyond the French trenches which formed our line of departure, so I moved the company forward before the formation was perfect. It seemed incredible that so many shells could fall in such a formation without hitting most of the squad-columns, but the only casualties in the passage of this barrage zone were from machine-gun bullets. When I reached the French trench, I saw a gap in the line of exploding shells to our right. Whistle signals did not attract attention, so I jumped out in front of the line, pointed to the right oblique, and as the gap was fairly evident to all, the entire company changed direction 45 degrees to the right, passed through the gap, and changed direction back to the original line. My spirits rose—I had moved the company in a difficult maneuver, and had seen my first tactical maneuver in combat meet with success.



We captured several guns with their crews.

The mist from the heavy night rain and the smoke from the two barrages formed a low curtain around us, and made it difficult to see Company C, 16th Infantry, the left assault company, which had started out directly ahead of us. The companies to our flanks were also screened.

The advance to our first objective—the road connecting La Glaux Farm and Tilleul de la Glaux—was a succession of short movements, losing direction, catching up with Company C, taking casualties from scattered artillery and machine-gun fire, reforming units when a squad was cut up by a chance shell, capturing a few prisoners who had been missed by the front-line company—and for my part, keeping constant vigil to see that all Germans in our sector were not bayoneted. Men in the midst of grave personal danger take little account of life—especially the life of an enemy. Moreover, these men had seen their comrades fall and the urge to exterminate those responsible blotted out all reasoning power. At one time I halted the advance long enough to pass the word along the line that no German would be killed unless he was found shooting at us. Those who have first-hand knowledge of battlefield emotions will not regard this action as an unnecessary precaution.

I noticed that after several shells had blown up men of the company that there was a spirit of uneasiness dominant—men stopped at the whine of an approaching shell—ranks began to sag and with little to do besides move forward, the threat of the shells was uppermost in their minds.

To divert their minds, I decided to try some drill-field disciplinary measures. I moved from front to rear, and with vigorous whistle-blowing, and considerable yelling, dressed up the lines from right to left and from front to rear. Whenever a man strayed out of formation, I called to the platoon or section leader to dress his outfit, and it was not long before each man was paying more attention to keeping his place in the line than to the machine-gun



Whistle signals did not attract attention.


bullets, or the shell fire. I noticed considerable talk among the men, with puzzled glances in my direction and I overheard remarks, such as: "Must think we're on the drill field," and "What t'hell's eating him?" However, the company moved forward without faltering even when a shell landed on a forward squad-column composed of a lieutenant and his platoon headquarters. I sent one man to look after any who had not been killed outright, and the rest of the company moved by this mangled group still keeping dressed to the right.

We reached the first objective about 5:30 a. m. and found that Company C was in front of us, as ordered, but that a platoon of the 26th Infantry was between us and Company B, the right support company. During the halt, the company was reorganized and casualties checked. Two lieutenants had been killed, and the second in command, a captain who had reported for duty at the "jump-off" line, wounded. The platoon leaders, old and new, were instructed to combine squads which had been shot up and to see that each squad had a designated leader and second in command.

The advance was resumed at about 5:30 a. m. with Companies D and B leapfrogging the two assault companies. The smoke and mist still hung low and within a few hundred yards from the second "jump-off" line both flank companies were invisible. I sent out flank patrols to right and left and these were promptly swallowed up in the mist. I knew that one of the two units on our flanks was leaving the correct line of attack and I had to decide what to do. The common sense solution seemed to be to cover the gap, so I kept on, hoping to see one of the units shortly. A solitary figure caught up with us, during this phase of the attack, and proved to be Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Craig, of the 16th Infantry, who explained that he was "just looking around." I informed him of the situation and told him that I was out of contact with the 26th and the remainder of the 16th, but that I would keep on in the gap if he thought that was all right. He said it was a good idea and marched along with us, watched the company come under fire from a concealed machine gun, saw the leader of the assault platoon send out two combat patrols which finished off the Germans, and continued along with us for a short way. Then he remarked that he would be "running along" and moved off toward our right flank.

The sun soon dissipated the fog and the smoke from occasional shells did not hinder observation. Within a space of one or two minutes we emerged from dense fog to clear sunshine, and found that we were alone on the battlefield as far as we could see. A slight rise, about 500 yards to our rear, was barren of American troops. A similar rise, about 300 yards to our left, was equally devoid of olive-drab figures. To our front rose the steep banks of the far side of the Missy-aux-Bois Ravine, and the town of Missy was plainly visible to our right front.

I sent out two contact patrols, equipped with wigwag flags, to find adjoining units and report. They were instructed to go to the top of the rise and send a message



I went to the top of the hill, with two lieutenants.

back. The right flank patrol moved out about 500 yards and began to send a wigwag message. Two officers, and I, who had passed a course in visual signalling, were unable to make any sense of the message and as we waved back "repeat" a machine gun opened up on the company and cut short all signalling. The patrol on the left disappeared over the top of the rise and was next heard from, five days later, at the company kitchen.

The march was resumed in direction of the Missy Ravine in face of long-range machine-gun fire which soon became heavy enough to stop the advance. While searching the terrain with field glasses I noted a line of Germans crossing a slight rise 600 yards to our front. I called several of the sergeants to me and asked for their estimate of range in the exact manner prescribed in Bjornstad's *Small Problems for Infantry*. This took so much time that many of the Germans were out of sight before a range was agreed upon and the fire order given. A heavy volume of fire was directed on them, but much to our surprise, no Germans fell, their gait remained unhurried, and none of them even looked around. Firing ceased when the last German leisurely walked out of sight. Either the firing was too accurate and the range estimation faulty or else the first rifle target the men had met found them too excited to apply the principles of rifle marksmanship.

Soon after the advance was started, we captured several 150-mm. guns with their crews. They surrendered without resistance and again I was called upon to restrain the men of the company from killing all of them. I collected a group of 25 officers and men and sent them to the rear under the escort of two men who had minor wounds.

The forward line of the company reached a small rise on the west edge of the Missy Ravine and immediately drew very heavy machine-gun and 77-mm. fire on them. This was the most concentrated fire the company had received so far. The line stopped and the platoon leaders looked to me for instructions. I did not care to move the entire company through this fire so I motioned the assault line to withdraw to a position behind the crest of the rise. The rear elements were now under fire, as they had closed up on the forward line. The men wounded during this fire were carried to shelter and first-aid bandages were applied by men of the company. The medical men and litter bearers attached to Company D had never advanced beyond the "jump-off" line, and whatever first aid the

men received was either from German Medical Corps men or their own comrades. Firing had now ceased. I went to the top of the hill, with two lieutenants, to try to locate the enemy guns. We lifted our heads to look over at the opposite side of the Missy Ravine when several 77-mm. shells landed close enough to us to indicate that we were plainly visible to them. This reconnaissance party withdrew immediately.

As we reached the company position, a lieutenant from the 26th Infantry reported that he had a mixed platoon of men from the 26th and 28th Infantry in the woods just north of us, and requested that this unit be allowed to join us. He was instructed to bring his platoon into the already crowded position and to act as the fifth platoon. Soldiers began drifting in from right and left and rear. Among these were men from each of the four regiments of the division, also two Moroccans and one Marine. A section from the regimental Machine-Gun Company, 16th Infantry, caught up with us and was assigned a place in the company. All the others were assigned to the fifth platoon and seemed glad to rejoin some organization.

I decided that another effort should be made to cross the rise and instructed the leading platoons to deploy at ten-pace intervals and move forward. Again they were met by machine-gun fire from Missy-aux-Bois and artillery fire from the east bank of the ravine. The entire hill shook under the impact of the shells and the leading line came back without command. I did not order them to repeat this movement inasmuch as I did not want to do it myself. I was convinced, by this time, that the machine guns around Missy must be put out before any further advance could be made. To this end I sent out a patrol of one squad under an experienced sergeant to find and clean out the machine guns near Missy-aux-Bois. A similar patrol was sent to our left with instructions to work across the ravine. These patrols drew fire as soon as they left the shelter of the hill. Then the fire was lifted from the patrols and directed to rise in our rear. Here we discovered four French tanks approaching us. They pushed on, under a hail of artillery fire, and pulled up under the shelter of the rise where we were halted. A French lieutenant stepped out of one tank and informed me, in excellent English, that the four tanks were at my disposal. If he had presented me with four pink elephants I could not have been at a greater loss as to their proper use. I asked him if he could knock out the 77's across the ravine and he replied that although he had been shot out of two tanks during the morning he would try it if I said so.

We went to the crest of the hill and were cautiously scanning the ravine for routes the tanks might take when one of the tanks opened fire with a 3-pounder at a group of our men who were observing the tanks about 100 yards away. Several were hit and wounded men screamed. By this time the French lieutenant was running at top speed toward the tank and calling to the gunner to cease firing. But the tank fired again and more men fell. The lieutenant stopped, picked up a rock, and began to pound on


the door. The rest of the company had taken cover by this time, not knowing what was happening. The gunner finally opened the door and orated and gesticulated to some length. Then both came over to the spot where the wounded men were lying. I instructed the lieutenant to notify the other tanks that we were not Germans and to waste no time in doing so. Meanwhile the five men who had been hit were given first aid and one machine gunner who had received a direct hit was covered with a raincoat. The lieutenant returned and with the tank gunner explained that the man had become confused, due to fatigue and excitement, and seeing a machine gun being set up, suddenly thought we were Germans and fired. The gunner himself was horrified at the results of his actions and the lieutenant was profuse in his apologies for the mistake. He wanted to start out at once across the ravine and requested a platoon to accompany his tanks. I sent the senior lieutenant and his platoon with the group and they passed through the woods to the left of the rise and disappeared in the valley.

The tanks and accompanying platoon moved straight across the ravine until sheltered from the 77-mm. guns on the crest, and then moved to the right toward the town of Missy. The tanks were heavily shelled during the advance, but none were hit. The platoon suffered casualties from this fire and from machine guns on the lower slope of the east side of the ravine. The action of the tanks is indicated by a statement of one of the men of the right flank patrol: "The tank came close to where McFaden and I were holding out, and there was a French lieutenant on the ground walking beside the tank. McFaden and he were talking, as this French lieutenant could speak a little English. I overheard him tell McFaden the number of miles we had covered and the number of prisoners taken, and praising the work of the Americans. Then as we were walking along with this tank, to the right of the hill where the company was halted, we could see some men trying to pass through the Missy ravine and were being mowed down by machine-gun fire, fired by two machine guns which were set up and concealed in a dug-out made in solid rock at the edge of this hill and in an opening for direct fire through part of the ravine. Everyone was able to see how this gun was mowing down our troops. The French lieutenant commanded his tank to the place where this machine gun was and opened fire with at least a dozen shells directly into the dugout entrance. The company remained still at the top of the hill edge while the tank was firing. I remember that after the tank crew had put the machine gun out of action the accompanying platoon moved forward through the ravine, and there were three tanks there in all. The tanks stopped and opened their doors and the crews came out to greet us. All the tanks were supplied with milk cans full of red wine. After having several good drinks of this wine and filling our canteens, the platoon again moved forward in high spirits."

(To be continued)

NOTES FROM THE CHIEF OF CAVALRY

What Would You Do?



WELL," interjected Major Noall, at one of those sessions after mess where the great "I" is the topic of conversation and the last man wins, "here's one for you." Wherewith he borrowed a pencil and being unable to produce paper, drew a sketch on the tablecloth, which with the permission of the tablecloth owner is reproduced above.

"Our regiment, less the 3d Squadron, was covering the advance of infantry by operating on its right flank, and after marching for some time our advance guard became engaged with a Red cavalry force, which it repulsed. To make a long story short, the enemy, estimated as a squadron of cavalry with some machine guns attached, took position on the hill as indicated. Its led horses were on the east side. Our colonel ordered an attack to be launched at 9:00 a.m., Troop A to attack dismounted generally along the stream line from the northwest of the enemy position. Our machine-gun troop, less detachments, was to support the attack from position as shown. My squadron—the 2d—was ordered to make a mounted attack from the cover of the ridge at A, attacking the enemy in flank and rear. One platoon of the machine-gun troop was attached to me for the attack. Troop B was to constitute the regimental reserve. The regimental limit of pursuit was as shown, and the assembly point was at D. The machine-gun troop commander was charged with the responsibility of discharging a red pyrotechnic signal for the suspending of fire of the secondary attack when necessary to prevent my squadron being placed under friendly fire. I sent my adjutant back to the squadron and ordered him to have it brought under the cover of hill A by the senior troop commander, cautioning him to use a

security detachment and to have the machine-gun platoon join promptly. Upon completion of transmitting that order the squadron adjutant was to rejoin me without delay. I then, accompanied by my sergeant major, corporal bugler and orderly, rode under cover to hill A so as to arrive there in advance of the squadron. Upon arrival of the squadron under cover southwest of A, I sent my sergeant major for the troop commanders and the platoon commander of the attached machine-gun platoon. When those officers joined me, from a point of vantage on ridge A, I issued my attack order, which was in substance as follows:

"I indicated the location of the Red squadron and its led horses. The regiment was to attack at 9:00 a.m., and I gave them the regimental dispositions as I have shown them to you. I ordered the squadron to attack mounted at that hour with Troop E, less the 1st and 2d Platoons, on the right, moving along the right of the road (indicated as B-C on the sketch), to attack the Red squadron in flank and rear. Troop F on the left was ordered to attack the Red squadron in flank. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Troop E, the squadron reserve, were to follow Troop E at 400 yards, and the 1st Platoon, Troop E, which had been detailed the security detachment, was to join the reserve after the attack was launched. I ordered the attached machine gun platoon to support the mounted attack by fire from the left of the hill that we were on and indicated the squadron limit of pursuit. The bridge about 500 yards southeast of C was designated as the squadron assembly point. I informed them that I would be with the reserve, and to make certain of coordination, I synchronized watches. I then remained on hill A observing the enemy and noted the dispositions being made by my troop commanders for the attack. The squadron was about 600 yards southwest of my position. I saw that all was ready, the security detachment had gained the distance, and promptly at 9:00 a.m. it moved forward to attack. Just at that moment, however, I noticed that one enemy troop had mounted and was galloping along the road toward E. My machine-gun platoon was opening fire. Other Red forces were mounting in good order, except one platoon which opened fire on my machine-gun platoon. The enemy machine guns apparently had ceased firing and had withdrawn. In such a situation, *what would you do?*"

FOR SOLUTION, TURN THE PAGE

Solution

"Well, here's what I did. I galloped toward the approaching squadron and signalled 'Assemble' and followed that with the signal for column on the left troop, which was, you remember, F. I directed the squadron sergeant major to notify the machine-gun platoon to cease firing and to follow in rear of the squadron immediately. I then directed the leading troop to throw out a new security detachment of a squad to precede the squadron at 600 yards under cover of available ground and to move in the direction of the stream junction southwest of D on E, gaining distance at increased gaits with a rate of march of 12 miles per hour. I informed the colonel by messenger that I was initiating parallel pursuit to the east with a view of cutting off the retreating Red troops before they could reach the high ground at E. I ordered the reserve and the old security detachment to be assembled and to rejoin their troop. I then took position at the head of the squadron proper and watched for the enemy and studied the terrain towards E."

Discussion

"That I had used excellent judgment developed a little later when my security detachment informed me that the troop we had seen withdraw was taking position on the high ground west of E, which I then attacked mounted. But, for your future information and guidance, let's go back and reason the thing out.

"When I saw the enemy squadron withdrawing from its initial position, quick action was necessary. I had two courses open for decision, one to continue the attack as ordered by the colonel, and then attempt pursuit from the rear, and the other to change the plan of attack for the squadron and pursue in a northeasterly direction, attempting to intercept the enemy in his retirement. I could stop my squadron attack by intercepting it in its approach by galloping to the southeast.

"Had I decided to continue the attack as ordered, I would have been at a decided disadvantage as regarded the pursuit which had been ordered. The only Reds left on the position at the time for the attack were a small group, about a platoon—a poor objective for my squadron. Even that group might have been able to escape before we reached them. I'm one of those Humphrev scale experts, as you know, and I had all of that figured out. Time and space, I mean. Had I pursued from the rear, I would very likely have run into the Reds, who would have then had sufficient time to take up another position.

"By changing the direction of the pursuit, though, I had an opportunity to intercept the bulk of the enemy force, and I certainly would have been a serious threat on their flank. You know—kinda disturbing any tranquility that they had at the moment. Note the stream line toward the east which would afford me cover. Also remember that the remainder of the regiment was suitably disposed to carry the attack down the road.

"I did what any first-class squadron commander would do under similar circumstances. In the twinkle of an eye, I considered all of the requirements of a sound tactical decision, I fulfilled the mission, simplicity was my watchword, and my disposition would lend itself advantageously to future operations. And gentlemen, eliminating all ego and claiming no credit for the remarkable achievement of my squadron in this instance," concluded Major Noall, "I would like to point out that that's an example of what they mean when they refer to *mental mobility*." (Department of Tactics, The Cavalry School.)

1936 Olympics

FOLLOWING is the text of a War Department letter of October 23, 1934, subject, "1936 Olympics."

1. The Equestrian Events of the Olympic Games consist of:

- a. Dressage Competition (a training test).
- b. The Prix des Nations (a jumping competition).
- c. The Concours Complet d'Equitation (a three-day competition involving training, jumping, and endurance).

Each of these events requires a different type of horse and special training on the part of the riders.

2. Equestrian events differ from all other events in Olympic Games in that they call for combinations of the best horses and the best riders. The determination of these combinations requires a great deal of experimentation which must necessarily be carried out over considerable periods of time. Because of the facilities at Fort Riley, Kansas, its central location and the number of prospective horses and riders already there, it is the most suitable place to assemble prospective competitors for training until the final selection of the Equestrian Team.

3. The following procedure will be followed in selecting the military members of the Equestrian Teams:

a. With the object of assembling the best army riders and horses for a period of training as a group prior to the selection of the Olympic Equestrian Team, preliminary tryout will be held at Fort Riley, Kansas, in the early part of May, 1935, to determine who shall constitute this Olympic squad.

b. The final selections of the Equestrian Teams will be made by the American Olympic Games Committee following final tryouts which will be held in the spring of 1936, probably at Fort Riley, Kansas.

4. The preliminary tryouts referred to in paragraph 3a will be held in connection with and as a part of the annual Cavalry School Horse Show, and will include specifically:

a. The complete Three-Day Contest to be run over the full distance. Cross-country course to be strictly unknown to all.

b. The Prix des Nations Jumping Competition, over an unknown five-foot course.

c. A Dressage Contest, in which the prescribed Olympic Ride will be followed.

These tryouts are open to all prospective Army candidates, both riders and horses. Since the Comptroller General has ruled that public funds cannot be used in connection with Olympic training, the costs of transportation to and from these tryouts must be borne by the individuals or the organizations sponsoring them.

5. All other army centers of horse activity are invited and urged to participate in these tryouts with selected entries with a view to competing for places on the Olympic Squad. It is suggested that the necessary funds to finance the moves may be obtained from local athletic sources, funds now on hand, or from gate receipts of local preliminary exhibitions or competitions.

6. Local commanders and prospective competitors are authorized to communicate direct with the Chief of Cavalry or the Secretary of the Cavalry School for further details.

A Practical and Constructive Idea

Fort Bliss, Texas,
October 18, 1934.

The Editor, All Service Journals and Military Publications.

Dear Sir:

I am trying to compile some data of a practical nature with a view to publishing them to the services at large in order to increase the knowledge of our military personnel, including myself, along practical lines.

There are many things that can be done to meet emergencies that are generally known but should be of universal knowledge in our Army.

For example, in the "Punitive Expedition" into Mexico in 1916, Colonel Albert E. Phillips, Cavalry, D.O.L. (inventor of the Phillips Pack), carried with him a box of ordinary carpet tacks. As the horses of his unit lost flesh, pieces of saddle blankets were tacked on the forward end of the bars in order to keep the saddles parallel to the ground and off the withers. This little expedient practically eliminated sore backs—particularly pinched withers—with obvious benefits to his unit.

In the same expedition the rear axle of a heavily loaded escort wagon crystallized and broke near the middle. The broken ends of the axle were jacked up, and a pick head with the convex side up was used as a splint on the under side of the break. It was securely wired with baling wire to the axle on both sides of the break, and the wagon was hauled into camp with but little loss of time and no loss of the load.

In 1917 while on a march in Texas and New Mexico to test the 1917 experimental equipment, one of the horses in my troop began to limp. I examined him at once and found a quarter crack. One of my sergeants said that he could fix it all right. Using a handkerchief and

the corner of a gunny sack, he bandaged the entire foot, after cleaning all sand from the crack, and the animal went right along with the column without further trouble for over a hundred miles until we reached Fort Bliss, where the march ended.

A little ingenuity will often stave off disaster. All machine shops and other commercial ventures constantly utilize improvised methods to solve their problems, and these expedients are published in the different commercial magazines and are widely read and used. I believe it is much more important in the army—where the lives of men may be at stake—to have a good knowledge of practical military matters. Some knowledge of practical military expedients is already published and well known, such as the rifles, boards or sticks for splints in the case of broken bones; improvised tourniquets, etc., but I believe that a great deal more data are still unpublished and generally unknown.

There is only one way to get these data, and that is by contributions from military men who know of practical solutions to common problems in garrison and in the field. It is believed that the great mass of these data will be found among officers and non-commissioned officers of long service. The undersigned intends to combine data of this description in a pamphlet indexed and arranged so as to be a ready reference at all times. It is therefore requested that information of this nature be forwarded to me.

Necessarily the success of this undertaking depends entirely on the response to this request. The response will naturally depend on the use to which the data is put. For these reasons the following information is given:

a. The undersigned will not receive any remuneration, either directly or indirectly, from this project. It is purely an educational proposition.

b. It is intended to put the accounts of each contributor over his name so that credit will fall where credit is due.

c. As little editing as possible is desired; consequently, the accounts should be brief, complete, presented in a clear manner and as interestingly as possible. The account to be of greatest value should first give the circumstances in which the problem arose; second, what was done to meet the situation successfully; and lastly, how it was done.

The widest publicity is desirable in order to reach the greatest number of men capable of furnishing anecdotes of practical value, and it is requested that all service journals and magazines publish this letter in order to inform the greatest number possible.

If you will kindly publish this letter in your columns, I will appreciate the courtesy and feel sure that you will be assisting in a worthy effort.

Yours truly,

V. W. B. WALES, Major, Cavalry,
Fort Bliss, Texas.

Major General Hugh Lenox Scott*



"Brave to a fault, unfaltering in the line of duty, loyal to superiors but never bending the knee for favor, honest as the midday sun, and devoted to flag and country." General Scott made a military record during his forty-three years of active service which few men have equaled or surpassed. But his active mentality was not content alone with mastering the details of army routine and the intricacies of strategy and tactics; he studied his enemies and made them his friends. He was a noted authority on the Indians and at the time of his death had almost completed a monumental work on their sign language, a project which he had been commissioned to undertake for the government.

He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1876. The first years of his commissioned service he spent in taming the old Wild West. Nine days after he was graduated General Custer made his last futile stand in the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Scott, a young second lieutenant, immediately applied for a transfer to the Seventh Cavalry.

He was engaged in several skirmishes in the Sioux Campaign and after it ended he was sent after Chief Joseph and his Nez Percés. Almost all of them were either killed or captured. Sitting Bull was ready to aid

the survivors, but forty-two of these were captured after a sharp fight by Lieutenant Marion P. Maus with eleven men and Lieutenant Scott with six men.

He spent all his time off duty among the Indians and became a friend of their chiefs and priests. From them he learned the sign language.

When Crow Indians broke away from their reservation in southeastern Montana in 1883, Scott succeeded in placating them and persuaded them to return to their reservation. On this expedition he swam the icy waters of the Little Missouri River raging with April freshets and secured a rope to a tree, making it the basis for a primitive ferry.

The Cheyennes started ghost dancing in 1890, and Scott was sent to talk to them. He quieted them and won a nickname from their chief; it was Molay-tay-quop, "The Man Who Talks With His Hands."

He enlisted and commanded a troop of Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indians as Troop L, 7th Cavalry. From 1894 to 1897 he was in charge of Geronimo's band of Chiricahua Apache prisoners of war and in the latter year started what was to become a lifelong task—the writing of a work on the sign language of the plains Indians of North America for the Bureau of Ethnology of the Smithsonian Institution.

In the Spanish-American War he was Adjutant General, 3rd Division, 1st Army Corps, and was Adjutant General, Department of Havana, from March, 1899, to May, 1902.

As Governor of the Sulu Province, P. I., and Commander of the military post at Joló, he waged an active campaign against the Moros. In a battle with them he was shot through both hands. General Leonard Wood said of him, "Scott had to deal with the most warlike and turbulent section of the Moro people . . . his work in the abolition of slavery and suppression of the slave trade has effectually terminated these curses of the Moro people."

He became Superintendent of the Military Academy in August, 1906. In 1908 he interrupted his four-year detail to go west again to settle troubles among the Navajos and Mexican Kickapoos, and in 1911 quieted the Hopi Indians; in succeeding years he was intermittently engaged in work among the Indian tribes for the War and Navy Departments. He settled many troubles on the Mexican border, several times averting war with Mexico. He commanded the 3rd Cavalry at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at El Paso.

President Wilson made him Chief of Staff in 1914, and when war was declared in 1917, he laid the basis for raising, training and equipping the American Army—Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker credits General Scott

*Born at Danville, Kentucky, September 22, 1853; died at Walter Reed Hospital, April 30, 1934.

with the inception of the idea of the draft law.

General Scott was a member of the Root Commission to Russia. He was retired for age, September 22, 1917, but was continued on active duty until May 12, 1919. He was with a British front line division at Arras, and with a French front line division at Chalons; he was present at the Battle of Passchendaele Ridge in 1917, and he inspected the Western Front from Verdun to Ypres.

He was assigned to command the 78th Division, National Army, January 2, 1918, and commanded Camp Dix, N. J., March, 1918, to May 1919, when he was relieved from further active service.

After his retirement General Scott was appointed a

member of the Board of Indian Commissioners and returned to the Western plains each summer to visit his Indian friends. He made his home in Princeton, N. J., and was Chairman of the New Jersey Highway Commission for a decade.

His decorations included the Distinguished Service Medal for his work at Camp Dix, the Medal of the Silver Star, the Order of the Purple Heart, and other awards.

In addition to various monographs and reports about the Plains Indians, he published in 1928 his autobiography of his adventurous life, "Some Memories of a Soldier."

(Adapted from *New York Times*, May 1, 1934.)

Major General James Parker*

Few cavalrymen have so identified themselves with their arm as did Major General James Parker. Scores of officers would instantly think of him if called upon to name an "ideal cavalryman."

James Parker attended Newark Academy, Phillips Andover and Rutgers College before entering the U. S. Military Academy, where he was graduated in 1876.

He joined, at Fort Sill, the 4th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie, for whom he had a great admiration and to whom he paid many tributes in his book, "The Old Army Memories," published in 1929.

In the spring of 1877, with a detachment, he pursued and captured three horse thieves, riding two hundred and fifty miles in five days.

He was on the "Mud March" of the 4th Cavalry in December, 1877, and was with Mackenzie's expedition into Mexico, June 13-28, 1878.


Going to Fort Hays, Kansas, in December, 1879, he was ordered to march to join Mackenzie at the Uncompaghre Agency in western Colorado. He writes that he told his men at this time, "I want you to be the best troop, in the best regiment, in the best army in the world!" Anyone who knew General Parker at all will believe that he succeeded in making it just that.

November 4, 1880, he went to Fort Riley, Kansas, and, in the spring of 1881, went to the Uncompaghre again, where Mackenzie, by his firmness, induced the Utes to proceed to Utah.

He went to Fort Apache after the Cibicu affair and soon after proceeded by forced marches to the San Carlos Agency, to restrain the Chiricahua Apaches under Geronimo. But Geronimo had already left. In November, 1881, Lieutenant Parker went for station to Fort Wingate, N. M.

In the summer of 1883, he made a topographic reconnaissance of northern and western New Mexico.

Ordered to Fort Apache, Arizona, in June, 1884, he started not long afterwards in pursuit of Geronimo. In the canyon of Devil's Creek, N. M., the command went into camp and was surprised soon after by the Indians. The commanding officer not being on the spot, Lieutenant Parker brought order out of chaos and ordered a spirited advance against the hostiles. He was the first to arrive at the top of the mountain. He received the War Department silver star citation for gallantry in action at Devil's



*Born at Newark, N. J., February 20, 1854; died in New York City, June 2, 1934.

Creek.. In writing of this action, he says, "It is, I believe, when ambushed, always the safest course to attack. The enemy's belief in his secure position fades, he loses morale, he is in turn surprised."

He reported at Fort Huachuca as regimental adjutant in January, 1886. In June he resigned the adjutancy and asked to be assigned to a troop. He went to H Troop at Cloverdale, Arizona, and, thirty-six hours after arrival, learned of a hostile trail in Guadalupe Cañon. This was verified and reported to General Miles at Albuquerque, and the latter ordered him to proceed into Mexico with a command on the trail of the hostiles. At Carretas a courier reached him with orders to await the arrival of Lieutenant C. B. Gatewood, 6th Cavalry, and to furnish him with an escort on his mission of carrying a proposition to the hostiles. Lieutenant Parker decided to take his whole command. When he reached Lawton's camp, he turned the emissaries over to that commander and thus deprived himself of the opportunity of taking the surrender of Geronimo. He writes, "I think, however, that, in doing as I did, I was acting in the best interests of the service." Lieutenant Parker cooperated with Lawton in the event leading up to Geronimo's surrender. September 30th, he returned with his troop to Fort Huachuca, having marched, since June 18th, over eleven hundred miles.

In July, 1887, he went to Fort Myer, Virginia, and was shortly afterwards promoted to the grade of Captain.

In May, 1891, Captain Parker went to the Presidio of San Francisco, and, in 1893 and 1894, was Acting Superintendent of the Sequoia National Park.

In August, 1894, he was ordered to West Point as instructor of cavalry tactics. Of this period, which he thoroughly enjoyed and during which he was engaged in work entirely suited to his talents, he writes, "The cadets crave excitement. With me they got plenty of it."

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, he was Mustering-in Officer, New York State troops. Appointed Major, and promoted Lieutenant Colonel, 12th New York Volunteer Infantry, he was Inspector of Sanitation, Camp of 1st and 3rd Army Corps, at Chickamauga, Ga.

His regiment sailed for Cuba in December, 1898. He was Provost Marshal, District of Matanzas, January to March, 1899, and commanded the post of Cardenas for a short time.

Captain Parker sailed for the Philippines with Troop B, 4th Cavalry, June 28, 1899. In August he commanded a successful attack on San Mateo. This was four months before General Lawton was killed while assaulting the same place. General S. B. M. Young wrote enthusiastically of his "great admiration" for Captain Parker's "skill and ability and great gallantry on the battlefield. He is simply superb." He received War Department silver star citation for gallantry in this action.

As Lieutenant Colonel, 45th Volunteer Infantry, he was in action at Calamba. In October, he was assigned to the

staff of General Young, commanding a cavalry brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry. With two troops of the 4th Cavalry, Colonel Parker captured Aliaga, and had a hot fight in that vicinity shortly afterwards. Of the action at Humingan, he writes, "I charged through the town with Dodd's troop, trying vainly to cut off the insurgents." At Manaog, on his horse *Brer Fox*, charging down a long column of insurgents, he found that he was accompanied by two men only. This movement contributed considerably to the rout of a large body of Filipinos and earned Colonel Parker another silver star citation.

There are many other Philippine engagements on Colonel Parker's record, chief among which is the defense of Vigan, for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Promoted Major, 4th Cavalry, February 2, 1901, he was in the Adjutant General's Department, Washington, June 1, 1901, to January, 1904, being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, 13th Cavalry, April 19, 1903. He was President of a Board charged with revision of the Small Arms Firing Regulations, 1904; member of board revising Cavalry Drill Regulations, 1902.

He commanded the Cavalry School, April, 1905, to October, 1906, and was on duty at Havana, Cuba, October, 1906, to April, 1907. Promoted to Colonel, 11th Cavalry, April 18, 1907, he commanded the Post of Pinar del Rio, April, 1907, to February, 1909, and Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., March, 1909, to March, 1913.

General Parker was on a Cavalry Board to determine organization and training of Cavalry, 1912-13, visiting Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria, France, and England.

He commanded the Cavalry Brigade on the Mexican border, March, 1913, to March, 1917; many an officer remembers his spirited tactical inspections and the eagerness of all to receive his commendation.

He commanded the Cavalry Brigade on the Mexican mobilized force of Regulars and National Guard of 30,000 men), March, 1916, to March, 1917; commanded 1st Provisional Division, Regular Army, March to May, 1917; commanded Department of Texas, Southern Department (75,000 men), May to August, 1917; established divisional camps at Deming, Fort Still, Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio. He commanded the 32nd Division, National Guard, at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, August to December, 1917 (on observation duty in France, September to November, 1917; present at the Battle of the Ailette, October 21-28, 1917); commanded 85th Division, National Army, Camp Custer, Mich., December, 1917, to February 20, 1918. He was retired as Major General, U. S. A., February 20, 1918.

Writing to General Parker in 1921, Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, commander of the 1st Army in France, said, "I remember very well how, on November 2, 1918, I said to members of my staff at Souilly, 'If I had Jim Parker here now, and a division of American cavalry, not one of the enemy's organizations and none of his material would get across the Meuse River.'"

Major General Edward L. King*

Edward L. King graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in the Class of 1896. He played both baseball and football during his entire four years at the Academy, and was captain of the football team for two years.

He served as a second lieutenant in the 7th Cavalry and the 9th Cavalry. He became aide-de-camp to Brigadier General C. V. Sumner at the outbreak of the War with Spain and, as aide to Major General Henry W. Lawton, served in Cuba with the Headquarters of the 4th Army Corps and with the Headquarters of the 1st Division, 8th Army Corps, until December, 1898, when General Lawton returned to the United States. For two years he served in Luzon against insurgent Filipinos, as aide-de-camp until General Lawton's death and after that time as a captain in the 11th Volunteer Cavalry. On June 10, 1899, he was cited "for gallantry in action against insurgent forces near Paranaque, Luzon." At Imus, four months later, he saved the life of a brother officer by disarming a hostile Filipino, for which act he received the Distinguished Service Cross over twenty years later.

During the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906, he commanded a refugee camp in the city. He marched with the 2nd Cavalry from Fort Snelling to Fort Des Moines, sailing for the Philippines in December, 1909.

A distinguished graduate of the School of the Line in April, 1914, he was an instructor at the early Plattsburgh training camps and, in September, 1916, was detailed to the Army War College. Here our entry into the World War found him—a Major of Cavalry.

After three months' detail on the War Department General Staff, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of Field Artillery, National Army, and appointed Chief of Staff, 28th Division. On November 5, 1917, while in France as an observer with the Australian Corps, he became a Colonel, National Army. He accompanied his division overseas, arriving in France, in May, 1918. The division, with Colonel King as Chief of Staff, participated in the Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne offensives. Promotion to the grade of brigadier general on June 2, 1918, took him to the command of the 65th Infantry Brigade, of the 33rd Division, with which he served on the Somme, in the Verdun sector, in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, in the Woëvre sector, and finally in the Army of Occupation in Luxembourg. During this latter period, General King, as President of the Cavalry Board, A. E. F., spent two months in visiting French, British, Belgian, and Italian cavalry units, to study their organization, tactical and armament lessons gained from the war.

After the war General King was actively identified with the development of the Army school system. From 1919 to 1921 he was a student officer and later a member of



the staff at the Naval War College; from 1921 to 1923 he was the Director of the Command Course at the Army War College; for the next two years he was the Commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. On July 18, 1929, he became Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff, from which he was relieved in February, 1932, to become the Commanding General of the Fourth Corps Area, the command which he was holding at the time of his death. He had been made Brigadier General in 1922 and Major General in 1931.

His death was sudden, following a heart attack while riding, and was a shock to his hundreds of friends in the Services and in civil life who had believed him to be in perfect health.

General King was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his service in the A. E. F. He was an officer of the French Legion of Honor, and wore the Croix de Guerre with Palm and Silver Star. In 1933 he received the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Alabama.

An outstanding athlete, he was a splendid specimen of manhood and appeared the soldier which his career proved him to be. He was so obviously a leader that his advancement was natural and inevitable. An inspiring commander has passed on.

*Born at Bridgewater, Mass., December 5, 1873; died at Fort McPherson, Ga., December 27, 1933.

Colonel Gordon Johnston*



As it must to all men, death came to Colonel Gordon Johnston, General Staff Corps, holder of the five highest American decorations, on March 8, 1934, after injuries sustained in a polo game at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where he was on duty as Chief of Staff of the Second Division.

Colonel Johnston graduated from Princeton University as a Bachelor of Arts in 1896. He was also an honor graduate of the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1903; the Royal Military Riding Academy at Hanover, Germany, in 1907; served as an instructor in the Mounted Service Schools at Fort Riley, Kansas, from 1907 to 1912; graduated from the General Staff College, American Expeditionary Forces at Langres, France, in 1918; the Advanced Class, Cavalry School, in 1925; and the Army War College in 1926.

Colonel Johnston received the Congressional Medal of Honor; Distinguished Service Cross; Distinguished Service Medal; Silver Star with two oakleaf clusters; the Purple Heart; Legion d'Honneur; the Order of the Sacred Treasurer, Japan; the Order of the Golden Grain, China; Spanish-American War; Philippine Campaign; Cuban Occupation; Mexico Border; Victory Medal; Society of Cincinnati of North Carolina; Society Sons of the American Revolution.

*Born at Charlotte, N. C., May 25, 1874; died at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, March 8, 1934.

Varied as were the assignments and decorations of this brilliant officer, the special services he rendered his country included the following:

"Mounted Orderly to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt in 1st U. S. V. Cavalry (Rough Riders), 1898. Commanded Regimental Scouts, 43d Infantry, U. S. V., in P. I. Campaign, 1889 to 1901. Recommended for Brevet 1st Lieutenant for action at Palo, Leyte, and Brevet Captain for action at Dagami, Leyte, 1900. Laid first deep-sea cable across Lake Lanao, Mindanao, 1905. Built telegraph line from Pikit to Cotobato, 1906. Member of Edgerly Mission of American Officers to Germany, 1907. Winner of Plaza Cup for Officers' Chargers at International Military Competition, New York, 1910; British, French, Canadian and Belgian teams competing. Member of officers' team representing the U. S. Army at the International Horse Show, Olympia, London, 1911. Aide-de-Camp to Major General Leonard Wood, December, 1914, to July, 1916. Organized the first Southern Training Camp, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, 1916. Commanded 12th New York Infantry on Mexican border service from July 7, 1916, to January 26, 1917. Appointed Major, National Army, and Adjutant of the 83d Division during its organization at Camp Sherman, Ohio, from August 25, 1917, to February, 1918. Served with the A.E.F. in France from March 1, 1918, to June, 1919, as follows: Attended General Staff College at Langres, March-June, 1918. Acting Chief of Staff, 7th Corps, in the Vosges Sector. Chief of Staff, 82d Division, from October 11, 1918, to February, 1919, when this division was ordered to port of embarkation, Chief of Staff, 7th Division, February, 1919, to December, 1919. Appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, 2d Army, February, 1919. Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, Central Department, December, 1919 to April, 1921. Member Wood-Forbes Mission appointed by the President to report on the Philippine situation, 1921. Assistant to Governor General of Philippine Island (Leonard Wood), 1921 to 1924. Executive Officer, the Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1926 to 1928. Assistant to General McCoy, Chief of Electoral Mission sent by the President to Nicaragua in 1928. Military Attaché to Mexico, 1929 to 1931. Colonel, 6th Cavalry, Commanding Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, August, 1931. Chief of Staff, 2d Infantry Division, November 3, 1933.

From statements made by Colonel Johnston prior to leaving Fort Oglethorpe, it is known that he enjoyed more than anything else in his service his last command, the Sixth Cavalry. His forcefulness, leadership, and keen interest in his subordinates served as an inspiration to greater effort and achievement for all those with whom he came in contact.

H. JORDAN THEIS, 1ST LIEUT., 6TH CAVALRY.

RESERVE NOTES

"Real Night Riders"

BY A CAVALRY RESERVE OFFICER

THIS article is based upon the premise that if given the right incentive Reserve Officers will take advantage of any suitable opportunity to gain practical training in addition to their theoretical studies at their own expense to eke out the present meagre summer training available to relatively few. It is also predicated upon the fact that the ridicule and thoughtless remarks heaped upon isolated Cavalry Reserve and National Guard officers (who are far outnumbered in all school and social military affairs), come from misinformed or uninformed officers whose ignorance can be dispelled and adverse criticism dissipated if they are given an opportunity to learn for themselves practically the value of horses and Cavalry. In this belief, we feel that we have the moral support of the author of "A Horse! A Horse! My Kingdom for a Horse!" which appeared in a recent number of the *Cavalry School Mailing List*!

Experience has shown that Reserve Officers become more efficient when they have the assistance of their fellow National Guard officers. By this we mean that the National Guard has matériel and men which offer practical assistance to the theoretical training each officer is obtaining, and at the same time this same theoretical training is invaluable to the National Guard. Therefore, anything which will serve to bring the officers of both components together is thereby aiding in the more finished application of our defense aims.

We also aim to show that Reserve Officers will react favorably and to their decided advantage to any constructive encouragement of Regular Army unit instructors who show, by their whole-hearted endeavors a real desire to give of their greater fund of experience and knowledge. It is absolutely essential for the benefit of an Adequate National Defense in its entirety that the three main components of the land forces of this country cooperate in peace as well as in war toward their mutual aggrandizement; that the combat arms find combined effort superior to independent fanaticism; that civilians be led to admire as well as appreciate their armed brothers through more pleasant relationships.

From a Cavalry standpoint, anything that will encourage the raising, training, and breeding of more and better mounts tends for the advancement of our arm to the better fruition of its mission in war. Not only must more and better horses be found, but capable riders and intelligent horsemen to fill our skeletonized Regular, Na-

tional Guard, and Reserve Cavalry regiments. Like aviators, cavalrymen are not really born. They must be trained. With the ever increasing use of mechanics in travel today, the source of blacksmiths, real horsemen, and allied equine interests becomes more thinned, and we, like Germany (as reported in the December issue of the *American Remount*) must seek methods to foster equitation.

In the September-October, 1934, issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, appeared an article regarding the "Mounted Activities of the 11th Cavalry." Paragraph 4 of this article read almost word for word the way Captain P. B. Waterbury, Inf.-D.O.L., explained and offered for consideration a new type of horseback riding to the assembled Reserve and National Guard officers at the first Troop School meeting in the Muncie, Indiana, Military Sector this fall. Not only have night movements in military operations become more discussed of late years in all military writings, but the need of practical demonstration to the new generation of younger officers appealed very strongly to Captain Waterbury, Infantry, unit instructor recently assigned by the War Department to Muncie.

The attractive terms offered by a local riding academy plus the unusual experience afforded appealed very strongly immediately. The only deterrent to mass acceptance of the idea was the lack of more than 12 mounts at one ride. The idea of night rides had another appeal, in that it was the time of day most officers could come without interfering with week-end plans or daily occupation. To the riding academy it offered a chance to exercise the horses during the week-days and obtain a more steady income to handle necessary overhead. From the local horsemanship interests, attracted by the idea of a military addition to next year's horse show, and an added element to horse circles to further public acceptance of horse activities of all kinds, came added encouragement.

It was decided to have three groups riding in order to meet the times available to the majority of officers. The groups had to have at least four officers and not more than 12 in order to get both the special rates and instruction. (Present indications are that more horses will be available shortly.) Thursday night was to be for National Guard officers and such Reserve Officers as trained with them or desired to. Friday night was to be for Reserve Officers. Sunday mornings were to be for both com-

ponents for equitation primarily as being easier to learn in the daytime than at night.

The riding academy is located on a horse farm of about 500 acres which in itself lends the right atmosphere for horses and riding, being composed of rolling hills, wooded bottomlands, gravelly slides, a river, fallen logs for jumping, open meadows, gates which can be opened without dismounting, as well as others that do require the extra effort. With the coöperation of neighboring land-owners, gates have been installed to connect several farms totaling approximately 1,500 additional acres, with their consequent varying topographical features of use in tactics and horsemanship.

With the backing of Mr. E. Arthur Ball, a former Lieutenant Colonel of the Indiana N.G., the owner of the above-mentioned Belgian Draft Horse Breeding Farm, and the assistance of Mr. Seward M. Price, secretary to the Muncie Horse Show Association, plans went rapidly ahead, and as many were put into effect to insure the success of the venture as could be done immediately. Captain Hanford N. Lockwood, Jr., F.A.-D.O.L., and Captain P. B. Waterbury, Inf.-D.O.L., marked trails, laid out mazes, and planned the necessary cutting out of excess underbrush and rubbish accumulated in dangerous places for the horses.

A floodlight was installed above a newly-constructed oval training ring for use when wanted at night prior to starting out on the cross-country ride. A children's class to be taught by the officer chosen for the purpose was begun for one afternoon each week. The wives of the officers naturally became interested, and several took to riding on the week-ends, which helped the riding academy also. Daylight riding more closely approximated park bridle-path riding by adhering to the trails, but the night riding was based upon objectives to be reached as well as objects to be avoided!

In almost ten weeks that the plan has been in operation the moon has been out in this locality only twice on the riding nights, so that the officers really rode in the dark! The rides began between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., and ended between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. The routes chosen and the

training program vary from night to night. Each night the weather has been growing colder, but winter riding is also being looked forward to with its added experience and training. The added sense of feeling and seeing in the dark is being gradually learned by the officers interested, and their first thrill and excitement in the new attempt has worn off into one of appreciation for the horse, and the knowledge that night maneuvering has to be done to be understood. To date about six National Guard officers and about two dozen Reserve Officers have taken advantage of the equitation instruction of the Regular Army officers on duty here, and the night riding facilities.

A new angle came into the plans when it was learned that the scout section of one of the local National Guard Field Artillery units wanted some practical outdoor mapping experience and was willing to give of their outside time to an instructor to map the farms and areas being used. Immediately it occurred to one of the Regular Army officers to plan small maneuvers from such a map to cover moving into position in the dark, compass bearings, location of objectives on the map by patrols, etc.

The *Cavalry School Mailing List* small unit problems will be utilized in getting the most out of the territory available and the small groups of officers which can be handled. THE CAVALRY JOURNAL situations from the Chief of Cavalry on small unit activities will also be useful when the locality is adequately mapped for such plans.

The movement has interested Colonel Sherburne, Cavalry, Chief of Staff of the Indiana Military Area. Interest was exhibited in the riding features of this community by Major Robert B. McBride, instructor to the Indiana National Guard, 150th Field Artillery, in Muncie and other near-by towns. The local newspapers have given adequate space to the unusual endeavor.

Not only do the rides educate the men in horses and night tactics, but the healthful experience and entertainment given, the real companionship and friendship developed have started a better morale for Reserve activities. The *esprit de corps* of the officers in the National Guard and Reserves locally was never higher as a result.

International Tournament in Berlin

January 25th to February 3, 1935

General von Poseck, President of the Reichsverband für Zucht und Prüfung deutschen Warmbluts (National Society for the Breeding and Development of German Thoroughbreds), has extended a written invitation to the members of the United States Cavalry Association to participate in the forthcoming International Tournament to be held at Berlin from January 25th to February 3, 1935. All riders, both military and civilian, are invited to compete. There are classes for ladies.

Further particulars may be obtained from the U. S. Cavalry Association.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE HEROIC YEARS. By Fletcher Pratt. New York. Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, Inc., 1934. 344 pages, illustrated. \$3.00.

The average American has, until recent years, looked upon our early national leaders as super-men, motivated by a magnificent unselfishness and high-mindedness that excluded all self-interest. Only lately have writers begun tearing aside these foolish traditions and presenting these heroes in their true colors, as veritable human beings. However this curative action has been confined principally to the Revolutionary War period and has not to any great extent been extended to that really critical period immediately following the death of George Washington. Most of us have little really accurate knowledge of the crises the country faced during that period or how they were weathered, and having little knowledge we are prone to classify the leaders of that day also with the heroes.

In this volume, Mr. Pratt undertakes to present a realistic picture of the events which took place in this country during the period 1801-1815. The result is an intensely interesting and fascinating book.

Aside from being the formative and the most truly critical period of American history, the years 1801 to 1815 also represent the most interesting period. The country was afire with energy and excitement. It was an age of violent passions and tremendous events, and never was the country in greater need of great men.

In 1801 Jefferson took with him to the Presidency a bagful of ideals; he left office with only one of them intact—peace at any price. Mr. Pratt describes the politics and financial juggling of Jefferson's two terms; the amazing naval power of the nation is foreshadowed in the Barbary battles; Lewis and Clark become the rallying-point of new blood in the West; Jefferson combats the arrogant British attitude and press-gang policy with ineffectual diplomacy and the Embargo; the Burr-Hamilton quarrel is set forth, and then the dramatic Burr conspiracy which looked toward an Empire in the Louisiana country.

Then Madison was in, with an ear to the younger men who would not brook England's arrogance. Finally the war, long in the brewing, broke. After a bad start, America came into her own in a series of sea battles, the account of which reads like tales of the old Elizabethan sea captains. The war is the climax of the book; with its end at New Orleans, American independence was established without further chance of cavil, and the most critical period of our history was concluded.

This book is well worth reading. Not only will it furnish a few hours' solid entertainment, but it will give the reader a new slant on facts now all too vaguely known.

ROBERT E. LEE, THE WEST POINTER. By Major General Charles Dudley Rhodes. Richmond, Va. Garrett & Massie. 42 pp.

This volume should be classed as a work of art rather than a book. The author's sketch of Lee's career at West Point can be read in a few minutes. One will perhaps spend more time admiring the decorative drawings of J. F. DeYoung. The work is a labor of love, the entire proceeds being applied on the purchase of Stratford Hall, the birthplace of Lee, and restoring it as an historical shrine. A masterpiece of the typographer's art, this little volume is already being eagerly sought by collectors.

NAVAL CUSTOMS, TRADITIONS AND USAGE.

By Lieutenant Commander Leland P. Lovette, U.S.N. Published by U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland. 364 pages, 11 appendices. Illustrated. Price \$3.75.

How many officers of the Army know the ritual and ceremonies of "crossing the line?" The history of announcing time by ships' bells? The derivation of such nautical words and expressions as "son of a gun," "grog," "devil to pay," "'Dutch' courage," "splicing the main brace," "boxing the compass," "commodore," "chaplain," etc.? What do Army officers know about old Davy Jones? The history of gun salutes? Why guns are fired to salute dignitaries; also why guards of honor are paraded and side boys stationed at the gangway? The origin and meaning of "piping over the side?" Why the colors are saluted on coming aboard and leaving a man-of-war? Why the quarter-deck is saluted?

These are only a few of the more than two hundred expressions and interesting customs that have been explained by Commander Lovette. Facts are augmented by explanations and anecdotes. Naval etiquette is fully explained.

The author and the publishers of this work are to be congratulated upon so excellent a production. The preparation of this volume certainly required much research, and the result of that research makes the book a veritable encyclopedia of the customs, ceremonies and language of seafaring and naval men. We have no hesitation in recommending this book to officers of the Army, who will find in it hours of entertaining and instructional reading. It is a most interesting history of the origin and meaning of the traditions, ceremonies, customs, honors, salutes and social usage observed by the United States Navy and the navies of other powers. The author has very properly inserted a short history of "The Golden Age" of our Navy—the War of 1812.

GLORY-HUNTER. A life of General Custer. By Fred-
eric F. Van de Water. Illustrated. 394 pp. Indian-
apolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. \$3.75.

R. L. Duffus, *The New York Times Book Review*,
November 18, 1934.

It must always seem a pity that dead heroes, so far as we can tell, do not have a chance to enjoy the pleasant things that are said of them after their eyes are darkened and the dust is in their nostrils. George Armstrong Custer, who departed this life on June 25, 1876, at the Little Bighorn, in the thirty-eighth year of his age, would particularly have relished the posthumous fame that came to him. He would not have relished all that Mr. Van de Water says of him in this biography, publication of which was presumably withheld, out of consideration for Mrs. Custer, the General's widow, until after the latter's death last year.

Yet here we have a brilliant example of the truth that a man's memory cannot really be preserved unless the memory of his failings and failures is retained. The Custer of the "Last Stand" legend never existed, except as the one item of reckless personal courage survives. The Custer Mr. Van de Water gives us is by no means a great or a wise man. He is a hero in the Greek sense of one driven to his doom by his own evil genius. His pride, his folly and his overweening ambition all contributed to his final tragedy. He died as the instrument of an unjust and unhappy Federal policy, which is a blot on his country's history. The Sioux who killed him were every whit as much within their rights as the men who fought at Lexington and Concord. Mr. Van de Water has accumulated evidence until it can hardly be questioned. There is enough of it to damn the man as hard, cruel and irresponsible. Yet the Custer so portrayed is a thousand times more fascinating, has far more claim to sympathy, than the plaster saint of poor Mrs. Custer's loving narratives. This result may be in part Custer's magic, in part Mr. Van de Water's. At any rate, the story has an epic movement, and at the last is heart-stirring and somberly beautiful.

It is customary in these days to look back with righteous abhorrence at the general collapse of idealism which followed the Civil War—as though war itself ever was or ever could be an idealistic performance. The truth pretty plainly is that Custer entertained a romantic conception of war, saw it through a roseate haze (he would never have dreamed of chiming in with Sherman's brief dismissal of the whole subject), and was morally invalidated by it. He never succeeded in reconciling the reality with the dream. He was one of those rare individuals who are exhilarated by the prospect of a fight and literally made drunk by battle, and who often are of no particular use to themselves or any one else when not in battle. He had something of Richard the Lion-hearted in him, something of Achilles and, unhappily, a little of Falstaff. But the thing that he desired ruined him. What else could be expected of a vain and impetuous boy, who by a still un-

explained fluke of fortune, was made a brigadier general at 23 and a major general at 25?

Custer came of no militant family. He had, so far as is known, only one soldier ancestor, a great-grandfather who was a sergeant in the Philadelphia County Militia. His father was a peaceable blacksmith. But young Custer was combative and daring from the first. At 4 he assured his father that "you and me can whip all the Whigs in Ohio." He stuck his fist through a pane of glass because some one was making faces at him from the outside. He wormed his way determinedly into West Point, though he was a slack and slovenly cadet and stood at the bottom of his class when he was graduated in the war year of '61. In 1862, still a first lieutenant, with a record not markedly different from that of scores of other first lieutenants, chance brought him to McClellan's attention and won him a staff position. In August, 1862, he killed a fleeing Confederate and took the man's horse; in his account of the incident, as Mr. Van de Water says, "he described the unhappy Confederate's death throes with the zest of a fisherman detailing the struggle of a hooked trout." That zest never left him. He could be chivalrous when the fight was over, but he certainly loved to kill.

He had boasted to his companions that he would be a general before the war was over and the boast had become a camp joke. On June 27, 1863, it ceased to be a joke. Custer was given command of the Second Brigade of the Third Division, the "Michigan Brigade." He had been jumped all the way from first lieutenant, for "no discernible reason." Two days later, as Mr. Van de Water says, "the Michigan Brigade was thoroughly miserable," for Custer, the insubordinate, untidy, disorderly cadet of a little over two years earlier, was suddenly transformed into, and thence remained, one of the most rigid and unrelenting disciplinarians in the army. At West Point he had rolled up demerits for appearing unshaven or with buttons missing. Now he blossomed out in a spectacular uniform, designed by himself, of black velveteen, with enough gold braid and buttons to equip half a dozen modern doormen.

His subsequent war record won him a name and a prominent place in the great parade in Washington before the volunteers went home. Critically scanned, as it is by Mr. Van de Water, it yields some heroic incidents but little trace of generalship. He never "waited to learn the strength of the enemy." He always charged at the head of his troops. At Gettysburg he attacked with his brigade Hampton's entire division of Stuart's Corps. Next day he led the Seventh Michigan against Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee—and later "challenged the annals of warfare to produce a more brilliant charge of cavalry." He rode under Sheridan through the Shenandoah, though there he soiled his renown by executing prisoners on the flimsy charge of being guerrillas. He disobeyed orders when it suited him, though always to take more risks rather than fewer. He helped stop Lee's retreat from Richmond, charging into Appomattox Station in fiery

disregard of the overwhelming forces that might have been in the woods beyond. Then, like any village show-off in a similar position, he made his horse run away at the Grand Review, so that those on the reviewing stand and along the streets would never forget Custer and his golden curls and his horsemanship.

This was the supreme climatic moment. His hunt for glory had no fruits comparable with this until the Sioux bullet crushed into his brain eleven years later. Were it not for that final apotheosis the rest of his career would seem a bitter anticlimax. But Mr. Van de Water, with a fine sense of drama, shows how inevitably Custer rode the long trail from Pennsylvania Avenue to the Little Bighorn. Some of the landmarks along the trail are sordid and some are abysmally sad. Like many a famous warrior Custer never asked the merits of the quarrel, provided only an enemy was pointed out to him. When war with Maximilian in Mexico failed to materialize, the only possible enemy left was the Indian. In garrison on the frontier, reduced to a lieutenant colonelcy, Custer was as uneasy as Paul Jones on shore. He drilled his men until they were on the point of mutiny, he made a few unwavering friends and more enemies among his fellow-officers, he hunted tirelessly, he tasted published authorship and found it sweet, he took lifelong delight in the companionship of his devoted wife. But it was battle that he longed for. * * *

His fate was foreshadowed at Washita, the blackest stain on his career. Here, falling upon Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes, who had committed no demonstrable offense, he fought a "battle" in which Indian women and children as well as warriors were indiscriminately slain; here, too, for some dark reason, he left Major Elliot and nineteen troopers to be killed. At the Little Bighorn he paid in full for these (to be charitable) blunders.

The story of Custer's last campaign and of the events leading up to it has been often told, though never with a finer sense of the dramatic than Mr. Van de Water has shown. Custer went into it humiliated as a result of charges he had made and could not substantiate against Secretary Belknap of the War Department. President Grant had disciplined him and Sherman and Sheridan had reproached him. To win back his tarnished glory he disobeyed orders, and in the mood of the 4-year-old who "could whip all the Whigs in Ohio" charged with fewer than 600 men into the largest force of fighting Indians ever assembled on the American continent. His madness cost the lives of himself and his command. It wrecked the life of his subordinate, Major Reno, who, separated from Custer and ignorant of Custer's whereabouts or plight, extricated himself before it was quite too late from the Indian ambushade. In this last battle Custer showed the worst of generalship. It was his valor and martyrdom that made him a hero.

No summary can do justice to Mr. Van de Water's telling of the tale. He has documented legend and made

it real. If the book he has written does not end the Custer controversy it will be because human nature instinctively shrinks from admitting that its military heroes may be at their best only when the bullets are flying. At that, Custer comes out better than some "heroes" of twenty years ago. * * *

NOTES AND COMMENTS ON THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN. By Lieutenant Colonel A. Kearsy, D.S.O., O.B.E., p.s.c. Aldershot, England. Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1934. 141 pages, index, 4 maps. \$1.50.

The author gives an exceptionally clear and concise discussion of the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign, and he follows the operations on the basis of facts and with the object of arriving at facts. His work is quite free from the defects of the usual "outline" study. It is a well arranged account that carries one along with a ready and sustained interest in its markedly well-ordered movement.

Colonel Kearsy had unusually good opportunities for collecting the data on which his work is based. Added to his service on the Gallipoli front, he has had access to much first-hand information and substantial assistance from most dependable sources.

As stated in the preface of the book, this volume is designed to provide an outline account of the operations. It serves as an excellent guide to students. The price of the book prohibits an exhaustive treatise being made on the subject of this campaign, nor is it possible to include elaborate maps. Nevertheless, the book is to be highly recommended. The general reader can enjoy it, while the student of warfare will find much of value in the accurate and complete compilation.

MEMOIRS OF A CAMP FOLLOWER. By Captain Philip Gosse. New York. Longmans, Green & Company, 1934. \$3.00.

Here is a book on the Great War from a new angle—that of a modern camp follower, a medical officer who, in the trench areas of Flanders "always kept a friendly eye for cats," who spent his time in back areas "creeping about in wet ditches and hedgerows with a piece of ration cheese for bait," and who eventually wrote this war book in which "no military event or happening appears unless it has especial bearing on some bird or animal."

Captain Gosse, a keen naturalist, sent to the British Museum hundreds of specimens he mounted in peaceful moments when away from the front line. He enriches his story with a humorous incident here and a bit of sarcasm there. American officers will be much amused by the description of the author's duties as Rat Officer of one of the British army areas. The author saw active service in Belgium, France and India. After the Armistice he was returned to England by way of the Suez Canal, Salonika, Italy and France.

An interesting volume, it will appeal to any officer or soldier who is also a lover of nature.

SPORTS

International Polo Games U. S. Army vs Mexican Army


BY CAPTAIN CHESTER E. DAVIS, CAVALRY

THE United States Army received an invitation from the Mexican Army in December, 1933, to send a polo team to Mexico to participate in a series of three games to be held in Mexico City, during April, 1934. This invitation was accepted. The United States Squad was composed of the following officers: Major Joseph M. Swing, Major C. C. Smith, Captain Lucian L. Truscott, Captain, C. E. Davis, Lieutenant Charles N. McFarland, and Lieutenant Gordon B. Rogers. This team won the first two games with scores of 12 to 4 and 9 to 8, respectively. The Mexican Army Team won the third game with a score of 7 to 5.


About the first of June, an invitation was extended to the Mexican Army to send a polo team to the United States for a return series to be played in Washington, D. C., during September. The Mexicans accepted the

invitation and arrived in Washington about August 25th, to prepare for the games, the first of which was played on September 19th. They utilized the time until the series commenced, conditioning their ponies and playing a number of practice games with the teams in and near Washington. General Gilberto R. Limon, President of the Mexican Federation of Polo, was in charge of the team. He was accompanied by Mrs. Limon and his aide, Captain Corona, in addition to the players. The playing members of the squad were: Captain Perez, Captain Nava, Captain Gracia, Captain Reyes, Captain Chavez, and Captain Zabalgoitia.

The United States used the same group of players who had represented the Army in the tournaments at Meadow Brook, L. I., and Rumson, N. J., earlier in the season. This squad was composed of the following: Major C. C.



MEXICAN ARMY POLO TEAM: Left to right: Gracia, Nava, Reyes, Pérez, Chávez



UNITED STATES ARMY POLO TEAM: *Left to right: Davis, Walker, Stadler, Read, Smith*

Smith, Captain C. E. Davis, Lieutenant G. W. Read, Jr., Lieutenant J. H. Stadler, and Lieutenant E. A. Walker. Lieutenant C. N. McFarland had played on the Army team earlier in the summer but had been injured in one of the games at Meadow Brook, so was not available for the Mexican Series.

The United States won all three games against Mexico. These games created a great deal of enthusiasm and interest and were well attended, especially in view of the fact that this was the first series of this kind ever held in Washington. However, Washington had during September, an unusual amount of rain which made the fields rather heavy and held down the attendance to a certain extent.

The Mexicans have a potentially stronger team than the scores indicate. They are excellent individual players but do not have the opportunity for the fast play in Mexico which is available in this country; consequently their team play is not so effective as it might have been.

One feature of the series in Mexico City and in Washington was the friendly spirit which existed between the teams and the many pleasant contacts which were made. It is thought that this exchange of games has increased

the feeling of friendship and understanding between the two countries.

SEPTEMBER 19, 1934

<i>U. S. Army (11)</i>	<i>Mexican Army (6)</i>
1—Capt. C. E. Davis	1—Capt. J. Gracia
2—Lt. E. A. Walker	2—Capt. A. Nava
3—Lt. G. W. Read, Jr.	3—Capt. Q. Reyes
Back—Maj. C. C. Smith	Back—Capt. A. Perez

Goals—U. S. Army: Davis 7, Read 2, Smith, 2. Mexican Army: Gracia 1, Nava 3, Reyes 2.

Referee—Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Devers. Umpires—Edwin B. Stewart and John Rawlings.

SEPTEMBER 26, 1934

<i>U. S. Army (12)</i>	<i>Mexican Army (8)</i>
1—Capt. C. E. Davis	1—Capt. J. Gracia
2—Lt. E. A. Walker	2—Capt. A. Nava
3—Lt. G. W. Read, Jr.	3—Capt. Q. Reyes
Back—Maj. C. C. Smith	Back—Capt. A. Perez

Goals—U. S. Army: Davis 4, Walker 1, Read 6, Smith 1. Mexican Army: Gracia 2, Nava 2, Reyes 1, Perez 1.

Referee—Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Devers. Umpires—Edwin B. Stewart and John Rawlings.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1934

- | <i>U. S. Army (14)</i> | <i>Mexican Army (4)</i> |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1—Lt. H. K. Stadler | 1—Capt. J. Gracia |
| 2—Capt. C. E. Davis | 2—Capt. A. Nava |
| 3—Lt. G. W. Read, Jr. | 3—Capt. Q. Reyes |
| Back—Lt. E. A. Walker | Back—Capt. A. Perez |
- Goals—U. S. Army: Stadler 6, Davis 4, Read 2, Walker 2. Mexican Army: Gracia 3, Nava 1.
 Referee—Lieutenant Colonel Adna R. Chaffee. Umpires—Edwin B. Stewart and John Rawlings.

The Army Team at the International Horse Shows of New York and Toronto

*By Captain W. B. Bradford, 9th Cavalry
 Captain, 1934 Army Horse Show Team*

THE work of the Army Horse Show Team during the past six months has been directed primarily towards the training and preparation of a group of young horses with a view to developing several of sufficient ability and experience for use in the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936. Training has been altogether out of doors, over types of courses to be found in continental Europe. The older jumpers, none of which can be considered Olympic prospects, were gradually conditioned at the end of the summer with a view to their use in the International Horse Shows which have just been concluded in New York and Toronto.

About one month before the opening of these shows, intensive special training was begun in preparation for the particular courses and indoor conditions to be expected at Madison Square Garden in New York and at the Royal Winter Fair in Toronto. On the 20th of October all young green horses and several older ones were taken to Kansas City to the American Royal Horse Show to give them experience and to accustom both horses and riders to indoor conditions before beginning the important international contests. This trip proved of particular benefit, the performance of the new horses being quite satisfactory.

This year, operating under a very efficient management, directed by Mr. J. Spencer Weed, the President, the National was a wonderful show. The house was well filled, even during the first two nights, and during the latter part of the week, it was impossible to buy seats. Much had been done to renovate the program, making it more attractive to public and exhibitors alike. The hunter classes were well filled, the quality of horse flesh being particularly notable. Open jumping classes were over constantly varying courses, usually without wings, requiring a superior type of jumper. The international military classes, in which the army teams were primarily interested, were conducted under International Equestrian Federation rules, and the courses were attractively made and constantly changed. The jump offs, in which time was an element, were most exciting, bringing the vast audiences to their feet with wild cheers, such as have never



Wide World Photos

ABOVE: The French Army Team, winners of the International Military Horse Show Perpetual Challenge Trophy, National Horse Show. Left to right: Captain Pierre Clavé, Team Captain, Lieutenant Christian de Castries, Lieutenant Armando Fernandez

CENTER: The 61st Cavalry Division Team, winners of the High Score Competition and Team Championship, Interstate Military Jumping Competition, National Horse Show. Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel J. K. Brown, U.S.A., coach, Major A. S. Edmonds with *Wellington*, Lieutenant Arthur I. Davenport with *Jeb Stuart*, Lieutenant John W. Morris with *Sun Tan*

BELOW: United States Army Team, winner of Final Event, International Military High Score Jumping Competition, National Horse Show. Left to right: Lieutenant Arthur E. Solem with *Snoozzer*, Captain C. C. Jadwin with *Tan Bark*, Lieutenant Carl W. A. Raguse with *Ugly*

before been heard from this usually staid horse show crowd. In some instances, it is true, speed became too great a factor, as the jumps were not sufficiently large. However, full credit is due the management for having finally instilled real life into an organization that only a few years ago was actually gasping for breath.

The international teams were from Chile, Canada, France, Ireland, and the United States. Chile was the unknown factor, but their team quickly proved itself. Riding in the Italian style, perhaps even more extreme than the Italians themselves, Captain Eduardo Yanez and his three officers conducted their small, well bred horses with great skill and were constantly a factor to be reckoned with. Though less successful than generally, the French, headed by Captain Pierre Clavé, terminated the week by carrying away the International Team Cup, with our own team in second place. Led by Captain S. C. Bate, the Canadians were somewhat handicapped by a poorer class of mounts than they usually bring. But the Irish, with Captain D. Corry in charge, brought many veteran performers, well accustomed to the conditions of our contests, and acquitted themselves especially well.

The United States Team consisted of Captain W. B. Bradford, riding *Don*, *Wampum* and *Suzanne*; Captain C. C. Jadwin, with *Tan Bark*, *Avocat*, *Ansonia*, and *Babe Wartham*; Lieutenant C. W. A. Raguse with *Ugly*, *Renzo*, *Dakota*, and *Tyrol*; and Lieutenant A. E. Solem

riding *Whirligig*, *Snoozer* and *Clysmic*. Of these horses, *Suzanne* is an old timer but has been off the team for the past few years due to her frequently erratic behavior. *Tan Bark*, *Avocat*, *Ansonia*, *Babe Wartham*, *Ugly*, *Tyrol*, and *Clysmic* are veterans, but only *Tan Bark* and *Ugly* can be depended upon for the Team Cup Class, where one poor score can spoil a team. *Avocat*, *Ansonia*, *Babe Wartham*, and *Clysmic*, though frequently of use in individual classes, are too careless and unreliable to warrant their inclusion as members of a team. *Tyrol*, though a consistently clean jumper, is too small for the larger obstacles to be found in many of the classes. The remaining horses were all comparatively green ones. Though *Whirligig* and *Wampum* made the trip last year, they were both injured and unable to demonstrate their ability. *Dakota* and *Renzo* are young horses of great promise recently turned over to the team by the Cavalry School. *Snoozer*, from Fort Sill, is an active, clean jumping young horse but lacks ability over larger obstacles. *Don*, owned by Major Louis A. Milne of the Medical Corps, is an aged saddle bred horse, with very little experience, making his debut this year. He is bold and has unusual jumping ability.

Of these six green horses, *Dakota*, ridden by Lieutenant Raguse, proved the sensation of the show in New York and made history by winning more classes than any other individual on any team. *Dakota*, *Wampum* and *Don* all improved steadily during the course of the two shows; so



Alexandra Studio, Toronto

WINNERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TEAM TROPHY AT THE ROYAL WINTER FAIR, TORONTO

Left to right: Captain C. C. Jadwin, Captain W. B. Bradford, Lieutenant C. W. A. Raguse, Unidentified, Colonel Harry McGee, President of the Toronto Winter Fair

well in fact that at the end of the Toronto show, with their greater natural jumping ability, they could be considered equally as good as the two veterans, *Tan Bark* and *Ugly*.

At both New York and Toronto there has become established the practice of holding one international military class as the feature event each night. These seven classes culminate in the International Military Team Cup Event, the most important of the week, both in the eyes of military participants and of disinterested observers. Military teams point their entire group of horses for each day's international feature. From time to time, where success in the military event will not be jeopardized, teams also enter with one or more horses such civilian classes as may be open to them. But their efforts in these events are secondary. Valuable though the stake may be, rarely does a team permit the desire to win an open class interfere in any way with its chances for success in the daily military feature.

Thus the full strength of each team is found only in the daily international military competition, and any comparison of teams should be based almost entirely upon the results of these international events.

The National Horse Show opened with an International Military Three Day High Score Competition for a challenge trophy presented by His Excellency, Arturo Alessandri, President of Chile. The event was continued for three nights, that team making the best aggregate

score to be awarded the cup. The first phase, for teams of two officers, each officer riding two horses, resulted in a tie between the United States and Chile, each having a total of 8 faults. Scores of other nations were: Ireland, 15; Canada, 18; France, 24. On the second night, the jumping was by pairs. Each nation was allowed two pairs, the score of the best pair only to count. France finished first with 1½ faults; the United States second with 2 faults; then Ireland, 4; Chile, 4½; Canada, 8½. The last phase of this competition, the third night of the show, was for teams of three, the horses of each nation to jump in column in the manner of hunt teams. The United States, Chile and Ireland had perfect performances; Canada and France each had 8 faults. Aggregate scores for the entire three days were: United States, 10; Chile, 12½; Ireland, 19; France, 33½; Canada, 34½. Thus the cup of the President of Chile passed to the possession of the United States Army Team for the duration of the coming year.

The feature of the fourth day was the Bowman Challenge Cup. Once again the United States Team scored, Lieutenant Raguse riding *Dakota* to win the Blue, with *Gallow Glass* of Ireland second, and *Ugly* and *Don* of the United States third and fourth.

The \$1,000.00 International Military Stake was the event of the fifth day. *Dakota* of the United States was first; *Gallow Glass* of Ireland 2nd; *Ugly* of the United States 3d; *Saida* of France 4th; *Limerick Lace* of Ireland 5th; and *Andina* of Chile 6th.

On Monday evening, the sixth event, the International Military Trophy for the Individual Championship was won by Ireland's *Limerick Lace*; *Gallow Glass* was 2nd. No other places were awarded.

The International Military Team Cup, the feature of the last night and the most cherished prize of the show was won by France with a total of 4 faults. The United States team of *Ugly*, *Tan Bark*, *Snoozer*, and *Don* was 2nd with 8 faults. Canada, Chile and Ireland finished in 3d, 4th and 5th places respectively.

Records of the various teams at the National Horse Show were as follows:

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CLASSES

Class	U. S.	Chile	France	Ireland	Canada
High Score Competition,					
1st, day	1	1	5	3	4
High Score Competition,					
2nd day	2	4	1	3	5
High Score Competition,					
3d day	1	1	4	1	4
Final High Score Championship	1	2	4	3	5
(Total score for 3 days)					
Bowman Challenge Cup	1	0	0	2	0
\$1,000.00 Military Stake	1-3	6	4	2-5	0
Individual Military					
Championship	0	0	0	1-2	0
International Military Team					
Cup	2	4	1	5	3



Wide World Photos

Lieutenant J. W. Wofford, 10th Cavalry, Winner of Olympic Equestrian Team Final Sweepstakes, National Horse Show

OPEN CLASSES

(These events were only partially participated in by the military teams, and at times, no entries at all were made.)

Class	U.S.	Chile	France	Ireland	Canada	Civilian*
Touch and Out,						
1st day			4			1-2-3
Touch and Out,						
2nd day	4	1				2-3
Touch and Out,						
3rd day				1		2-3-4
Touch and Out,						
4th day	1			3-4		2
Touch and Out,						
5th day				2		1-3-4
Touch and Out,						
Final Championship 2						1
Olympic Fund						
Sweepstakes	3			2		1-4
Westchester Chal-						
lenge Cup				1		2
The Skyscraper—						
5' 6" Class	2		3			1-4
The Triple Bar.....			3-4			1-2
The Rocket—						
5' Class.....		3				1-2-4
\$1,000.00 Open						
Jumping Stake.....	3-4					1-2-5-6

After the close of the National, all military teams were shipped to Toronto for the Royal Winter Fair Horse Show. The several days that intervened before the opening event were used for resting and toning up the somewhat jaded mounts.

The Toronto Show has always been popular and well attended. This year was no exception. Crowds were even more numerous than usual, and the attendance record established a new high in the history of the Fair. As in New York, an international jumping event was held each day and was the feature of the evening's program. Courses were larger and more difficult than at the National, and our horses were somewhat slow in starting. However, they finished particularly well, winning the feature event on each of the last three days, including the much coveted International Team Cup.

The course in this event was big and difficult, including jumps up to five feet in height, and some quite broad. Only three horses were allowed in Toronto, whereas in New York four had been used, the three high scores counting. In making the final selection of the team, preference was given to experience, despite the greater natural jumping ability of the new horses. The veterans, *Tan Bark* and *Ugly*, with one new horse, *Don*, were chosen. Each acquitted himself well, and the United States Team finished in the lead with a score of 9 points, the faults being evenly divided between its three entries. Ireland was second with 13; then Chile, France and Canada in the order named. This marks the third victory of the United States Army Team in the past six years.

*This column includes also all military entries from the U. S. that are not a part of the Army Team. Several classes, in which the military won nothing, have not been included.

Results in the International Military Classes:

RESULTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY CLASSES

International Military Class	U. S.	Chile	France	Ireland	Canada
Military Jumping Stake	3-5	2	1	0	0
Military Broad Jump	5	0	2-3	1	4
Military Teams of 3 Abreast	5	1-2	4	3	0
Military Figure of Eight.....	3-5	0	0	1-2-4	0
Military Handy Jumper	3-5	1-2	4	0	0
Military Touch and Out....	1-2-3-4	0	0	0	0
Open Military and Civilian					
Sweepstake*	1-3	0	0	2-6	4-5
International Military Team					
Trophy	1	3	4	2	5

This trip of the Army Horse Show Team afforded an excellent opportunity to try out new Olympic prospects. The successful performances of the new horses in these competitions mark a definite step forward in our preparations for the Olympic Games in 1936.

The Fort Meade Fall Horse Show

THE Fall Horse Show at Fort Meade, South Dakota, October 17-20, 1934, was well attended by local residents and visitors from the surrounding towns of Deadwood, Lead, Rapid City, and Sturgis. Major and Mrs. Seymour, V.C., Captain Malloy, Q.M.C., and Captain and Mrs. Fred W. Koester, Q.M.C. (Cav.), all from Fort Robinson, Nebraska, Remount Depot, attended the show, and these officers officiated as judges in most of the events. Much credit is due Lieutenants Bixel, Trapnell and Prunty, who had charge of the preparations, for arranging and staging a most interesting and enjoyable show. The garrison is also grateful to its Commanding Officer, Colonel W. R. Pope, 4th Cavalry, for his interest and active coöperation, best illustrated by the fact that he himself competed in several jumping events.

Following are the results:

CLASS I—LIGHT, MIDDLE, AND HEAVYWEIGHT HUNTERS

- 1st, Corporal Eckmann, Troop F, on *Bozo*
- 2nd, Private Barger, M.G. Troop, on *Bison*
- 3rd, Pfc. Shy, Troop A, on *Chester*
- 4th, Private Schrum, Hq. Troop, on *Hungry*

CLASS II—HUNTERS PRIVATELY OWNED

- 1st, Lieutenant Bixel, on *Mad Sister*
- 2nd, Miss Jean Blakelock, on *Madam Pele*
- 3rd, Captain Cramer, on *Glen Garry*
- 4th, Captain Barriger, on *Dixie Charnell*

CLASS III—LADIES' HUNTERS

- 1st, Miss Jean Blakelock, on *Kitchener*
- 2nd, Miss Jean Krough, on *Chief*
- 3rd, Mrs. D. H. Blakelock, on *Madam Pele*
- 4th, Miss Sidwell, on *Cimron*

*NOTE: This was an open class but is included here as there was no military class on this day, and the international teams were consequently all fully represented, except France, who showed only two horses.

CLASS IV—HUNT TEAMS

- 1st, Team No. 2, Lieutenant Stodter, on *March Along*; Mrs. Stodter, on *Copper King*; Lieutenant Prunty, on *Snip*
 2nd, Team No. 4, Lieutenant Trapnell, on *Dutch*; Lieutenant Morrison, on *Bison*; Lieutenant Bixel, on *Riggs*
 3rd, Team No. 3, Major Minton, on *Bob*; Major McLennan, on *Cimron*; Captain Barriger, on *Dixie*
 4th, Team No. 1, Colonel Pope, on *Foxy*; Major Blake-lock, on *Stella*; Lieutenant Trapnell, on *Chester*

CLASS V—NOVICE JUMPERS

- 1st, Lieutenant Morrison, on *Bison*
 2nd, Major McLennan, on *Cimron*
 3rd, Lieutenant Stodter, on *March Along*

CLASS VI—LADIES' JUMPERS

- 1st, Miss Sidwell, on *Cimron*
 2nd, Miss Jean Krough, on *Chief*
 3rd, Mrs. Stodter, on *Glen Garry*
 4th, Miss Jean Blakelock, on *Kitchener*

CLASS VII—OFFICERS' JUMPING

- 1st, Captain Cramer, on *Glen Garry*
 2nd, Major McLennan, on *Cimron*
 3rd, Lieutenant Trapnell, on *Stella*
 4th, Major Minton, on *Bob*

CLASS VIII—TOUCH AND OUT

- 1st, Pfc. Harwick, Hq. Troop, on *Chick*
 2nd, Corporal Lawton, Troop F, on *Pee Wee*
 3rd, Sergeant Shipton, M.G. Troop, on *Dutch*

CLASS IX—ENLISTED MENS' JUMPING

- 1st, Pfc. Harwick, Hq. Troop, on *Chick*
 2nd, Pvt. Schrum, Hq. Troop, on *March Along*
 3rd, Corporal Lawton, Troop F, on *Pee Wee*

CLASS X—LIGHTWEIGHT POLO

- 1st, Lieutenant Morrison, on *Babe*
 2nd, Captain Cramer, on *Tillie*
 3rd, Lieutenant Stodter, on *Shorty*
 4th, Lieutenant Land, on *Kid*

CLASS XI—HEAVYWEIGHT POLO PONIES

- 1st, Lieutenant Trapnell, on *Jack*
 2nd, Lieutenant Morrison, on *Queen*
 3rd, Lieutenant Stodter, on *Buffalo*

CLASS XII—GREEN POLO PONIES

- 1st, Lieutenant Bixel, on *Mad Sister*
 2nd, Major Jones, on *Princess*
 3rd, Lieutenant Morrison, on *Queen*
 4th, Lieutenant Land, on *Poke, Jr.*

CLASS XIII—PACK JUMPING

- 1st, Private Rice, Hq. Troop. Horses: *Henry* and *Silver*
 2nd, Pfc. Shy, Troop A. Horses: *Larry* and *Baldy*
 3rd, Pfc. Schoeberl, Troop E. Horses: *Bones* and *Emmit*
 4th, Private Remer, M.G. Troop. Horses: *Colombo* and *Smokey*

CLASS XIV—RIFLE SQUAD COMPETITION

- 1st, Corporal Pell's Squad, Troop A
 2nd, Corporal Erickson's Squad, Troop E
 3rd, Corporal Crawford's Squad, Troop B
 4th, Corporal Waldy's Squad, Troop F

CLASS XV—MACHINE GUN SQUAD COMPETITION

- 1st, 4th Squad. Corporal Vander Ark, M.G. Troop.

CLASS XVI—SPRING WAGON

- 1st, Troop E
 2nd, Troop F
 3rd, Troop A
 4th, Troop B

CLASS XVII—BEST TURNED OUT TROOPER

- 1st, Corporal Ades, M.G. Troop, on *Dopey*
 2nd, Corporal Crawford, Troop B, on *Tillie*
 3rd, Corporal Storm, Troop E, on *Du Salle*
 4th, Private Burns, Troop A, on *Peggy*

CLASS XVIII—ROAD HACKS

- 1st, Mrs. Modisette, on *Sand Toy*
 2nd, Bouton Jones, on *Princess*
 3rd, Mrs. Stodter, on *Mad Sister*
 4th, Miss Virginia Morrison, on *Queen*

CLASS XIX—CHILDREN'S SADDLE CLASS

- 1st, David Blakelock, on *Princess*
 2nd, Bouton Jones, on *Princess*
 3rd, Bob Shaw, on *Dixie*
 4th, Jack Blakelock, on *Madam Pele*

CLASS XX—THREE DAY EVENT

- 1st, Sergeant Green, Troop B, on *Bon Bon*
 2nd, Sergeant Brossard, Hq. Troop, on *Sandy*
 3rd, 1st Sgt. Sutton, M.G. Troop, on *Belle Rose*
 4th, Sergeant Hutcheson, Troop A, on *Stella*

CLASS XXI—NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS' NIGHT RIDE

- 1st, Sergeant Kadera, Troop B, on *Rob Roy*
 2nd, Sergeant Hutcherson, Troop A, on *Peter Pan*
 3rd, Corporal Campese, Hq. Troop, on *Octolong*
 4th, Corporal Ades, M.G. Troop, on *Lummox*
 4th, Sergeant Green, Troop B, on *Sonny Boy*

EVENT NO. I—ENLISTED MEN'S RACE. TWO FURLONGS

- 1st, Corporal Lawton, Troop F, on *Tillie*
 2nd, Private Whiteaker, Troop F, on *Steve*
 3rd, Private Burns, Troop A, on *Peggy*

EVENT NO. II—RESCUE RACE

- 1st, Privates Price and Lambert, Troop E
 2nd, Privates Goman and Wiljamen, Troop B
 3rd, Privates Peterson and Necklace, Troop B

EVENT NO. III—MOUNTED WRESTLING

- 1st, Private Jensen, Hq. Troop
 2nd, Private Dudley, Hq. Troop
 3rd, Private Moorman, Hq. Troop

EVENT NO. IV—EQUIPMENT RACE

- 1st, Corporal Leep, Troop A
 2nd, Private Price, Troop E
 3rd, Private Gjovig, Troop F

Professional Notes and Discussion

Windolph, Benteen and Custer

EDITOR THE CAVALRY JOURNAL:

In your January-February issue appeared an account of an alleged episode connected with the battle of the Little Big Horn, which calls for some comment. This account was first printed some four years ago in a western periodical now defunct, and the narrator was Sergeant Charles A. Windolph, formerly of Benteen's company (H) of the Seventh Cavalry. In the story Windolph represents himself as having been, on the morning of June 25, 1876, near a gathering of officers of the regiment, all of whom "seemed to be talking very earnestly." What particularly stuck to his memory was a question alleged to have been asked of Custer by Benteen, with an answer alleged to have been made by Custer. "Hadh't we better keep the regiment together? If that is a big camp, we will need every man we have," suggested Benteen, and Custer's only reply was, "You have your orders. Sound to horse." Fifty-four years afterward Windolph gave this remarkable story to the press.

It is an ancient and a wise observation that the memory is a treacherous thing and that with the passage of years it becomes less and less dependable. Not only does it develop blind spots of blank forgetfulness regarding things of note, but also it fuses with the imagination to create visions of things that never happened. This story is simple fantasy, without the slightest basis of fact. Sergeant Windolph's memory has played him a sad trick.

Obviously the story relates to the halt of the regiment, a little east of the divide, from 10:30 to 11:45 on the morning of the first day's battle and to the gathering of officers in response to Custer's call shortly before the march was resumed. There are a number of reasons why the episode *could* not have happened, and further there is documentary evidence that it *did* not happen. In the first place, no such incident could have remained so long in oblivion. If the story could possibly be true, where was it slumbering all the fifty-four years between the day of the battle and the time Windolph gave it to the press? Godfrey was at the scene and walked from it, as he has said, with Benteen. If he had known of such an incident he would have related it. How could it have been overlooked by all the other surviving officers (and presumably some of the privates) who must have heard the conversation? How could it have escaped mention during the more than twenty days of rigorous questioning at the Court of Inquiry? How could Benteen, for thirty-one years of his life zealously engaged in belittling the character of Custer, have ignored so pertinent a count in his indictment?

In each of its details the account sets down as fact what is clearly and demonstrably illusion. The statement that "all of the officers seemed to be talking earnestly" is at variance with all the other testimony, which represents

Custer as the sole speaker. As, at the time, there had been no suggestion of dividing the regiment, Benteen could not have proffered the suggestion of keeping it together. Nor could he have used the expression about the "big camp," because he always maintained (even though, as Godfrey says, mistakenly) that Custer denied its existence. Nor could Custer have told Benteen, "You have your orders," because no specific orders had then been given. Nor could Custer, at that particular time, have voiced the order, "Sound to horse."

It will be noticed that Custer's alleged reply presents the General in the light of an arrogant and arbitrary commander, unwilling, even in the face of a critical situation, to listen to the counsel of a subordinate. Whatever the manner of Custer in the field may ordinarily have been, there is evidence that on this march it was considerate if not uniformly courteous, and toward his implacable enemy, Benteen, conciliatory. Benteen has himself written that Custer gratefully accepted his suggestions regarding the handling of the pack train, and has further written that in an open criticism of some of the officers for non-observance of certain regulations he qualified his censure by saying, "Colonel Benteen, for your own information I will state that none of my remarks have been directed at you."

The story is thus, by internal evidence, self-destructive. It happens, moreover, that each of the two main parts has been specifically refuted by the survivor of the two principals. About 1891 or 1892 Benteen wrote a narrative, some 5,000 words long, of the march of the 7th Cavalry from the mouth of the Rosebud to the battlefield. It has never been published, though several typescripts have been made of it, one of which is in my possession. According to Benteen, Custer announced, on his return from the Crow's Nest, that though the Crow scouts had declared "they could see dust, Indians and ponies and all that," he could see nothing and "didn't believe there was anything to be seen." Benteen thereupon says that he himself *did* believe that the scouts were right—a presentiment told him so—and adds, "However, 'twasn't my 'chip in,' so I said *nothing*." (Italics mine.)

So much for what Benteen is alleged to have said to Custer. What Custer actually said to Benteen is also a matter of documentary evidence. After Custer informed his officers that since the command had been discovered he would attack at once, he announced that the first officer who reported his company ready should have the advance, and then dismissed them. Benteen, walking from the scene, and getting from his lieutenant, Gibson, either a signal or a shout that everything was in readiness, turned and so reported to Custer. The General thereupon called out, "*Colonel Benteen, you have the advance.*" In slightly differing forms Benteen wrote this to his wife

immediately after the battle; he repeated it on the stand at the Court of Inquiry, and he again repeated it in his Narrative. Godfrey has, in the main, confirmed this statement, and Gibson, in a letter to Godfrey (Sept. 8, 1918) has mentioned his own part in the incident.

There is thus in the story not even a shred of fact. Of the two or three hundred fictions in circulation regarding Custer and his last battle, this one, apparently the youngest of the lot, has perhaps the least excuse for being.

W. J. GHENT.

1840 California Street,
Washington, D. C.

Dull Knife

EDITOR, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I don't like to spoil a good story, but Major Joseph Mills Hanson is certainly greatly mistaken in his article on General Ranald Mackenzie (in your March issue), wherein he states that Chief Dull Knife was killed "with six bullets through his body," in Mackenzie's raid on Dull Knife's village in November of 1876.

Any Western historian knows that Dull Knife was not killed, because he was later a prisoner (practically) with his band, down in the Indian Territory. There his people began to die off like flies, because they were not used to any such climate, and after repeated pleadings to be allowed to return to their Northern range, Dull Knife and his band broke away and started north, dodging the troops which were set on his trail in all directions and managing to get into the Nebraska sandhills, where they were finally compelled to surrender after a hot skirmish in which many were killed. They were taken as prisoners to Fort Robinson, and orders were issued for their return to the Indian Territory in the dead of winter. They refused to go, and finally General H. W. Wessels (in command at Robinson) ordered their fuel, lights, water, and food cut off until they agreed to go peaceably back to the Indian Territory. They still refused to go.

When these Indians were captured in the Nebraska sandhills and taken back to Robinson, they were not searched, and unknown to anyone but themselves, the squaws had many rifles concealed under their skirts. After the Indians had been placed in an old barrack building they took up a section of the floor and hid the guns until a favorable time to make a break came. It came after staving off matters for three days after refusing to go back south. One night they broke out again, killed the guard, and with their women and children, started another campaign of trouble. They were pursued of course and of course were again corralled, and many of them were killed. Dull Knife, however, escaped capture.

Somewhere among my files I have the date of his death on a reservation—a natural death, and not "with six bullets through his body." These are the facts about Dull

Knife, a keen strategist and an Indian general worthy any white soldier's steel.

Yours very truly,

E. A. BRINSTOOL.

Box 1072, Station C,
Los Angeles, California.

COLONEL GEORGE M. RUSSELL,
Editor, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Russell:

The letter of Mr. E. A. Brininstool addressed to you, which you kindly passed on to me, I have read with interest. In my article, to which he alludes, concerning the late General Ranald S. Mackenzie—which appeared, not in the March issue of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, as Mr. Brininstool erroneously states, but in the January-February issue, I evidently did not look quite far enough for facts concerning the later career of the Cheyenne Indian, Dull Knife. I am glad to acknowledge, on Mr. Brininstool's testimony, that Chief Dull Knife was not killed, as I stated, "with six bullets through his body," on the occasion of Mackenzie's attack on his village in November, 1876. However, as I was writing a biographical study of Ranald Mackenzie, not of Dull Knife, of whose life I have never had occasion to make any detailed examinations, I thought it sufficient, in briefly describing this one incident out of many in Mackenzie's career, to refer only to one or two recognized authorities on Western history.

One of these, Dr. Cyrus Townsend Brady, who, in his *Indian Fights and Fighters*, published in 1904, contributed many facts not previously known to the general public about the Little Big Horn campaign, stated on page 315 of that work, in his account of "Mackenzie's Winter Battle," that when Mackenzie's men had captured the camp of the Cheyenne, "Dull Knife, their leader, was found in the village with half a dozen bullets in him. He had fought gallantly in the open until he died."

Major William A. Ganoe seemed to confirm Brady by the statement on page 342 of his *History of the United States Army*, published in 1924, that "the Indians fled naked from their wigwams, or cut slits in their tipis from which they fired. Many of their numbers were killed, their horses taken, and their chief Dull Knife lost."

It would appear that the historians mentioned, both careful writers, were wrongly informed in this case. But, though the noted Indian evidently did not meet his death as indicated above, neither, according to various other authorities, is it at all certain that he died a natural death on a reservation, as Mr. Brininstool believes. After reading his letter I took the trouble to look into the matter a little further. In Bulletin No. 30, Part 1, of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, entitled, "Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico," I find a biographical article on Dull Knife by Agnes

(Concluded on page 80)

THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESS

REVIEWED BY MAJOR ALEXANDER L. P. JOHNSON, INFANTRY

CANADA—*Canadian Defense Quarterly*—July, 1934.
AN APPRECIATION OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE SITUATION. By Lieut. W. W. Goforth, M.A., F.R.S.S.,
17th Duke of York Canadian Hussars.

Believing that a second Russo-Japanese war is highly probable eventually though not necessarily inevitable, the author seeks to fathom the implications of such a conflict in the light of published facts and some personal familiarity with the Far Eastern arena. He believes that only a substantial reversal of present policies and historic aspirations of both countries can avert a clash within the next five or ten years. The trend of events, in his opinion, points to an armed conflict. The fundamental causes are deeply grounded in history, clearly defined by geography, but superficially expressed by a conflict of economic interest.

Analyzing the economic factors, the author finds railways, fisheries and trade at the bottom of the dispute. The Chinese Eastern Railway divides Northern Manchuria and connects Vladivostok with the Trans-Siberian Railway. In the author's well-founded opinion, the Power which controls the C.E.R. necessarily dominates Northern Manchuria, and determines the fate of Vladivostok and Maritime Siberia in time of war, while at the same time it threatens or protects Korea and the more populous southern portion of Manchuria.

Siberian coastal waters contain the most valuable fisheries in the Western Pacific. Although the treaty of Portsmouth conceded fishing rights to Japan in those waters, the terms of this right have given rise to frequent controversies between the two powers. Russia and Japan have for many years competed for the trade of North China. In recent years Japan has been gaining steadily on its rival.

Among the geographical factors, the author points out that Manchuria constitutes the bridgehead of Korea—gateway to Japan. For Japan, therefore, it is not so much an area of economic exploitation, as a necessary insurance against invasion. At the same time, this bridgehead is a threat to Russia's hold on the Siberian coast. Therein, the author states, lies the unavoidable root of controversy. If Japan abandon Manchuria, she will create for Russia in Vladivostok an almost impregnable base for air operations against the great centers of population and industry in Japan. If, on the contrary, she extend her hold towards the Amur and Ussary Rivers, she will render untenable Russia's position on the Pacific coast.

The Great Khingan Range is a formidable barrier which defends Japan against attack from Irkutsk and Chita. The Amur River and the Little Khingan, on an average within 150 miles from railhead, should protect the Japanese against Russian attack based upon the circuitous

Chita-Khabarovsk Section of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Ussary River, backed by the Kentel-Alin Range and the White Mountains of Korea, the author compares with the effectiveness of the Vosges. As the latter checkmated German efforts against Nancy, so will the former aid in frustrating any Russian stroke from Vladivostok. On the other hand, the numerous passes which pierce the Great Khingan Range are a serious menace to Japan. A successful thrust from Chita by a Russian army will focus on Tung-Liao. The capture or threat of capture of that city, used as an advanced base of Japanese cavalry operations in Jehol during 1933, would result in the collapse of Japanese resistance in Northern Manchuria.

Russia's enormous distance from her main bases of supply, the author thinks, is a source of weakness as well as of strength. It will make initial successes almost impossible, but by the same token will render her ultimate defeat an equally remote contingency. As an historical factor, the author notes that Soviet rule has not dimmed Russia's memory of her great bid for sea power. Barred from expansion westward and through India, only Persia and Manchuria afforded means for materializing Russia's dream of a warm water outlet. Great Britain watches over Persia, and Japan has defied Russia ever to attempt anything in Manchuria.

Pointing out some of the radical differences presented by the strategical problem of 1934 compared with that of 1904, the author concludes that Japan will, at least initially, possess greater liberty of action. She can rapidly concentrate superior forces at any one of the several widely separated points, but it will be difficult for her to maintain this numerical superiority. The author doubts the wisdom or likelihood of an initial Japanese thrust across the Amur River in the direction of Blagoveshchensk to force the capitulation of Russian forces east of that point. He believes that the struggle of the main forces will probably take place in the vicinity of Manchuli, 600 miles northwest of Blagoveshchensk, with Chita, midway between Lake Baikal and the Manchukuo border, as the main Japanese objective. Conversely, Tungliao, gateway to Mukden, the author thinks, would be the logical objective of the Russians.

China's position in case of war would, in the author's opinion, be quite different than it was thirty years ago. Chinese military leaders are bitterly hostile to Japan. The Jehol campaign served to consolidate the Japanese rear against possible Chinese guerilla attacks in the event of war with Russia. This campaign, moreover, afforded excellent training for the Japanese staff, and provided Japan with an excellent base for outflanking Chita, 500 miles to the north. As to the attitude of other Powers,

the author believes, "it would take something more than suicidal Russian diplomacy to bring Britain in on the side of Japan, and the possibility of the United States siding with Russia is even more remote."

In the author's opinion, cavalry may play a decisive part in a Russo-Japanese conflict. Armored cars and mechanized forces would be unsuited to operations across the Gobi Desert and the mountain barriers, while the terrain is ideal for cavalry. Although Russian cavalry in 1904 was superior to that of the Japanese, no arm in Japan has received more careful attention in recent years than the cavalry. The efficiency of Japanese artillery in relation to that of Russia is even greater today than it was in 1904.

The most reliable prediction anyone could venture, the author writes, is that a war between these Powers would be productive of indecisive results. Japan cannot hope for more than to drive the Russians behind Lake Baikal. There the Japanese advance would come to a standstill. The most favorable result the Russian staff can hope for is to drive the Japanese off the Asiatic mainland. Japanese victory would mean the acquisition of a vast territory with unlimited possibilities of settlement, exploitation and development. It would make Japan a military power second to none, and would render Japan's claim to naval parity with Great Britain and the United States beyond dispute. Moreover, it would enable Japan to distribute the financial burden incidental to her military position over a materially increased population. A probable secondary result of Japanese victory, the author believes, would be an offensive and defensive alliance between the British Empire and the United States. Defeat of Russia would entail the collapse of the Soviet system in Russia with a return to modified republicanism or even restoration of the Monarchy.

A Russian victory, on the other hand, would lead to the absorption by Russia of Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea. It would strengthen the power of the Soviet rulers in Moscow, and might provide a strong temptation for a further test of strength with the British Empire. Victory for either side would confer upon the victor temporary control of Northern China. Japan is less likely to suffer financial embarrassment and economic impoverishment than Russia except in the case of a crushing defeat.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. By Major T. V. Scudamore, V.D., F.R.G.S., The British Columbia Regiment.

With an intimate knowledge of Germany extending over a period of 33 years, the author endeavors to prognosticate the future of the German Reich. The national Socialist party, he writes, came into power as the direct result of depression and unemployment. Their task has become more difficult as the depression became more intense, partly because of general world conditions and partly because of the errors committed by the leaders. Brief estimates of the leading figures of the Third Reich

form an interesting background of this evaluation of the situation.

The late Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg, the author writes, whose first accession to the presidency was hailed as a sign of German militarism once more rampant, lived to become the apostle of peace—a rock of moderation in the whirlpool of German politics; but in his extreme old age with rapidly failing health, he was hardly more than a figurehead.

Hitler is the one man everybody trusts. Worshipped almost as a god, his fall would bring disillusion to such a vast number of Germans that the tragic consequences to the peace of Europe and the world would be far greater than the successful fruition of his plans. Hitler's associates and assistants, the author states, are without exception extremely able men.

Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, is an intellectual who attended no less than eight universities. A club foot prevented him from serving during the war. Although his courage enabled him to overcome this handicap, it did not keep him from having a warped mind. The Jews are his pet aversion, which is never far from the surface. By an irony of fate, his wife's stepfather is a Jew.

Dr. Hanfstaengel, in charge of the Foreign Press Bureau, and close personal friend of Hitler, is at times very approachable, but prone to be abusive of journalists. There is ample evidence, the author states, to warrant doubt as to the accuracy of some of his public utterances.

Vice-Chancellor von Papen, erstwhile military attaché in Washington, and more recently German Ambassador to Austria, is a devout Catholic, member of the old nobility, an imperialist with a taste for intrigue without the ability to intrigue successfully. His speeches do more harm than good. The author writes him off as a failure and a disappointed man.

Captain Roehm, late commander of the Nazi storm troops, summarily liquidated by the second Nazi revolution, was a man attractive neither in looks nor character. Reports current about him in Germany are unrepeatable.

General Hermann von Goering, Premier of Prussia, the author characterizes as ruthless. A member of the aristocracy, he was with Hitler in the abortive "putch" of 1923. He was wounded in that affair, and escaped to Austria. Goering revels in fancy uniforms and plasters himself on all occasions with his array of decorations. His first step on attaining power was to promote himself from captain to Lieutenant General. It is jokingly said of Goering that when a pipe bursts in his house he puts on an admiral's uniform before calling a plumber.

The author credits the Hitler regime with having reduced unemployment, restored the moral fibre of the German people, and leveled all classes. Germany's leaving the League of Nations the author qualifies as a vigorous protest against wasting time in talk with little result. The Nazi government believes in direct contact without intervention of third parties. The Saar will return to Germany but, in the author's opinion, the vote will not

be as unanimous as it would have been two years ago. The return of the Saar to Germany, however, will leave open the question of repurchase of mines from France. They are working at a loss, and France had eight or nine years more use of them than she was entitled to have. This, the author states, is ample compensation for her own destroyed mines which have been working at full blast since 1926.

Austria is the next big issue, and the author thinks that sooner or later her destiny must be joined to that of Germany. Much misrepresentation has been published about Nazi Germany, the author states. There is dreadful disillusion and genuine poverty. There have been outrages, but they have been made most of. As to the Jewish question, the author writes, Jews have never been more than tolerated in Germany. In hard times Jews are blamed for conditions which they did not create but which their business acumen enables them to turn to profit. Although there was and is a campaign against Jews, the extent of the brutalities, the author states, has been greatly exaggerated. This campaign, however, has bankrupted Germany's export trade, while the quarrel with the Catholic Church has done incalculable harm to the Nazi cause at home. In conclusion the author states that the Nazis do not want war, but demand the recognition of Germany as an equal among nations.

URUGUAY.—*Revista Militar y Naval*.—March-April, 1934.

THE ARMIES OF THE AMERICAS AND PAN-AMERICANISM. By Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo U. Genta.

To the civilian, the author writes, it might seem incongruous that army men should have any friendly interest in the cause of Pan-Americanism. He points to the curious fact that, contrary to popular belief, there is a strong, fraternal camaraderie among military men of all nations. The bias or prejudice against the stranger, the foreigner, so common among civilians, does not exist among men of the profession of arms. Indeed, the author adds, "if there are any obstacles in the way of fraternal relations between nations they must be sought elsewhere than in the minds and hearts of soldiers."

As the power of contemporary Russia is derived from thirty-six constituent republics, and as the greatness of the United States rests upon forty-eight sovereign states, so, the author believes, the day is bound to come which will translate Bolívar's dream of a federation of American republics into reality. The author conceives Pan-Americanism as a federation of Fatherlands united by historic and racial ties, by spiritual, economic and defensive reciprocity with absolute sincerity and mutual respect as the basis of concord. He suggests that in the various inter-American congresses greater opportunities be given for the active participation of military men. Their background of training and tradition of honor and uprightness, which is so often lacking in civilians, would be the best guaranty that they would sincerely and honestly strive to bring about a betterment of the lot of mankind.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA — *Vojenské Rozhledy* — April, 1934.

ACCURACY OF BATTLE REPORTS. Anonymous.

The unnamed author discusses a number of interesting historic examples where the failure to render accurate reports in the course of battle led to serious, and occasionally to disastrous consequences. The author cites the commander of Samsonoff's left corps at Tannenberg, in August, 1914, who reported that he was "standing firmly as a rock" five hours after his command had started its retreat. Again, General Rennenkampf, after his disastrous defeat near the Mazurian Lakes, where he lost 80,000 men, 150 guns and 120 machine guns, calmly reported that "he broke off the action, disengaged his troops from hostile contact and that, after a brief rest, his troops would be ready to renew the action. . . ." The Russian official communiqué reporting the capture of Lemberg stated that "General Russki's gallant troops were wading knee deep in blood in the streets of Lemberg . . ." when as a matter of fact the Austrians had evacuated the place three days before and there had not been an Austrian soldier in town when the Russians entered.

On December 8, 1917, the commander of the Turkish Eighth Army received information that the British had decisively beaten his right wing. In order to avoid having portions of his army cut off, the Turkish commander decided to evacuate Jerusalem, and the British entered the city without firing a shot. In reality only a Turkish outpost detachment had been driven in by a British patrol.

The unnamed author attributes inaccuracies in battle reports to the following causes: 1. superficiality; 2. lack of a sense of responsibility; 3. egotism; 4. fear of superiors; 5. cowardice; 6. an inclination towards the sensational; 7. dishonorable pandering to personal interests; 8. tendency to become panicky; 9. moral depression.

HUNGARY—*Magyar Katonai Szemle*—May, 1934.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZED FORCES. By Lieutenant General Charles Gerbert, retired.

The author reviews the prevailing professional opinion with respect to the proper tactical employment of the different types of tanks and armored cars. The small tank, he notes, can be employed on independent missions, while the heavy tank is essentially a weapon of accompaniment for infantry. The light and medium tanks, on the other hand, are capable of performing both types of missions.

The French "Renault" tank still remains the principal representative in the class of light tanks. Modernized in design and construction, the new Renault is capable of a speed of 18 km. per hour. It is a weapon peculiarly suited to give support to the infantry in the attack. Although this tank might on occasion be employed on independent missions, the author does not believe it to be adapted to such employment. The heavy tank, of which the French "Char C-2" is the best representative, is too slow for independent action. Owing to its heavy armor and arma-

ment, this tank, the author states, is essentially a weapon of position warfare.

The small tank, armed with a machine gun and capable of high speed is, in the author's opinion, especially well adapted for reconnaissance missions in the service of the mechanized force, while the armored car supplies the best means for long-distance reconnaissance. The artillery tank, armed with a single field gun, was designed to provide artillery support for the mechanized force in action. The author believes, however, that motorization of the field artillery in general will render this type of tank superfluous.

The British developed an amphibian tank, the "Carden Lloyd." It carries an armored plate 7-9-mm. and weighs one ton. It is armed with a single machine gun, and is capable of a speed of 65 km.p.h. on roads, 10 km.p.h. in still water, and has a climbing capacity of 30-45°. The French "Schneider-Laurent" tank is capable of a speed of 45 km.p.h. on wheels, 30 km.p.h. on tracks and 16 km.p.h. in still water. Both tanks apparently proved successful. The stream with a depth of one and one-half meters and width of four to five meters is no longer an obstacle to these amphibian tanks.

The French tactical plan, the author writes, contemplates the attachment of a tank regiment (90 light tanks) to the division in the attack. Since the French division normally attacks with regiments abreast, each with two battalions in line and one in reserve, the assault battalion will receive the direct support of the tank company. According to the French point of view, the author states, tank action independent of the infantry is altogether inconceivable; hence tanks will not, as a rule, go more than 300 meters beyond the infantry objective, but will await the assault wave before pressing forward to the next objective. The author believes that this method of attack subordinates the tank to the progress of the foot soldier, hence it needlessly sacrifices favorable opportunities to exploit success.

Heavy tank companies or battalions are attached under the French plan of action to divisions making the main effort. The method of their employment is entirely discretionary with the division commander. Since the mission of these tanks contemplates penetration of the hostile front to the enemy artillery position, they will precede the infantry assault and press forward directly to their objective.

The author writes that in an attack on a six-division front of about 18-20 km., the French would probably employ six light tank regiments and three heavy tank battalions. He visualizes the French tank attack penetrating the hostile position in successive waves, engaging the enemy artillery and reserves, thereby seeking to facilitate the advance of the infantry. In the author's opinion, this method of attack might effect a breach along a wide front, but the penetration would not reach a great depth except by a repetition of blows.

Russian military opinion estimates that a force of ten divisions would require a complement of 2,000 tanks, a

total of 31 battalions or three battalions to a division. In addition, the Soviet army commander will have at his disposal a reserve force of 1,000 additional tanks. From this the author concludes that the Soviet military experts contemplate a tank battle fought in a succession of waves deployed in great depth and seeking decisive results. He declines to take the Russian figures seriously, and observes that while Soviet Russia would require 15,000 tanks to meet the estimates, the available supply actually amounts to only six or seven hundred.

Discussing the mechanized and motorized forces and so-called "rapid forces" maintained by some of the principal powers, and the effectiveness of available anti-tank defense, the author summarizes his conclusions briefly as follows:

1. The main effort of the infantry attack will normally have tank support.
2. Tanks will play an active part in the outpost zone.
3. Exceptionally tanks may attack independently.
4. Anti-tank defense from fixed positions holds out promise of effectiveness; mobile anti-tank defense is not likely to succeed.
5. The idea of mechanized forces seems to have been abandoned in favor of motorized troops which, in conjunction with cavalry, constitute the modern "rapid force," their action well in advance of the main army and on the flanks must be expected.

GREAT BRITAIN—*Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette*—October 25, 1934.

Generaloberst von Kluck. Editorial

Of von Kluck, who died on October 19, it may be said that at certain moments he was the one man who held victory for the German armies within his grasp. He was commander of the First Army on the extreme flank of the German wheel and departed from the Schlieffen Plan by moving in a southeasterly direction, instead of continuing to the lower Seine.

Assailed by Maunoury's Army, he had to swing around to face Paris, leaving a gap of 30 miles between his army and that of his neighbor. He skilfully maneuvered his troops to meet this threat and had some success against Maunoury. In his book von Kluck said that, but for the orders given him to retreat, he would have been able to exploit this success and then to turn against the British Army, which moved into the gap and thus ensured the victory of the Marne.

"It is very much to von Kluck's credit that, when the front stabilized, old man as he was (over 68), he kept in close touch with conditions at the front in the only way, so clearly demonstrated by the whole War, that such touch can be maintained by personal inspection. In this and other ways he established his right to be termed a leader, but leadership is not generalship. It was in March, 1915, that he was wounded and on his recovery he was not reemployed."

ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION

Fort Bliss, Texas

Brigadier General Hamilton S. Hawkins, Commanding
 Colonel Alexander B. Cox, G.S.C. (Cav.), Chief of Staff
 Colonel Joseph C. Kay, Q.M.C., Quartermaster
 Colonel William W. Gordon, Cav., Executive Officer, Arizona-New Mexico District, C.C.C.
 Colonel Alexander M. Milton, G.S.C. (Cav.), Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Lieutenant Colonel Shenburne Whipple, A.G.D., Adjutant General
 Lieutenant Colonel William R. Arnold, Ch., Chaplain
 Major Henry J. M. Smith, I.G.D., Inspector General
 Major Donald B. Sanger, Sig. C., Signal Officer
 Major Lewis K. Underhill, J.A.G.D., Judge Advocate
 Major Russell A. Osmun, Q.M.C., Assistant to Quartermaster
 Major Carl Halla, F.D., Finance Officer
 Major Oron A. Palmer, Cav., Recreation Officer
 Major Arthur T. Lacey, G.S.C. (Cav.), G-2
 Major Clifford L. Miller, Ch., Assistant Chaplain
 Major Victor W. B. Wales, Cav., Prison and Parole Officer, and Assistant Provost Marshal
 Major McFarland Cockrill, G.S.C. (Cav.), G-1 and G-4
 Major Thomas G. Hanson, Jr., Cav., Attached to 7th Cavalry
 Major Roscoe S. Parker, Cav., D.S., C.C.C., Hq. 8th Corps Area
 Major George E. Huthsteiner, Cav., Acting Assistant to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Major Charles J. Booth, Cav., D.S., C.C.C., Camp D.S.P.-1-T, Marathon, Texas
 Major William T. Hamilton, Cav., Attached to 8th Cavalry

2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE

Fort Bliss, Texas

Brigadier General George Vidmer, Commanding
 Major Oliver L. Haines, Executive
 Captain Herbert A. Myers, S-2 and S-3
 Second Lieutenant William H. S. Wright, Aide-de-Camp to General Vidmer

Headquarters Troop, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas

Captain Murray H. Ellis
 First Lieutenant Grant A. Williams

Special Troops, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Bliss, Texas

Major Duncan G. Richart, Commanding

Captain George B. Hudson
 Captain Harold Engerud
 1st Lieutenant George C. Claussen
 1st Lieutenant Henry M. Zeller, Jr.

First Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, Fort Bliss, Texas

Colonel George P. Tyler, Commanding

Lieutenant Colonel Philip W. Booker
 Major Ray C. Rutherford
 Major H. Crampton Jones
 Captain Lester J. Whitlock
 Captain James G. Watkins
 Captain William B. Weston
 Captain Earl A. Hyde
 Captain Fred B. Lyle
 Captain Harold J. Guernsey
 Captain Raymond G. Miller
 1st Lieut. George B. McReynolds
 1st Lieut. Robert A. Ellsworth
 1st Lieut. Earl J. Murphy
 1st Lieut. Alexander R. Sewall
 1st Lieut. Paul A. Gavan
 1st Lieut. Donald Dunford
 1st Lieut. James B. Evans
 2nd Lieut. Merle L. Fisher
 2nd Lieut. Dean A. Herman
 2nd Lieut. William Taylor, Jr.
 2nd Lieut. Paul E. LaDue
 2nd Lieut. Daniel Parker, Jr.
 2nd Lieut. John R. Brindley
 2nd Lieut. William O. Darby
 2nd Lieut. George T. Powers, 3d
 2nd Lieut. Harry J. Hubbard
 2nd Lieut. Robert H. Adams
 2nd Lieut. Kenneth A. Cunin
 2nd Lieut. Thomas E. Wood

First Cavalry Division Train, Fort Bliss, Texas

Major Horace T. Aplington, Commanding

Captain Kirk Broadus, Q.M.C. (Cav.)
 1st Lieutenant George W. Bailey, Jr., 7th Cav.
 1st Lieutenant Charles A. Sheldon, 8th Cav.
 2nd Lieut. Frank H. Britton, 8th Cav.

Troop A, 1st Armored Car Squadron, Fort Bliss, Texas

Captain John C. Macdonald, Commanding

1st Lieutenant John L. Ryan

1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE

Fort Clark, Texas

Colonel Wallace B. Scales, 5th Cavalry, Commanding
 Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Amory, Jr., Executive
 Captain Raymond C. Gibbs, 5th Cav., Acting S-2 and S-3
 Captain C. Loyd Stafford, 5th Cav., Adjutant
 1st Lieutenant Thomas T. Thornburgh, Assistant Adjutant

Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, Fort Clark, Texas

Captain Clifford I. Hunn, Commanding
 First Lieutenant Dana G. McBride

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL

Fort Riley, Kansas

Brigadier General Abraham G. Lott, U.S.A., Commandant
 Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Wainwright, Assistant Commandant
 John Millikin, Director of Instruction
 Captain Paul C. Febiger, Secretary
 1st Lieutenant Thomas J. Randolph, Librarian

Cavalry Board

Colonel Charles R. Mayo, Director

Major Lawrence C. Frizzell
 Captain Stephen Boon, Jr.
 Captain Gyles Merrill
 Captain Leslie D. Carter

Department of Tactics

Major Geoffrey Keyes (Chief)
 Major Bernard R. Peyton
 Major Charles B. Hazeltine
 Major Thomas L. Martin
 Major George S. Andrew
 Major Adolphus W. Roffe
 Major Joseph L. Phillips
 Major Frank L. Whittaker
 Major Clinton A. Pierce
 Major James B. Wise, Jr.
 Major Rosenhams Beam
 Major Vernon L. Padgett
 Captain George I. Smith
 Captain John H. Beeque
 Captain Richard Lee
 1st Lieutenant William L. McEnery

Department of Cavalry Weapons

Major Karl S. Bradford (Chief)
 Major John C. Daly
 Captain Charles H. Unger
 Captain Thomas J. Heavey
 Captain Harold P. Stewart
 Captain Paul McD. Robinett
 Captain Newman R. Laughinghouse

Department of General Instruction and Publications

Major Wilson T. Bals (Chief)
 Captain Oscar W. Koch

Department of Horsemanship

Major Calvin DeWitt, Jr. (Chief)
 Major Arthur P. Thayer
 Major George L. Caldwell
 Major Kent C. Lambert
 Major Carlisle B. Cox
 Captain Paul H. Morris
 Captain Russell C. Winchester
 Captain Edwin M. Burnett
 1st Lieutenant Gilman C. Mudgett

Horse Show Team

Captain William B. Bradford
 Captain Cornelius C. Jadwin
 1st Lieutenant Halley G. Maddox
 1st Lieutenant Carl W. A. Raguse
 1st Lieutenant Milo H. Matteson

Supply Officer, Academic Division

Captain Alexander B. MacNabb

Post of Fort Riley

Colonel John A. McKinnon, Veterinarian
 Colonel Edgar W. Miller, Surgeon
 Lieutenant Colonel William C. Christy, Executive
 Lieutenant Colonel Max A. Elser, Quartermaster
 Major Frederick Gilbreath, Assistant to Executive
 Major Henry B. Saylor, Ordnance Officer
 Major Charles A. Wickliffe, Judge Advocate
 Major Roy H. Parker, Chaplain
 Captain Richard Lee, Post Engineer Officer
 Captain Ray T. Maddocks, Adjutant
 Captain L. Curtis Tiernan, Assistant Chaplain
 Captain Donald A. Young, Provost Marshal

Captain Lathan H. Collins, Assistant to Executive
 Captain Alexander B. MacNabb, Supply Officer, Misc. Troop
 Captain Alexander G. Olsen, Range Officer
 Captain Alston B. Ames, Assistant Comdt., E. & C. School
 1st Lieutenant Charles G. Meehan (DOL) ADC to Brig. Gen. Lott,
 Recreation and Post School Officer
 1st Lieutenant Paul A. Disney (DOL) ADC to Brig. Gen. Lott
 1st Lieutenant George G. Elms, Post Exchange Officer
 1st Lieutenant David E. Bradford, Assistant Adjutant
 1st Lieutenant George W. Peake, Assistant Provost Marshal
 1st Lieutenant Joseph Harris, Finance Officer
 1st Lieutenant William L. McEnery, Signal Officer

Students, Advanced Equitation Course

1st Lieut. Kenneth G. Hoge	1st Lieut. Leander LaC. Doan
1st Lieut. Clarence K. Darling	1st Lieut. John G. Minnicce, Jr.
1st Lieut. Zachery W. Moores	1st Lieut. Edwin H. J. Carns
1st Lieut. William H. Hunter	1st Lieut. Milton A. Acklen
1st Lieut. Henri A. Luebberrmann	1st Lieut. Paul D. Harkins

Regular Course

1st Lieut. Oliver W. Hughes, Inf.	2nd Lieut. Franklin F. Wing, Jr.
1st Lieut. David A. Watt, Jr.	2nd Lieut. James O. Curtis, Jr.
1st Lieut. Chandler P. Robbins, Jr.	2nd Lieut. Henry B. Croswell
1st Lieut. Frank D. Merrill	2nd Lieut. Albert E. Harris
1st Lieut. Donald M. Schorr	2nd Lieut. Brainard S. Cook
1st Lieut. Wayne J. Dunn	2nd Lieut. O'Neill K. Kane
1st Lieut. Charles C. W. Allan	2nd Lieut. Marvin C. Johnson
1st Lieut. Harvie R. Ellis, VC	2nd Lieut. Angelo R. Del Campo
2nd Lieut. Robert W. Porter, Jr.	2nd Lieut. Jergen B. Olsen
2nd Lieut. John H. Dudley	2nd Lieut. Glenn F. Rogers
2nd Lieut. Charles G. Dodge	2nd Lieut. Cornelius A. Lichirie
2nd Lieut. Hamilton H. Howze	2nd Lieut. John K. Waters

7th Cavalry Brigade Fort Knox, Kentucky

Brigadier General Guy V. Henry, Commanding

Majors

Otto B. Trigg Harry A. Flint

First Cavalry (Mechanized) Fort Knox, Kentucky

Colonel Bruce Palmer, Commanding

Majors

Richard W. Carter	Ralph I. Sasse
Harold B. Gibson	Isaac G. Walker

Captains

Burton C. Andrus	Rossiter H. Garity
Richard N. Atwell	James I. Gibbon
Wayland B. Augur	Floyd M. Hyndman
Clyde B. Bell	Leslie F. Lawrence
Raymond C. Blatt	Cornelius F. O'Keefe
Gersum Cronander	Carl J. Rohsenberger
Edward A. Everitt, Jr.	Hal M. Rose
Frederick W. Fenn	Richard E. Tallant
William T. Fletcher	

First Lieutenants

Donald H. Bratton	Claude A. Thorp
John C. Hamilton	Frank G. Trew
Harrison H. D. Heiberg	Gustavus W. West
Granville V. Morse	Isaac D. White
Francis L. Ready	William P. Withers
Hayden A. Sears	

Second Cavalry Fort Riley, Kansas

Colonel Selwyn D. Smith, Commanding

Lieutenant Colonels

Hugh H. Broadhurst	Joseph Plassmeyer
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Majors

Clarence C. Benson	William E. Barott
John L. Rice	Frank H. Barnhart

Captains

Donald A. Young	Carl J. Dockler
John E. Selby	Lawrence Patterson
Alfred L. Baylies	Joseph I. Lambert
Lathan H. Collins	Winfield C. Scott
Edwin M. Sumner	Phillip B. Shotwell
Manly F. Meador	Francis P. Tompkins

First Lieutenants

Henry L. Kinnison, Jr.	Earl F. Thomson
George G. Elms	Thomas J. Randolph
Basil G. Thayer	Thomas D. Roberts
Joseph M. Williams	Henry R. Westphalinger

Second Lieutenants

Charles B. McClelland	Louis M. de L. de Riemer
Edward J. McNally	James B. Quill

For the first time in two years, the regiment has been engaged in rifle, pistol and machine-gun practice.

On August 27th, the regiment left on its two weeks' annual practice march, covering about 300 miles. Parades and exhibitions were given in Wichita and Salina, Kansas.

The following officers of the regiment are attending the Post of Riley Course, which began its first term October 22nd: Major Rice, Major Barnhart, Captain Meador, Captain Patterson, Captain Lambert, Captain Shotwell, Captain Kinnison, Lieutenant Thayer, Lieutenant Thomson.

It will be of interest to know that all officers of the regiment have moved out of Godfrey Court and that they are now comfortably settled in permanent quarters.

On October 30th, the Machine Gun Troop gave a dinner-dance. Among those present were General and Mrs. Lott, Colonel and Mrs. Smith, Colonel and Mrs. Wainwright, Major and Mrs. Selby and a number of others. Trophies for highest percentage of men qualifying in swimming at Fort Riley, 1934, the Regimental Mounted Pistol Trophy, cups for Troop Horse Show and administrative placard for excellence in barracks and stable were presented.

A dinner-dance was given by the officers and ladies of the regiment at the Cavalry School Club on the evening of November 2nd.

The Headquarters Troop won and were presented with cups for winning the annual baseball and swimming competitions.

The 2d Squadron, which includes men from the Machine Gun Troop, are at this date (November 15th) leading the Post Football League with three games won, none lost, and no ties. Two more games are to be played. Lieutenant Westphalinger and Lieutenant de Riemer are the coaches.

Third Cavalry (Less 1st Squadron) Fort Myer, Virginia

Colonel Kenyon A. Joyce, Commanding
Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, Jr.
Major John F. Davis

Captains

James T. Menzie	Herbert L. Earnest
Herbert V. Scanlan	Frank A. Allen, Jr.
James T. Duke	Charles S. Miller
Thomas W. Ligon	Marion Carson
Callie H. Palmer	

First Lieutenants

Willard G. Wyman	John H. Stadler, Jr.
Charles H. Reed	William A. Fuller
Eugene L. Harrison	Clayton J. Mansfield

Second Lieutenants

Loren F. Cole	Frank S. Henry
George R. Mather	Marshall W. Frame
George R. Grunert	

First Squadron, Third Cavalry Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur E. Wilbourn, Commanding
Major Theodore B. Appgar

Captains

Lawrence B. Wyant	Hugh G. Culton
Randolph Russell	

First Lieutenants

Joseph M. Glasgow	Richard B. Evans
Allen L. Fulton	Roland A. Browne

Second Lieutenants

James L. Dalton	William B. Bunker
Edwin H. Cahill	Robert W. Fuller, III

Since our last writing the Squadron has had an unusually busy summer and fall season. Besides musketry problems, combat firing, mounted pistol practice, a mobilization test, National Guard training, C.M.T.C., three groups of Reserve Officers, totalling one hundred and sixty-eight officers—to repeat—in addition to all these activities, the Squadron saw most of the State of Vermont and part of New Hampshire from the back of its old friend, the Horse; this during the annual practice march, the Cavalry Leadership Test and the Goodrich Trophy Training Test.

The annual practice march was held September 1st to September 14th, and involved a march of about two hundred and eighty miles, through the Green Mountains to Dixville Notch, New Hampshire, in the White Mountains. Beautiful scenery was encountered in the mountains and in the valleys of the Lamoille and Connecticut Rivers. At Dixville Notch, N. H., the squadron was camped for a week-end on the Polo Field, a few hundred yards from the Balsams Hotel, at the invitation of Captain Frank Doudera, O.R.C., owner and our genial host.

While encamped here, the squadron put on a review, an exhibition drill, a monkey drill and a boxing match, for the many guests of the hotel and those living in the surrounding country, who visited the camp. Notwithstanding these diversions, the squadron was assumed to be operating under war conditions with continuing tactical situations.

On the return trip the squadron received orders, on September 13th, to march to Fort Ethan Allen without delay. This entailed a march of seventy-five miles, which was completed in twenty-four hours. An account of this will be found elsewhere in this issue.

The Cavalry Leadership Test for Small Units was held on October 11th to 13th. It involved an individual phase with a five mile cross-country ride for enlisted men, and a twenty-mile ride for lieutenants; mounted and dismounted combat, and a march, on reconnaissance, of seventy-five miles to Middlebury, in southern Vermont, and return to Fort Ethan Allen. Both platoons completed this reconnaissance in thirty hours. The two participating platoons, from Troops "A" and "B," were commanded by Lieutenants R. B. Evans and A. L. Fulton, respectively. The scores of the platoons (subject to approval by the Chief of Cavalry), were Troop "A" platoon—80.20%; Troop "B" platoon—85.85%.

The Goodrich Trophy Training Test was participated in by Troop "B," commanded by Captain H. G. Culton. The other officers of this troop who were in the test are: First Lieutenant A. L. Fulton and Second Lieutenant W. B. Bunker. This test was held on October 24th-25th, and involved a fifty-mile march, with the various tactical and combat features.

After this strenuous summer season, the squadron feels it is "ready for anything."

Fourth Cavalry Fort Meade, South Dakota

Colonel William R. Pope, Commanding
Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Cummins

Majors

Welton M. Modisette	David H. Blakelock
John T. Minton	Carter R. McLennan

Captains

Charles G. Hutchinson	Silas W. Robertson
Hans C. Minuth	Frank E. Bertholet
Edwin W. Godbold	John H. Healy
Philip R. Upton	William L. Barriger
Charles Cramer	

First Lieutenants

Charles E. Morrison	George W. Busbey
Virgil F. Shaw	Rufus L. Land
Walter F. Jennings	Thomas J. H. Trapnell
John H. Stodter	Charles P. Bixel
Harold E. Walker	Carroll H. Prunty

Second Lieutenants

Thomas F. Taylor	Daniel E. Still
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Fifth Cavalry Fort Clark, Texas

Colonel Wallace B. Scales, Commanding
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Amory, Jr.
Major Spencer A. Townsend

Captains

William V. Ochs	Malcolm Byrne
Andrew J. Wynne	Carleton Burgess
Raymond C. Gibbs	Howard A. Boone
Walter W. Boon	Wilford R. Mobley
Curtis L. Stafford	Ralph E. Ireland

First Lieutenants

David A. Taylor	Rogers A. Gardner
John K. Sells	George V. Ehrhardt
John O'D. Murtaugh	Thomas J. Brennan, Jr.
Clark L. Ruffner	

Second Lieutenants

James B. Corbett	Charles F. Harrison
James C. Blanning	William F. Damon
Howard E. Webster	Robert E. Arnette, Jr.

Sixth Cavalry

Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia

Colonel Walter S. Grant, Commanding
Lieutenant Colonel Kinzie B. Edmunds

Majors

Robert W. Strong	Frederick W. Boye
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Captains

Lloyd W. Biggs	William R. Hamby
Rufus S. Ramey	Edward H. de Saussure
John O. Lawrence	George R. McElroy
Thomas W. Herren	John M. Bethel

First Lieutenants

Robert Edwards	Don E. Carleton
John T. Ward	H. Jordan Theis
Paul M. Martin	Cary B. Hutchinson
Arthur N. Willis	Logan C. Berry
Walter Burnside	Ralph T. Garver
Ralph M. Neal	Harry W. Johnson

Second Lieutenants

William E. Chandler	F. Clay Bridgewater
Harry W. Candler	Donald C. Cubbison
Bogardus S. Cairns	Charles W. Schnabel

The Sixth Cavalry completed annual target practice during the month of October, qualifying 93.23%. In view of the heavy demands on the Regiment in connection with training of civilian components of the Army and the administration of District "C," Civilian Conservation Corps, Fourth Corps Area (seventy-one camps), it is felt that the Regiment made a very commendable record.

On October 24, notification was received from the Chief of Cavalry that Troop A had been selected to rep-

resent the Sixth Cavalry in the Goodrich Trophy Competition. The day of the test, October 30, was cold and threatening with intermittent rain. During the night, while in bivouac, the troop was struck by a violent wind, rain and electrical storm which persisted for a period of approximately four hours, adding materially to the problem of the organization. In spite of the adverse conditions, Troop A came through the test splendidly.

The Regiment and other organizations at Fort Oglethorpe have just completed a very successful soccer season, in which Headquarters Troop barely nosed out Machine Gun Troop for the championship. Preparations for an active basketball season are in progress.

The Sixth Cavalry Polo Association is ending the season with a series of three exhibition games for the benefit of the Community Chest at Chattanooga, Tennessee.

First Lieutenant Cary B. Hutchinson recently departed for service in the Philippines, and Captain William R. Hamby has joined from duty in the Philippines and takes command of the Machine Gun Troop, 6th Cavalry. First Lieutenant Joseph K. Baker, Cavalry, has recently been attached to the Sixth Cavalry for duty with the Headquarters District "C," C.C.C., at this post.

The Sixth Cavalry has received its quota of the new scout cars and part of its quota of trucks. The entire Regiment is looking forward to interesting work with the new motor vehicles.

Seventh Cavalry Fort Bliss, Texas

Colonel Joseph A. Baer, Commanding
Lieutenant Colonel Herman Kobbe

Majors

Harding Polk	Sidney V. Bingham
Horace T. Aplington	John T. Cole

Captains

Waldemar A. Falck	John P. Scott
Eugene A. Regnier	Samuel R. Goodwin
Donald R. Dunkle	Vance W. Batchelor
Edward M. Fickett	William H. S. Reinburg
Mordaunt V. Turner	Leo B. Conner

First Lieutenants

Christian Knudsen	Lee C. Vance
Albert S. J. Stovall, Jr.	Donald M. Shaw
Daniel P. Buckland	Edward J. Doyle
George W. Bailey, Jr.	

Second Lieutenants

Richard T. Coiner, Jr.	Joseph E. Bastion, Jr.
Karl L. Scherer	Norman K. Markle, Jr.
William W. Culp	Carl D. Womack
William G. Bartlett	Harry E. Lardin
Sherburne Whipple, Jr.	Dana W. Johnston, Jr.
Anthony F. Kleitz, Jr.	William S. Van Nostrand

Eighth Cavalry Fort Bliss, Texas

Lieutenant Arthur H. Wilson, Commanding

Majors

John T. McLane	Ernest N. Harmon
John W. McDonald	

Captains

Harold E. Eastwood	Ceylon O. Griffin
Harvey N. Christman	Vaughan M. Cannon
William R. Stickman	Darrow Menoher
Vernon McT. Shell	Thomas Q. Donaldson, Jr.
Holmes G. Paullin	Thomas F. Sheehan

First Lieutenants

John L. Ballantyne	Charles A. Sheldon
Raymond M. Barton	James L. Hathaway
August W. Farwick	

Second Lieutenants

Philip H. Bethune	Jesse M. Hawkins, Jr.
Frank H. Britton	Theodore F. Hurt, Jr.
John R. Pugh	Paul E. Johnson, Jr.
James H. Polk	James W. Snee
Jack W. Turner	Joseph A. Cleary
David V. Adamson	Karl L. Gould

The Regiment spent the month of September on the Donna Anna Rifle Range engaged in its annual target practice and in platoon and troop combat exercises. The target season was highly successful, the regiment qualifying over 90 per cent of its personnel.

The important event of the month of October was the Annual First Cavalry Division Horse Show in which blue ribbons were won by the following members of the Eighth Cavalry: Handy Jumpers, Enlisted Men, First Sergeant, Van C. White on *Sotol*; Handy Jumpers, Officers, Lieutenant P. H. Bethune on *Kid*; Ladies' Jumpers, Mrs. T. Q. Donaldson on *Bashful*; Fault or Disobedience and Out, Lieutenant W. W. Bertz, V. C. on *Huachuca*; Prix des Nations, Enlisted Men, Corporal Paul D. Evans on *Kaiser*; Polo Bending Race, Captain Vaughan M. Cannon on *Norma*; Equestrian Teams Funds Sweepstakes Class, Officers, Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Wilson on *Woodrow*; Families' Three-Gaited Riding Horses, Captain T. Q. Donaldson and family; Teams of Jumpers, Enlisted Men, Sergeant Julian R. Wells, Corporal Avery W. Carnes, and Private Kay K. Moore; Hunt Teams, Officers, Major George E. Huthsteiner, Captain T. Q. Donaldson, Jr., and Lieutenant James L. Hathaway; Teams of Jumpers, Inter Unit, First Sergeant Van C. White, Corporal Paul D. Evans, Corporal John F. Kennedy and Private Kay K. Moore.

On October 22nd a Regimental Dinner was held at Zaragoza, Old Mexico, in honor of a number of recently assigned officers. At this dinner Major and Mrs. J. T. McLane, Major and Mrs. John W. McDonald, Major and Mrs. E. N. Harmon, Major and Mrs. William T.

Hamilton, Lieutenant and Mrs. J. H. Hathaway, Lieutenant and Mrs. Karl L. Gould, and Lieutenants Theodore F. Hurt, Jr., Paul E. Johnson, Jr., James W. Snee, and Joseph A. Cleary were formally welcomed into the Regiment. Mrs. Frank H. Britton, the most recent bride in the regiment was presented with a silver tray by the officers.

On October 30th, Sergeant Jim H. Williams, who was honorably retired after over thirty years' service, was tendered a review by the Second Cavalry Brigade.

The period of Collective Training for the 1st Cavalry Division started on November 1st, and the members of the regiment are looking forward to an interesting and instructive winter.

Ninth Cavalry Fort Riley, Kansas

Lieutenant Colonel William C. Christy, Commanding

Majors

Frederick Gilbreath	Wilson T. Bals
Geoffrey Keyes	Clinton A. Pierce
Calvin De Witt, Jr.	Kent C. Lambert
Arthur P. Thayer	Carlisle B. Cox
Adolphus W. Roffe	

Captains

Paul H. Morris	Harold P. Stewart
William B. Bradford	Charles R. Chase
James V. V. Shufelt	Paul McD. Robinett
Alexander B. McNabb	Oscar W. Koch
Thomas J. Heavey	Cornelius C. Jadwin
Russell C. Winchester	

First Lieutenants

Halley G. Maddox	C. Stanton Babcock
Gilman C. Mudgett	Milo H. Matteson
Carl W. A. Raguse	Raymond W. Curtis

Headquarters and 1st Squadron Tenth Cavalry

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Lieutenant Colonel Edgar W. Taulbee, Commanding

Captains

John H. Irving	Charles H. Martin
Glenn S. Finley	

First Lieutenants

Peter C. Hains, 3rd	Alexander M. Miller, 3rd
Wallace H. Barnes	

2nd Squadron, 10th Cavalry West Point, N. Y.

Major John B. Thompson, Commanding

First Lieutenants

Samuel P. Walker, Jr.	William J. Reardon
Arthur K. Hammond	Donald H. Galloway
John W. Wofford	William O. Heacock
Andrew A. Frierson	

Machine Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry Fort Myer, Virginia

Captain Clyde O. Burch, Commanding

First Lieutenants

John B. Reybold Gordon B. Rogers

1 1 1

Eleventh Cavalry Presidio of Monterey, California

Colonel Ralph M. Parker, Commanding

Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. Robinson

Majors

Edward C. McGuire Richard W. Cooksey
Harrison Herman Louis G. Gibney
Herman F. Rathjen Frederick F. Duggan
Donald S. Perry

Captains

Sexton Berg Harry C. Mewshaw
Henry H. Cameron James C. Ward
James S. Rodwell William S. Conrow
John R. Thornton Norman N. Rogers
Claude W. Feagin

First Lieutenants

Edwin P. Crandell Paul A. Ridge
Newton F. McCurdy Robert G. Lowe
Paul G. Kendall Donald H. Nelson
Harrison W. Davison Joseph A. Michela

Second Lieutenants

William H. Thompson Perry B. Griffith
Robert H. Bayne Frederick W. Barnes
Charles E. Leydecker Donald O. Vars
Charles E. Wheatley, Jr. Travis L. Petty

1 1 1

Twelfth Cavalry (Less 2nd Squadron) Fort Brown, Texas

Colonel Guy Kent, Commanding

Colonel Stephen W. Winfree

Majors

John M. Thompson Heywood S. Dodd

Captains

Harry W. Maas Redding F. Perry
Wallace C. Steiger Benners B. Vail
Gene R. Mauger

First Lieutenants

Hugh F. T. Hoffman Prentice E. Yeomans
Raymond D. Palmer

Second Lieutenants

John L. Inskip Ellis O. Davis
Gerard C. Cowan Richard A. Smith
Charles M. Iseley

2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry Fort Ringgold, Texas

Major Rexford M. Willoughby, Commanding

Captains

Charles M. Burkett Herbert L. Jackson
George P. Cummings Benjamin A. Thomas
Henry M. Shoemaker

First Lieutenants

Donald W. Sawtelle John F. M. Kohler
Clyde Massey Samuel C. Myers
Herbert W. Ketchum, Jr.

The command was inspected by Major Henry J. M. Smith, I.G.D., Division Inspector, who remained on the post from September 15th to 18th.

Work on the hospital kitchen is progressing rapidly, and it is thought that it will be completed for Thanksgiving.

The 12th Cavalry Band came up from Fort Brown on October 26th and remained until the 28th. During their stay they played for a formal guard mount and an enlisted men's Hallowe'en Party on the 27th. Their services were greatly appreciated, not only by the personnel at this station but by the townspeople of Rio Grande City.

The Post Basketball Team, coached by First Lieutenant H. W. Ketchum, has commenced practice. Several teams from the Valley have arranged for games.

The trophies offered by Lieutenant Colonel Levi G. Brown, Cavalry, for highest percentage of qualifications with the service rifle and pistol mounted were won by Troop F for the target year 1934. Colonel Brown's saber trophy, having been won the greatest number of times by Troop F, has been awarded that troop permanently. Troop F is commanded by Captain C. W. Burkett. Sergeant Millard Mitchell is First Sergeant.

1 1 1

Thirteenth Cavalry Fort Riley, Kansas

Colonel Charles F. Martin, Commanding

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Johnson

Majors

Otto Wagner Charles R. Johnson, Jr.
John P. Wheeler William T. Bauskett, Jr.
Herbert E. Featherstone

Captains

John A. Hettinger Herbert W. Worcester
Harold deB. Bruck Gilbert Rieman
Ralph C. Thomas Alexander G. Olsen
Roy E. Craig William L. Hamilton

First Lieutenants

Elmer V. Stansbury David E. Bradford
Charles H. Noble Norman M. Winn
Frederick R. Pitts Walter E. Finnegan
John H. Claybrook, Jr. Powhatan M. Morton
John P. Willey Paul W. Shumate

Second Lieutenants

George W. Coolidge Hugh W. Stevenson

✓ ✓ ✓

Fourteenth Cavalry (Less 1st Squadron)**Fort Des Moines, Iowa**

Colonel Clarence Lininger, Commanding

Lieutenant Colonel N. Butler Briscoe

Major Joseph W. Geer

Captains

Royden Williamson	Robert M. Graham
Erskine A. Franklin	Mark A. Devine, Jr.
Wilkie C. Burt	Benjamin H. Graban
Henry H. Cheshire	Frank T. Turner
Daniel Becker	

First Lieutenants

Wilbur K. Noel	William J. Bradley
Harry D. Eckert	

Second Lieutenants

Harry J. Fleeger	Matthew W. Kane
Joseph H. O'Malley	

✓ ✓ ✓

1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry**Fort Sheridan, Illinois**

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Chamberlin, Commanding

Major Alton W. Howard

Captains

Charles W. Fake	Brock Putnam
Catesby ap C. Jones	Daniel B. Cullinane
Candler A. Wilkinson	

First Lieutenants

Lawrence G. Smith	Edwin C. Greiner
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Second Lieutenants

Jules V. Richardson	Harold L. Richey
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26th Cavalry**Fort Stotsenburg, P. I.**

Colonel E. Kearsley Sterling, Commanding

Lieutenant Robert M. Cheney

Majors

Gordon J. F. Heron	Melvin S. Williamson
Julian W. Cunningham	

Captains

Ernest F. Dukes	Byron E. Shirley
Halbert H. Neilson	Marcus E. Jones
Robert O. Wright	Morton McD. Jones
Alden H. Seabury	Joe C. Rogers
Lawrence G. Forsythe	Ernest A. Williams
Charles A. Horger	George J. Rawlins

First Lieutenants

Charles H. Valentine	Basil L. Riggs
Kevin O'Shea	Woodbury M. Burgess
Richard T. Willson	Lawrence R. Dewey
Wendell Blanchard	John L. Hitchings
Louis B. Rapp	Clyde Massey
Henry I. Hodes	Harrison W. Davison
Jesse B. Wells	Juan S. Moran (P.S.)
Charles V. Bromley, Jr.	Eustaquio S. Baclig (P.S.)
George P. Berilla, Jr.	

✓ ✓ ✓

102nd Cavalry**Newark, N. J.**

NEWARK, N. J., is the home of probably the only full-strength troop of cavalry composed of young boys in the country—the Junior Essex Troop—limited to 78 youngsters from eleven to sixteen years of age.

Organized in 1931 by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. K. Mattison, a Reserve officer and former member of the Essex Troop, the Junior Troop is sponsored by the 102nd Cavalry (Essex Troop) and enjoys the use of horses and armory of the regiment. Training of the Troop is under the direction of a board of officers of the 102nd Cavalry. Colonel Mattison is commandant, as well as head of the Parents Committee. First Sergeant Ernest Zobian, Troop B, 102nd Cavalry, a young trooper of great promise, is instructor. Mounted drills are held for two hours every Saturday morning, from September to June, supplemented by periods of foot drill and sub-caliber rifle practice. Uniform is regulation olive drab with campaign hat and yellow tie.

The personnel of the Troop is carefully selected and is from the best families of the New Jersey suburbs, largely from Montclair and the Oranges. Only boys of good scholastic standing are admitted, and no boy known to have mean or cowardly traits. Discipline is firm but kindly, and the youthful cavalrymen are noted for neatness, courtesy and military enthusiasm. The parents are delighted, and a well-known civil authority has pronounced the Troop one of the best boys' organizations in America. A list of over 150 applicants is eagerly awaiting vacancies that seldom occur, except when a boy goes away to school which most of them do at the age of about fifteen. All expect to go to college, two or three to West Point and many to R.O.T.C. institutions. All officers of the 102nd Cavalry from Colonel Lewis B. Ballantyne down see great possibilities in the Junior Troop, and it is expected that upon completing their education many of the boys will join the regiment.

The Troop has three cadet officers and all non-coms and specialists of a rifle troop. It is not armed but otherwise executes all movements of a regular troop. Flat saddles are used. The precision of drill and proficiency of equitation are remarkable. Colonel Ralph C. Tobin, 107th Infantry, recently reviewed the organization and as the platoons passed at a walk, trot and gallop to the music

of the fine mounted regimental band, he expressed amazement at the skill and ease of the young troopers.

The Junior Troop is represented at all nearby horse shows, including the National, and numerous trophies have been won.

On every Armistice Day and Memorial Day the Troop maintains an armed guard at the Montclair War Memorial in honor of 71 men of the town who died in the World War. General Pershing has shown much interest in the organization and is expected to review it in the near future.

305th Cavalry Philadelphia, Pa.

BEGINNING with the first conference on September 26th, members of the regiment have been very energetic and enthusiastic in the work of the new inactive training season. Attendance at all meetings is above average.

The new schedule provides not only many topics of general interest, but also embodies instructional subjects essential to the well-rounded education of cavalry officers and at the same time affords ample opportunity for every member to participate as an instructor.

Sunday, October 28th, the 305th Cavalry as the Advance Guard of the 62nd Cavalry Division moved out from the vicinity of Valley Forge Military Academy. The mission: Protection of the left flank of our lines which were moving to form battle lines north of Valley Forge Park; and to gain early contact with enemy cavalry reported moving south. The problem ended as the regiment took up a defensive position in the Park to prevent the crossing of the Schuylkill River by the enemy. This exercise contained sufficient tactical situations requiring solutions, allowed for some practice in map reading and indicated clearly the necessity for a thorough training and knowledge of cavalry marching. Some experience was also gained in avoiding detection from the air as a number of planes from the Pennsylvania National Guard and U. S. Naval Reserve participated.

Wednesday, noon, October 24th, at luncheon in the Art Club, Major General Leon B. Kromer, the Chief of Cavalry, gave an interesting and enlightening discussion on late developments in Cavalry organization. General Kromer had also a word of praise and encouragement for the work being carried on by the regiment. The turnout was large, and members of the regiment were honored and pleased by General Kromer's visit.

306th Cavalry Baltimore, Maryland

INACTIVE duty training started with the first conference on October 15, 1934, at the home of the Regimental Commander, Colonel J. B. P. Clayton Hill. There was an excellent turnout, two or three on C.C.C. duty coming in some miles, and everyone was well pleased

with the arrangement. There are three map problem rooms and one large conference room available.

The conference was preceded by a 50c dinner, both price and food pleasing to all.

Training schedules, programs and allied subjects were discussed, and the Unit Instructor reviewed an interesting article on Cavalry Pack Loads (by Lieutenant Yale in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL).

Second Squadron and Machine Gun Troop, 306th Cavalry Washington, D. C.

PLANs for an extensive program of conference and equitation classes under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Dagley, unit instructor, were formulated by the Second Squadron, 306th Cavalry, in Washington at the initial autumn meeting of the 1934-35 season on October 4.

Arrangements have been made to take full advantage of the facilities at nearby Fort Myer for the equitation classes, which will begin November 4.

Despite the fact that its headquarters are now located in the nation's capital, the Second Squadron, 306th Cavalry, failed to escape the economy wave that prevented officers from receiving active duty last summer. Like other officers, those of this organization felt the effects of Congressional retrenchment, and only nine officers were ordered to active duty for 14 days.

In the face of this situation, however, officers of the Second Squadron, 306th Cavalry, expect to concentrate on the unit conferences and equitation classes. They have reached the conclusion that the lack of funds for active duty training makes it essential that they take full advantage of the inactive training provided.

The necessity of serious "boning" on correspondence courses and equitation, however, has not prevented the formulation of plans for "social" activity. A dinner-dance will be held about the middle of December, and more will follow provided the less experienced survive the first classes in horsemanship.

307th Cavalry Richmond, Virginia

ON September 7th, Colonel Begg, our Commanding Officer, made a quick trip to Richmond from his CP at V.P.I. Eleven men greeted him for lunch at the Hotel Rueger.

On October 11th, the Richmond contingent had a dinner followed by an organization meeting. Twenty-four men were present. Major Schwenck passed the buck to Lieutenant Cosby, who carried on in a businesslike manner. At this dinner, the following committee was elected to guide the Richmond contingent in its activities:

First Lieutenants John Clifford Miller, Jr., Osmond

Tower Jamerson, Hope Cecil Miles, and William Temple Talman, and Second Lieutenant Jack Lindsey Epps, Jr., all of the 307th Cavalry.

During our camp at Fort Myer, the idea was born of having a regimental meeting at V.M.I. on Home-Coming Day. Lieutenant Montague improved on the initial idea by suggesting a dinner. He also put the dinner over very effectively. Twenty-eight men accepted and *paid in advance*. Some casualties, as could be expected on such a day, occurred. Believe it or not, Lieutenant Montague refunded.

This V.M.I. dinner was a great idea. General Lejeune, the Superintendent of the Institute, honored us with his presence. Other distinguished guests were Colonel Richard Foulke Berine, Sr., C.A.-Res., and Major Bertrand Morrow, Senior Cavalry Instructor, V.M.I. This dinner was much more serious than might have been expected. Many serious and potentially beneficial ideas were presented. The food was good, the talks short and a good time was had by all.

3d Squadron and Machine Gun Troop, 307th Cavalry Norfolk, Virginia

THE Unit Instructor, Major James R. Finley, Cavalry, who had been confined to Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., during the past several months has returned to duty with the Unit at Norfolk, Va.

The headquarters of the 3d Squadron and Machine Gun Troop, 307th Cavalry, has been moved from its old location at foot of Front St. (Fort Norfolk), to the new United States Post Office and Court House, Norfolk, Va., where commodious office and assembly hall have been provided.

The following graduates of the 1934 class at Virginia Military Institute, have been assigned to the Squadron and Machine Gun Troop:

Second Lieutenant Rufus G. Baldwin, Jr., Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Elmer E. Ebersole, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Taylor E. Carney, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Meyer R. Koteen, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant George P. Page, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Morton Riddle, III, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Edward J. Taylor, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Alvin B. Tillett, Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant James M. Nimmo, Jr., Cav.-Res.
Second Lieutenant Tully R. Wise, Cav.-Res.

308th Cavalry Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

THE Second Annual Pulaski Dinner given by the officers of the 308th Cavalry in honor of General Casimir Pulaski, the first Chief of Cavalry, was held at the Pittsburgh Athletic Association, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Thursday, October 11, 1934. The dinner was well at-

tended. United States Senator David A. Reed was the principal speaker.

An all-day ride was conducted on Sunday, October 28, 1934, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Shenkel in command. The total mileage covered was 32½ miles over various kinds of roads. Parts of the ride were conducted during a snowstorm. The following officers attended: Lieutenant Colonel John H. Shenkel, Major William S. Ernst, First Lieutenant Ronald L. Thompson, First Lieutenant Alexander O. Froede, First Lieutenant John R. McConnell, and two civilian riders.

The promotion of Captain William S. Ernst to Major and First Lieutenant Truman G. McMullan to Captain, is announced.

Two new officers, Second Lieutenant Albert K. Brown and Second Lieutenant J. Roy Degenhardt, have been assigned to this regiment.

862nd Field Artillery (62nd Cavalry Division) Baltimore, Maryland

THE inactive duty training period of the Regiment commences October 1, 1934, and extends through June 30, 1935.

Conferences will be held regularly on the first and third Thursdays of each month. Subjects of Gunnery, Tactics of the Combined Arms, Riot Duty, and Chemical Warfare, will be covered during these sessions. Pistol practice will be held in the target room, basement of the Post Office Building, on days which are announced in the Monthly Schedule.

The 862nd Field Artillery has been supplied with a Field Artillery Trainer, M2. This trainer consists of a miniature gun and a miniature carriage. They are issued and used in batteries of four trainers each, and are mounted on a firing platform. The trainer is designed for simulated field artillery training, including traversing, elevating, and angle of site setting. Provision is made for mounting the panoramic sight. Seats are provided on the cradle and rocker for the gunner's quadrant. The ammunition consists of a caliber .22 short blank cartridge as the propellant and a 1-inch steel ball as the projectile. A range of 150 yards is practicable. The range scale, however, is graduated to 90 yards, based on 1/100 of the range of the 75-mm. gun, M1897.

Arrangements are being made with the Commanding Officer, 110th Field Artillery, to utilize their riding hall for the use of this trainer on specified nights. It is hoped this trainer will furnish an opportunity to many officers to familiarize themselves with firing commands and both axial and lateral conduct of fire, prior to the active duty training.

66th Cavalry Division Kansas City, Missouri

THE 1934-35 fiscal school year got under way with a lecture by the acting chief of staff, 66th Cavalry Division, Major Harold Thompson, U. S. Cavalry, October

2, 1934. The growing attendance is encouraging and we look for an average attendance of over forty officers at the weekly conferences.

The group also pursues instruction accorded all reserve officers through Kansas City Chapter, R.O.A., whose weekly lectures, war games and conferences are in charge of Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Peek, F.A., coördinator of reserve activities. The instructors include the regular officers on duty here and members of the staff of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

Equitation and platoon drill is included in the weekly riding classes on Sunday mornings at Fort Leavenworth.

Forty-two reserve cavalry officers were afforded active duty training July 14-28, at Fort Riley. The provisional troop was commanded by Major T. C. Swanson, with Major W. A. Heap of Mulvane, Kansas, Major Harry Davis of Ames, Iowa, and Major H. D. Hughes of Lincoln, Nebraska, taking turns commanding in field problems, terrain exercises and map problems.

Despite the intense heat, all enjoyed the tour, and the following trainees voted their thanks to Major Thompson for "the most instructive tour of active duty," they ever had:

Majors

Thomas Clyde Swanson	William Andrew Heap
Harry Kimbal Davis	Hayden DeForrest Hughes

Captains

Edward M. Brown	Milton B. Leith
Valerius Hakanson	Clarence G. Swenson

First Lieutenants

Russell T. Boyle	Carl J. Meurer
Andrew E. Farrell	S. D. Slaughter, Jr.
Frank W. Guthrie	Forest C. Welliver
John K. Little	Howard Williams
Williams S. Mason	

Second Lieutenants

Maurice F. Anderson	George E. Hinz
Robert W. Andres	Joseph W. Hourihan
Richard T. Brewster	Albert M. Kirch
Orville W. Brown	Stanton G. Marquardt
Gilbert H. Clevidence	Millet V. O'Connell
Raymond Coward	Joseph J. Redden
James D. Clemens	Ernest C. Sanders
Henry L. DeLong	Lawrence B. Shallcross
Ernest M. Dennison	Peter Siegel
Robert V. Ely	Abbott A. Thomas, Jr.
William R. Emery	James F. S. Triplett
Leonard E. Engeman	Virgil R. Walker
Edward G. Hellier	

Professional Notes and Discussion Dull Knife

(Continued from page 66)

Thomas, in which it is stated that "greatly dissatisfied with their new home (at Fort Robinson, Neb.), an attempt was made by a large party under Dull Knife to

escape on the night of January 9, 1879, during which most of them, including Dull Knife, were killed."

Again, in *The Indians' Last Fight, or the Dull Knife Raid*, by Dennis Collins, on pages 259-60, it is stated that the Cheyenne Indians who had been taken as prisoners of war to Fort Robinson "were placed in the guardhouse and held there until New Year's night, 1879, when they broke out and made their escape." The narrative continues with the statement that, pursued by troops of the 3rd Cavalry, they were overtaken on the border of Wyoming, and a fight ensued. "When the smoke of battle cleared away . . . it was discovered that Dull Knife himself, his daughter, who was present, and about two-thirds of his followers, had all gone to the Happy Hunting Grounds together."

On the other hand, in Vol. I of the *Memoirs of the American Anthropological and Ethnological Societies*, on page 400, in a footnote to a paper by James Mooney, entitled, "Cheyenne Indians," it is declared that "according to the *Official Record of Engagements*, Dull Knife was killed in one of the encounters after the escape from Fort Robinson. This is denied by the Cheyenne, who assert he escaped to the Sioux, and according to a statement by the agent in charge at Pine Ridge it would appear that Dull Knife with a band of about 120 Cheyenne had been for some time residing at the agency until transferred to Fort Keogh, Montana, November, 1879."

So there are evidently a variety of versions of the mode of demise of the eminent Cheyenne chieftain, and Western historians have taken their choice. Had I been writing in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL primarily, instead of quite incidentally, on the subject of Dull Knife, I would have devoted the care to investigation and verification which should be devoted to a primary subject; as I did, for example, in my *Conquest of the Missouri*, relating to the Indian wars on the upper Missouri, which I believe Mr. Brininstool has at times used as an acceptable authority on that period. However, the matter does not particularly affect the military merits of Ranald Mackenzie, who, after all, terminated Dull Knife's career as an important leader, whether or not the Indian's earthly career was terminated at the same time.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH MILLS HANSON.

703 East Capitol Street,
Washington, D. C.

EDITOR'S NOTE. General W. C. Brown, U.S.A., Retired, has kindly called the editor's attention to a book, *Reminiscences of a Ranchman*, by Edgar Beecher Bronson, which has a long account of the wanderings of Dull Knife and his band in 1878 and 1879, while being pursued by U. S. troops. The following is an extract: "And among the Ogalalla Sioux thereafter, till he died, dwelt Dull Knife, grim and silent as Sphinx or dumb man; brooding over his wrongs; cursing the fate that had denied him the privilege to die fighting with his people; sitting alone daily for hours on the crest of a Wounded Knee bluff rising near his tepee, and gazing longingly across the wide reaches of the Bad Lands to a faint blue line, on the northwestern horizon, that marked his old highland home in the Black Hills."

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